HP.EE  DIALOGUES 

BETWEEN 

LAS  HND  PHILONOXJS 


BERKCLCY 


GEORGE   BERKELEY. 

(1685-1753.^ 
From  an  Engraving  by  T.  Cooke. 


THREE    DIALOGUES 


HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS 


GEORGE  BERKELEY 


REPRINT  EDITION 


CHICAGO 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

LONDON  AGENTS 

KEGAN  PAUL,  TRENCH,  TRUBNER  &  Co.,  LTD. 
1906 


Annex 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 


THE  bulk  of  the  introductory  matter  requisite  to  an  understand- 
ing of  Berkeley's  Three  Dialogues  Between  Hylas  and  Phi- 
lonous  has  already  been  given  in  the  Preface  to  his  Principles  of 
Human  Knowledge  (No.  48  of  the  Religion  of  Science  Library), 
which  is  supposed  to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  reader,  and  to  which 
he  is  referred.  It  remains  for  us  in  this  place  simply  to  supply  a 
few  general  characterisations  and  to  refer  again  to  Berkeley's  re- 


WHITEHALL,  DEAN  BERKELEY'S  RESIDENCE  IN  RHODE  ISLAND. 

lations  to  Hume  and  to  modern  psychology.  We  also  take  advan- 
tage of  this  opportunity  to  reproduce  two  illustrations  of  Berkeley's 
Rhode  Island  home,  which  will  impart  a  human  interest  to  our 
little  work,  and  bring  it  nearer  to  our  American  readers.  It  was 
in  Rhode  Island  that  Alcifhron  was  composed, — dialogues  "better 
fitted  than  any  in  our  language  to  enable  the  English  reader  to 
realise  the  charm  of  Cicero  and  Plato.  ...  In  Rhode  Island,  Ber- 


iv 


PREFACE. 


keley  was  accustomed  to  study  in  an  alcove  among  the  rocks  on 
that  magnificent  coast,  in  a  region  where  he  had  exchanged  the 
society  of  the  philosophers  and  men  of  letters  of  London  and  Paris 
for  a  solitude  occasionally  broken  by  the  unsophisticated  mission- 
aries of  the  New  England  plantations,  who  travelled  great  dis- 
tances to  converse  with  him."1 

The  Three  Dialogues  Between  ffylas  and  Philonous,  which 
were  first  published  in  London,  in  1713, 2  have  been  styled  by  Pro- 


BERKELEY'S  ALCOVE,  HANGING  ROCKS,  RHODE  ISLAND. 
In  this  alcove  parts  of  Alciphron  are  said  to  have  been  composed. 


fessor  Fraser  "the  gem  of  British  metaphysical  literature."     He 
says  :  ' '  Berkeley's  claim  to  be  the  great  modern  master  of  Socratic 

1  Quoted  from  Prof.  A.  Campbell  Eraser's  The  Works  of  George  Berkeley, 
four  volumes,  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1871.  The  illustrations  of  Berkeley's 
Rhode  Island  home  here  reproduced  have  also  been  taken  from  this  admir- 
able and  careful  work,  .which  is  the  authoritative  and  definitive  edition  of 
Berkeley's  writings,  and  to  which  the  reader  is  referred  for  an  exhaustive 
study  of  Berkeley's  philosophy  and  life. 

S  A  second  edition  appeared  in  1725 ;  a  third,  with  additions  in  1734.  This 
was  the  last  in  the  author's  life-time. 


PREFACE.  V 

dialogue  rests,  indeed,  upon  Alcifhron,  which  surpasses  the  con- 
versations between  Hylas  and  Philonous  in  expression  of  individ- 
ual character,  and  in  general  dramatic  effect.  Here  the  conversa- 
tional form  is  adopted  merely  as  a  convenient  way  of  treating  the 
chief  objections  to  the  theory  of  Matter  which  is  contained  in  the 
Principles  of  Human  Knowledge.  But  the  clearness  of  thought 
and  language,  the  occasional  coloring  of  fancy,  and  the  glow  of 
practical  human  sympathy  and  earnestness  that  pervade  the  subtle 
reasonings  by  which  the  fallacies  of  metaphysics  are  inexorably 
pursued  through  these  discussions,  place  the  following  Dialogues 
almost  alone  in  the  modern  metaphysical  library.  Among  those 
who  have  employed  the  English  language,  except  perhaps  Hume 
and  Ferrier,  none  approach  Berkeley  in  the  art  of  uniting  deep 
metaphysical  thought  and  ingenious  speculation  with  an  easy, 
graceful,  and  transparent  style.  Our  surprise  and  admiration  are 
increased  when  we  recollect  that  this  charming  production  of  rea- 
son and  imagination  came  from  Ireland,  at  a  time  when  that  coun- 
try was  scarcely  known  in  the  world  of  letters  and  philosophy." 

The  contents  of  the  three  Dialogues,  which  are  a  popular 
presentation  of  the  Principles,  and  were  written  in  refutation  of 
the  objections  that  had  been  raised  to  the  new  doctrine  of  sensible 
as  distinguished  from  absolute  things,  propounded  in  the  earlier 
work,  may  be  briefly  summarised  as  follows  : 

The  First  Dialogue  aims  to  show  the  repugnancy  or  contra- 
dictory nature  of  the  philosophical  dogma  of  the  absolute  existence 
of  a  material  reality  or  world-in-itself,  independent  of  a  perceiving 
or  conceiving  mind;  the  argument  being  that  under  no  circum- 
stances can  such  a  material  world  be  perceived  either  immediately 
or  mediately.  The  Second  Dialogue  seeks  to  show  that  the  exist- 
ence of  this  metaphysical,  supersensible  world  of  matter  also  can- 
not be  reached  by  inference,  that  is,  cannot  be  demonstrated.  The 
Third  Dialogue  is  devoted  to  the  refutation  of  objections;  for 
example,  that  the  new  doctrine  is  skeptical ;  that,  with  absolute 
material  substance,  it  also  implicitly  disproves  the  existence  of 
absolute  spiritual  substance,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  ego  ;  etc.,  etc. 

The  last-named  objection,  the  most  important  of  all.  was  an- 
swered by  Berkeley  in  a  passage  inserted  in  the  third  edition  (see 
page  93  et  seq.),  considered  by  Professor  Fraser  the  most  remark- 
able in  the  Dialogues,  but  in  our  opinion  one  of  the  weakest. 
Professor  Fraser  says:  "It  is,  by  anticipation,  Berkeley's  answer 
to  Hume's  application  of  the  objections  to  the  reality  and  possibil- 


VI  PREFACE. 

ity  of  Absolute  or  Unknown  Matter,  to  che  reality  and  possibility 
of  the  Ego  or  Self  of  which  we  are  aware  through  memory,  as 
identical  amid  the  changes  of  its  ideas  or  successive  states." 

As  a  fact,  Berkeley's  system  leads  logically  to  the  conclusion 
which  he  seeks  to  controvert  in  this  passage.  Hylas  truly  re- 
marks :  "Notwithstanding  all  you  have  said,  to  me  it  seems  that, 
according  to  your  own  way  of  thinking,  and  in  consequence  of  your 
own  principles,  it  should  follow  that  you  are  only  a  system  of 
floating  ideas,  without  any  substance  to  support  them.  Words  are 
not  to  be  used  without  a  meaning.  And,  as  there  is  no  more  mean- 
ing in  spiritual  Substance  than  in  material  Substance,  the  one  is 
to  be  exploded  as  well  as  the  other."  (Page  95.) 

Berkeley  answers:  "  How  often  must  I  repeat,  that  I  know  or 
am  convinced  of  my  own  being ;  and  that  /  myself  am  not  my 
ideas,  but  somewhat  else,  a  thinking,  active  principle  that  per- 
ceives, knows,  wills,  and  operates  about  ideas,"  etc.,  p.  95. 

Subjectively,  the  force  of  this  answer  depends  entirely  upon 
one's  personal  point  of  view.  But  the  fact  remains  that  both 
Hylas  and  Hume  have  been  upheld  by  modern  scientific  psychol- 
ogy1 in  their  rejection  of  an  ego-entity,  and  that  Berkeley  in  his 
contention  has  not.  Perhaps  this  is  the  only  element  lacking,  to 
have  made  Berkeley's  system  a  perfect  spiritualistic  theological 
monism.  Nevertheless,  its  beauty  and  consistency  reposed  entirely 
on  the  arbitrary  hypothesis  of  existence  in  God,  on  the  intervention 
of  a  deus  ex  machina,  and  it  stood  in  this  respect  on  the  same 
footing  and  met  the  same  destiny,  as  Malebranche's  Occasionalism 
and  Leibnitz's  Pre-established  Harmony. 

THOMAS  J.  McCoRMACK. 

LA  SALLE,  ILL. 

ISee  Ribot,  Dittafts  of  Personality,  Chicago,  The  Open  Court  Pub.  Co. 


THREE 

DIALOGUES 

BETWEEN 

Hylas  and  PMlonous. 

The  Defign  of  which 

Is  plainly  to  demonftrate  the  Reality  and 
Perfection  of  Humane  Knowlege,  the  In- 
corporeal Nature  of  the  Soul,  and  the  Im- 
mediate Providence  of  a  DEITY: 

In  Oppofition  to 

SCEPTICS  and  ATHEISTS 

ALSO, 

To  open  a  METHOD  for  rendering  the 
SCIENCES  more  eafy,  ufeful,  and 
compendious. 


By  George  Berkeley^  M.  A. 
Fellow  of  7r/#/Vy-College, 
Dublin. 


LONDON: 

Printed  by  G.  James,  for  HENRY  CLEMENTS, 
at  the  Half-Moon,  in  S.  Paul's  Church- 
yard. MDCCXIII. 


TO  THE  RIGHT  HONOURABLE 


THE 


LORD  BERKELEY  OF  STRATTON, 

MASTER  OF  THE  ROLLS  IN  THE   KINGDOM  OF  IRELAND, 

CHANCELLOR  OF  THE  DUCHY  OF  LANCASTER,  AND 

ONE  OF  THE  LORDS  OF  HER  MAJESTY'S  MOST 

HONOURABLE  PRIVY  COUNCIL. 

MY  LORD, 

The  virtue,  learning,  and  good  sense  which  are 
acknowledged  to  distinguish  your  character,  would 
tempt  me  to  indulge  myself  the  pleasure  men  natu- 
rally take  in  giving  applause  to  those  whom  they  es- 
teem and  honour:  and  it  should  seem  of  importance 
to  the  subjects  of  Great  Britain  that  they  knew  the 
eminent  share  you  enjoy  in  the  favour  of  your  sover- 
eign, and  the  honours  she  has  conferred  upon  you, 
have  not  been  owing  to  any  application  from  your 
lordship,  but  entirely  to  her  majesty's  own  thought, 
arising  from  a  sense  of  your  personal  merit,  and  an 
inclination  to  reward  it.  But,  as  your  name  is  pre- 
fixed to  this  treatise  with  an  intention  to  do  honour  to 
myself  alone,  I  shall  only  say  that  I  am  encouraged 
by  the  favour  you  have  treated  me  with,  to  address 
these  papers  to  your  lordship.  And  I  was  the  more 
ambitious  of  doing  this,  because  a  Philosophical  Trea- 


2  DEDICATION. 

tise  could  not  so  properly  be  addressed  to  any  one  as 
to  a  person  of  your  lordship's  character,  who,  to  your 
other  valuable  distinctions,  have  added  the  knowledge 
and  relish  of  Philosophy. 

I  am,  with  the  greatest  respect, 

My  Lord, 

Your  lordship's  most  obedient  and 
most  humble  servant, 

GEORGE  BERKELEY.1 

1  Not  published  in  the  third  edition,  of  1734. 


THE  PREFACE.1 

THOUGH  it  seems  the  general  opinion  of  the 
world,  no  less  than  the  design  of  nature  and 
providence,  that  the  end  of  speculation  be  Practice, 
or  the  improvement  and  regulation  of  our  lives  and 
actions ;  yet  those  who  are  most  addicted  to  specula- 
tive studies,  seem  as  generally  of  another  mind.  And, 
indeed,  if  we  consider  the  pains  that  have  been  taken 
to  perplex  the  plainest  things — that  distrust  of  the 
senses,  those  doubts  and  scruples,  those  abstractions 
and  refinements  that  occur  in  the  very  entrance  of  the 
sciences ;  it  will  not  seem  strange  that  men  of  leisure 
and  curiosity  should  lay  themselves  out  in  fruitless 
disquisitions,  without  descending  to  the  practical 
parts  of  life,  or  informing  themselves  in  the  more  ne- 
cessary and  important  parts  of  knowledge. 

Upon  the  common  principles  of  philosophers,  we 
are  not  assured  of  the  existence  of  things  from  their 
being  perceived.  And  we  are  taught  to  distinguish 
their  real  nature  from  that  which  falls  under  our  sen- 
ses. Hence  arises  Scepticism  and  Paradoxes.  It  is 
not  enough  that  we  see  and  feel,  that  we  taste  and 
smell  a  thing :  its  true  nature,  its  absolute  external 
entity,  is  still  concealed.  For,  though  it  be  the  fic- 
tion of  our  own  brain,  we  have  made  it  inaccessible 
to  all  our  faculties.  Sense  is  fallacious,  reason  defec- 

IThis  Preface  was  omitted  by  the  author  in  the  edition  of  1734. 


4  PREFACE. 

tive.  We  spend  our  lives  in  doubting  of  those  things 
which  other  men  evidently  know,  and  believing  those 
things  which  they  laugh  at  and  despise. 

In  order,  therefore,  to  divert  the  busy  mind  of 
man  from  vain  researches,  it  seemed  necessary  to  in- 
quire into  the  source  of  its  perplexities ;  and,  if  pos- 
sible, to  lay  down  such  Principles  as,  by  an  easy  so- 
lution of  them,  together  with  their  own  native  evi- 
dence, may  at  once  recommend  themselves  for  genuine 
to  the  mind,  and  rescue  it  from  those  endless  pursuits 
it  is  engaged  in.  Which  with  a  plain  demonstration 
of  the  Immediate  Providence  of  an  all-seeing  God, 
and  the  natural  Immortality  of  the  soul,  should  seem 
the  readiest  preparation,  as  well  as  the  strongest  mo- 
tive, to  the  study  and  practice  of  virtue. 

This  design  I  proposed  in  the  First  Part  of  a  trea- 
tise concerning  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  pub- 
lished in  the  year  1710.  But,  before  I  proceed  to 
publish  the  Second  Part,  I  thought  it  requisite  to 
treat  more  clearly  and  fully  of  certain  Principles  laid 
down  in  the  First,  and  to  place  them  in  a  new  light. 
Which  is  the  business  of  the  following  Dialogues. 

In  this  treatise,  which  does  not  presuppose  in  the 
reader  any  knowledge  of  what  was  contained  in  the 
former,  it  has  been  my  aim  to  introduce  the  notions  I 
advance  into  the  mind  in  the  most  easy  and  familiar 
manner ;  especially  because  they  carry  with  them  a 
great  opposition  to  the  prejudices  of  philosophers, 
which  have  so  far  prevailed  against  the  common  sense 
and  natural  notions  of  mankind. 

If  the  principles  which  I  here  endeavour  to  propa- 
gate are  admitted  for  true,  the  consequences  which,  I 
think,  evidently  flow  from  thence  are,  that  Atheism 
and  Scepticism  will  be  utterly  destroyed,  many  intri- 


PREFACE.  5 

cate  points  made  plain,  great  difficulties  solved,  sev- 
eral useless  parts  of  science  retrenched,  speculation 
referred  to  practice,  and  men  reduced  from  paradoxes 
to  common  sense. 

And,  although  it  may,  perhaps,  seem  an  uneasy 
reflexion  to  some  that,  when  they  have  taken  a  circuit 
through  so  many  refined  and  unvulgar  notions,  they 
should  at  last  come  to  think  like  other  men ;  yet,  me- 
thinks,  this  return  to  the  simple  dictates  of  nature, 
after  having  wandered  through  the  wild  mazes  of  phi- 
losophy, is  not  unpleasant.  It  is  like  coming  home 
from  a  long  voyage  :  a  man  reflects  with  pleasure  on 
the  many  difficulties  and  perplexities  he  has  passed 
through,  sets  his  heart  at  ease,  and  enjoys  himself 
with  more  satisfaction  for  the  future. 

As  it  was  my  intention  to  convince  Sceptics  and 
Infidels  by  reason,  so  it  has  been  my  endeavour 
strictly  to  observe  the  most  rigid  laws  of  reasoning. 
And,  to  an  impartial  reader,  I  hope  it  will  be  mani- 
fest that  the  sublime  notion  of  a  God,  and  the  com- 
fortable expectation  of  Immortality,  do  naturally  arise 
from  a  close  and  methodical  application  of  thought — 
whatever  may  be  the  result  of  that  loose,  rambling 
way,  not  altogether  improperly  termed  Free-thinking, 
by  certain  libertines  in  thought,  who  can  no  more  en- 
dure the  restraints  of  logic  than  those  of  religion  or 
government. 

It  will  perhaps  be  objected  to  my  design  that,  so 
far  as  it  tends  to  ease  the  mind  of  difficult  and  useless 
inquiries,  it  can  affect  only  a  few  speculative  persons ; 
but,  if  by  their  speculations  rightly  placed,  the  study 
of  morality  and  the  law  of  nature  were  brought  more 
into  fashion  among  men  of  parts  and  genius,  the  dis- 
couragements that  draw  to  Scepticism  removed,  the 


6  PREFACE. 

measures  of  right  and  wrong  accurately  denned,  and 
the  principles  of  Natural  Religion  reduced  into  regu- 
lar systems,  as  artfully  disposed  and  clearly  connected 
as  those  of  some  other  sciences :  there  are  grounds  to 
think  these  effects  would  not  only  have  a  gradual  in- 
fluence in  repairing  the  too  much  defaced  sense  of 
virtue  in  the  world ;  but  also,  by  showing  that  such 
parts  of  revelation  as  lie  within  the  reach  of  human 
inquiry  are  most  agreeable  to  right  reason,  would  dis- 
pose all  prudent,  unprejudiced  persons  to  a  modest 
and  wary  treatment  of  those  sacred  mysteries  which 
are  above  the  comprehension  of  our  faculties. 

It  remains  that  I  desire  the  reader  to  withhold  his 
censure  of  these  Dialogues  till  he  has  read  them 
through.  Otherwise  he  may  lay  them  aside,  in  a  mis- 
take of  their  design,  or  on  account  of  difficulties  or 
objections  which  he  would  find  answered  in  the  sequel. 
A  treatise  of  this  nature  would  require  to  be  once 
read  over  coherently,  in  order  to  comprehend  its  de- 
sign, the  proofs,  solution  of  difficulties,  and  the  con- 
nexion and  disposition  of  its  parts.  If  it  be  thought 
to  deserve  a  second  reading,  this,  I  imagine,  will 
make  the  entire  scheme  very  plain ;  especially  if  re- 
course be  had  to  an  Essay  I  wrote  some  years  since 
upon  Vision,  and  the  Treatise  concerning  the  Prin- 
ciples of  Human  Knowledge — wherein  divers  notions 
advanced  in  these  Dialogues  are  farther  pursued,  or 
placed  in  different  lights,  and  other  points  handled 
which  naturally  tend  to  confirm  and  illustrate  them. 


THREE  DIALOGUES 

BETWEEN   HYLAS  AND   PHILONOUS,  IN  OPPOSI- 
TION TO  SCEPTICS  AND  ATHEISTS 

THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

Philonous. 

GOOD  morning,  Hylas :  I  did  not  expect  to  find 
you  abroad  so  early. 

HyL  It  is  indeed  something  unusual;  but  my 
thoughts  were  so  taken  up  with  a  subject  I  was  dis- 
coursing of  last  night,  that  finding  I  could  not  sleep, 
I  resolved  to  rise  and  take  a  turn  in  the  garden. 

Phil.  It  happened  well,  to  let  you  see  what  inno- 
cent and  agreeable  pleasures  you  lose  every  morning. 
Can  there  be  a  pleasanter  time  of  the  day,  or  a  more 
delightful  season  of  the  year?  That  purple  sky,  those 
wild  but  sweet  notes  of  birds,  the  fragrant  bloom  upon 
the  trees  and  flowers,  the  gentle  influence  of  the  rising 
sun,  these  and  a  thousand  nameless  beauties  of  nature 
inspire  the  soul  with  secret  transports ;  its  faculties 
too  being  at  this  time  fresh  and  lively,  are  fit  for  these 
meditations,  which  the  solitude  of  a  garden  and  tran. 
quillity  of  the  morning  naturally  dispose  us  to.  But 
I  am  afraid  I  interrupt  your  thoughts  :  for  you  seemed 
very  intent  on  something. 

HyL  It  is  true,  I  was,  and  shall  be  obliged  to  you 
if  you  will  permit  me  to  go  on  in  the  same  vein ;  not 


8  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

that  I  would  by  any  means  deprive  myself  of  your 
company,  for  my  thoughts  always  flow  more  easily  in 
conversation  with  a  friend,  than  when  I  am  alone : 
but  my  request  is,  that  you  would  suffer  me  to  impart 
my  reflexions  to  you. 

Phil.  With  all  my  heart,  it  is  what  I  should  have 
requested  myself  if  you  had  not  prevented  me. 

Hyl.  I  was  considering  the  old  fate  of  those  men 
who  have  in  all  ages,  through  an  affectation  of  being 
distinguished  from  the  vulgar,  or  some  unaccountable 
turn  of  thought,  pretended  either  to  believe  nothing 
at  all,  or  to  believe  the  most  extravagant  things  in 
the  world.  This  however  might  be  borne,  if  their 
paradoxes  and  scepticism  did  not  draw  after  them 
some  consequences  of  general  disadvantage  to  man- 
kind. But  the  mischief  lieth  here  ;  that  when  men  of 
less  leisure  see  them  who  are  supposed  to  have  spent 
their  whole  time  in  the  pursuits  of  knowledge  pro- 
fessing an  entire  ignorance  of  all  things,  or  advancing 
such  notions  as  are  repugnant  to  plain  and  commonly 
received  principles,  they  will  be  tempted  to  entertain 
suspicions  concerning  the  most  important  truths,  which 
they  had  hitherto  held  sacred  and  unquestionable. 

Phil.  I  entirely  agree  with  you,  as  to  the  ill  ten- 
dency of  the  affected  doubts  of  some  philosophers, 
and  fantastical  conceits  of  others.  I  am  even  so  far 
gone  of  late  in  this  way  of  thinking,  that  I  have  quitted 
several  of  the  sublime  notions  I  had  got  in  their 
schools  for  vulgar  opinions.  And  I  give  it  you  on  my 
word,  since  this  revolt  from  metaphysical  notions,  to 
the  plain  dictates  of  nature  and  common  sense,  I  find 
my  understanding  strangely  enlightened,  so  that  I  can 
now  easily  comprehend  a  great  many  things  which 
before  were  all  mystery  and  riddle. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  9 

Hyl.  I  am  glad  to  find  there  was  nothing  in  the 
accounts  I  heard  of  you. 

Phil.   Pray,  what  were  those? 

Hyl.  You  were  represented  in  last  night's  conver- 
sation, as  one  who  maintained  the  most  extravagant 
opinion  that  ever  entered  into  the  mind  of  man,  to 
wit,  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  material  substance 
in  the  world. 

Phil.  That  there  is  no  such  thing  as  what  Philos- 
ophers call  material  substance,  I  am  seriously  per- 
suaded :  but,  if  I  were  made  to  see  anything  absurd 
or  sceptical  in  this,  I  should  then  have  the  same  rea- 
son to  renounce  this  that  I  imagine  I  have  now  to  re- 
ject the  contrary  opinion. 

Hyl.  What !  can  anything  be  more  fantastical, 
more  repugnant  to  common  sense,  or  a  more  manifest 
piece  of  Scepticism,  than  to  believe  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  matter? 

Phil.  Softly,  good  Hylas.  What  if  it  should  prove, 
that  you,  who  hold  there  is,  are,  by  virtue  of  that 
opinion,  a  greater  sceptic,  and  maintain  more  para- 
doxes and  repugnances  to  common  sense,  than  I  who 
believe  no  such  thing? 

Hyl.  You  may  as  soon  persuade  me,  the  part  is 
greater  than  the  whole,  as  that,  in  order  to  avoid  ab- 
surdity and  Scepticism,  I  should  ever  be  obliged  to 
give  up  my  opinion  in  this  point. 

Phil.  Well  then,  are  you  content  to  admit  that 
opinion  for  true,  which,  upon  examination,  shall  ap- 
pear most  agreeable  to  common  sense,  and  remote 
from  Scepticism? 

Hyl.  With  all  my  heart.  Since  you  are  for  raising 
disputes  about  the  plainest  things  in  nature,  I  am 
content  for  once  to  hear  what  you  have  to  say. 


IO  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

Phil.   Pray,  Hylas,  what  do  you  mean  by  a  sceptic? 

Hyl.  I  mean  what  all  men  mean,  one  that  doubts 
of  everything. 

Phil.  He  then  who  entertains  no  doubt  concerning 
some  particular  point,  with  regard  to  that  point  can- 
not be  thought  a  sceptic. 

Hyl.   I  agree  with  you. 

Phil.  Whether  doth  doubting  consist  in  embracing 
the  affirmative  or  negative  side  of  a  question? 

Hyl.  In  neither ;  for  whoever  understands  English 
cannot  but  know  that  doubting  signifies  a  suspense  be- 
tween both. 

Phil.  He  then  that  denieth  any  point,  can  no  more 
be  said  to  doubt  of  it,  than  he  who  affirmeth  it  with 
the  same  degree  of  assurance. 

Hyl.  True. 

Phil.  And,  consequently,  for  such  his  denial  is  no 
more  to  be  esteemed  a  sceptic  than  the  other. 

Hyl.   I  acknowledge  it. 

Phil.  How  cometh  it  to  pass  then,  Hylas,  that  you 
pronounce  me  a  sceptic,  because  I  deny  what  you 
affirm,  to  wit,  the  existence  of  Matter?  Since,  for 
aught  you  can  tell,  I  am  as  peremptory  in  my  denial, 
as  you  in  your  affirmation. 

Hyl.  Hold,  Philonous,  I  have  been  a  little  out  in 
my  definition ;  but  every  false  step  a  man  makes  in 
discourse  is  not  to  be  insisted  on.  I  said  indeed  that 
a  sceptic  was  one  who  doubted  of  everything ;  but  I 
should  have  added,  or  who  denies  the  reality  and 
truth  of  things. 

Phil.  What  things?  Do  you  mean  the  principles 
and  theorems  of  sciences?  But  these  you  know  are 
universal  intellectual  notions,  and  consequently  inde- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  TI 

pendent  of  Matter ;  the  denial  therefore  of  this  doth 
not  imply  the  denying  them. 

Hyl.  I  grant  it.  But  are  there  no  other  things? 
What  think  you  of  distrusting  the  senses,  of  denying 
the  real  existence  of  sensible  things,  or  pretending  to 
know  nothing  of  them.  Is  not  this  sufficient  to  de- 
nominate a  man  a  sceptic? 

Phil.  Shall  we  therefore  examine  which  of  us  it  is 
that  denies  the  reality  of  sensible  things,  or  professes 
the  greatest  ignorance  of  them ;  since,  if  I  take  you 
rightly,  he  is  to  be  esteemed  the  greatest  sceptic? 

Hyl.   That  is  what  I  desire. 

Phil.  What  mean  you  by  Sensible  Things? 

Hyl.  Those  things  which  are  perceived  by  the 
senses.  Can  you  imagine  that  I  mean  anything  else? 

Phil.  Pardon  me,  Hylas,  if  I  am  desirous  clearly 
to  apprehend  your  notions,  since  this  may  much 
shorten  our  inquiry.  Suffer  me  then  to  ask  you  this 
farther  question.  Are  those  things  only  perceived  by 
the  senses  which  are  perceived  immediately?  Or, 
may  those  things  properly  be  said  to  be  sensible  which 
are  perceived  mediately,  or  not  without  the  interven- 
tion of  others? 

Hyl.   I  do  not  sufficiently  understand  you. 

Phil.  In  reading  a  book,  what  I  immediately  per- 
ceive are  the  letters,  but  mediately,  or  by  means  of 
these,  are  suggested  to  my  mind  the  notions  of  God, 
virtue,  truth,  &c.  Now,  that  the  letters  are  truly 
,  sensible  things,  or  perceived  by  sense,  there  is  no 
doubt :  but  I  would  know  whether  you  take  the  things 
suggested  by  them  to  be  so  too. 

Hyl.  No,  certainly;  it  were  absurd  to  think  God  or 
virtue  sensible  things,  though  they  may  be  signified 


12  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

and  suggested  to  the  mind  by  sensible  marks,  with 
which  they  have  an  arbitrary  connexion. 

Phil.  It  seems  then,  that  by  sensible  things  you 
mean  those  only  which  can  be  perceived  immediately 
by  sense? 

Hyl.   Right. 

Phil.  Doth  it  not  follow  from  this,  that  though  I  see 
one  part  of  the  sky  red,  and  another  blue,  and  that 
my  reason  doth  thence  evidently  conclude  there  must 
be  some  cause  of  that  diversity  of  colours,  yet  that 
cause  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  sensible  thing,  or  per- 
ceived by  the  sense  of  seeing? 

Hyl.   It  doth. 

Phil.  In  like  manner,  though  I  hear  variety  of 
sounds,  yet  I  cannot  be  said  to  hear  the  causes  of 
those  sounds? 

Hyl.  You  cannot. 

Phil.  And  when  by  my  touch  I  perceive  a  thing  to 
be  hot  and  heavy,  I  cannot  say,  with  any  truth  or  pro- 
priety, that  I  feel  the  cause  of  its  heat  or  weight? 

Hyl.  To  prevent  any  more  questions  of  this  kind, 
I  tell  you  once  for  all,  that  by  sensible  things  I  mean 
those  only  which  are  perceived  by  sense,  and  that  in 
truth  the  senses  perceive  nothing  which  they  do  not 
perceive  immediately:  for  they  make  no  inferences. 
The  deducing  therefore  of  causes  or  occasions  from 
effects  and  appearances,  w*hich  alone  are  perceived 
by  sense,  entirely  relates  to  reason. 

Phil.  This  point  then  is  agreed  between  us — that 
sensible  things  are  those  only  which  are  immediately  per- 
ceived by  sense.  You  will  farther  inform  me,  whether 
we  immediately  perceive  by  sight  anything  beside 
light,  and  colours,  and  figures ;  or  by  hearing,  any- 
thing but  sounds ;  by  the  palate,  anything  beside 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  13 

tastes  ;  by  the  smell,  beside  odours ;  or  by  the  touch, 
more  than  tangible  qualities. 

Hyl.   We  do  not. 

Phil.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  if  you  take  away  all 
sensible  qualities,  there  remains  nothing  sensible? 

Hyl.    I  grant  it. 

Phil.  Sensible  things  therefore  are  nothing  else  but 
so  many  sensible  qualities,  or  combinations  of  sensible 
qualities? 

Hyl.   Nothing  else. 

Phil.   Heat  is  then  a  sensible  thing? 

Hyl.   Certainly. 

Phil.  Doth  the  reality  of  sensible  things  consist  in 
being  perceived?  or,  is  it  something  distinct  from 
their  being  perceived,  and  that  bears  no  relation  to 
the  mind? 

Hyl.  To  exist  is  one  thing,  and  to  be  perceived  is 
another. 

Phil.  I  speak  with  regard  to  sensible  things  only : 
and  of  these  I  ask,  whether  by  their  real  existence  you 
mean  a  subsistence  exterior  to  the  mind,  and  distinct 
from  their  being  perceived? 

Hyl.  I  mean  a  real  absolute  being,  distinct  from, 
and  without  any  relation  to  their  being  perceived. 

Phil.  Heat  therefore,  if  it  be  allowed  a  real  being, 
must  exist  without  the  mind? 

Hyl.   It  must. 

Phil.  Tell  me,  Hylas,  is  this  real  existence  equally 
compatible  to  all  degrees  of  heat,  which  we  perceive ; 
or  is  there  any  reason  why  we  should  attribute  it  to 
some,  and  deny  it  to  others?  and  if  there  be,  pray  let 
me  know  that  reason. 

Hyl.    Whatever  degree  of  heat   we   perceive    by 


14  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

sense,  we  may  be  sure  the  same  exists  in  the  object 
that  occasions  it. 

Phil.  What !  the  greatest  as  well  as  the  least? 

Hyl.  I  tell  you,  the  reason  is  plainly  the  same  in 
respect  of  both :  they  are  both  perceived  by  sense  ; 
nay,  the  greater  degree  of  heat  is  more  sensibly  per- 
ceived ;  and  consequently,  if  there  is  any  difference, 
we  are  more  certain  of  its  real  existence  than  we  can 
be  of  the  reality  of  a  lesser  degree. 

Phil.  But  is  not  the  most  vehement  and  intense 
degree  of  heat  a  very  great  pain? 

Hyl.     No  one  can  deny  it. 

Phil.  And  is  any  unperceiving  thing  capable  of 
pain  or  pleasure? 

Hyl.   No  certainly. 

Phil.  Is  your  material  substance  a  senseless  being, 
or  a  being  endowed  with  sense  and  perception? 

Hyl.   It  is  senseless  without  doubt. 

Phil.   It  cannot  therefore  be  the  subject  of  pain? 

Hyl.   By  no  means. 

Phil.  Nor  consequently  of  the  greatest  heat  per- 
ceived by  sense,  since  you  acknowledge  this  to  be  no 
small  pain? 

Hyl.   I  grant  it. 

Phil.  What  shall  we  say  then  of  your  external  ob- 
ject ;  is  it  a  material  Substance,  or  no? 

Hyl.  It  is  a  material  substance  with  the  sensible 
qualities  inhering  in  it. 

Phil.  How  then  can  a  great  heat  exist  in  it,  since 
you  own  it  cannot  in  a  material  substance?  I  desire 
you  would  clear  this  point. 

Hyl.  Hold,  Philonous,  I  fear  I  was  out  in  yielding 
intense  heat  to  be  a  pain.  It  should  seem  rather, 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  15 

that  pain  is  something  distinct  from  heat,  and  the 
consequence  or  effect  of  it. 

Phil.  Upon  putting  your  hand  near  the  fire,  do 
you  perceive  one  simple  uniform  sensation,  or  two 
distinct  sensations? 

Hyl,   But  one  simple  sensation. 

Phil.   Is  not  the  heat  immediately  perceived? 

Hyl.   It  is. 

Phil.   And  the  pain? 

Hyl.   True. 

Phil.  Seeing  therefore  they  are  both  immediately 
perceived  at  the  same  time,  and  the  fire  affects  you 
only  with  one  simple,  or  uncompounded  idea,  it  fol- 
lows that  this  same  simple  idea  is  both  the  intense 
heat  immediately  perceived,  and  the  pain ;  and,  con- 
sequently, that  the  intense  heat  immediately  per- 
ceived, is  nothing  distinct  from  a  particular  sort  of 
pain. 

Hyl.    It  seems  so. 

Phil.  Again,  try  in  your  thoughts,  Hylas,  if  you 
can  conceive  a  vehement  sensation  to  be  without  pain 
or  pleasure. 

Hyl.    I  cannot. 

Phil.  Or  can  you  frame  to  yourself  an  idea  of  sen- 
sible pain  or  pleasure,  in  general,  abstracted  from 
every  particular  idea  of  heat,  cold,  tastes,  smells?  &c. 

Hyl.   I  do  not  find  that  I  can. 

Phil.  Doth  it  not  therefore  follow,  that  sensible 
pain  is  nothing  distinct  from  those  sensations  or  ideas, 
— in  an  intense  degree? 

Hyl.  It  is  undeniable ;  and,  to  speak  the  truth,  I 
begin  to  suspect  a  very  great  heat  cannot  exist  but  in 
a  mind  perceiving  it. 


l6  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

Phil.  What!  are  you  then  in  that  sceptical  state  of 
suspense,  between  affirming  and  denying? 

HyL  I  think  I  may  be  positive  in  the  point.  A 
very  violent  and  painful  heat  cannot  exist  without  the 
mind. 

Phil.  It  hath  not  therefore,  according  to  you,  any 
real  being? 

Hyl.    I  own  it. 

Phil.  Is  it  therefore  certain,  that  there  is  no  body 
in  nature  really  hot? 

Hyl.  I  have  not  denied  there  is  any  real  heat  in 
bodies.  I  only  say,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  in- 
tense real  heat. 

Phil.  But,  did  you  not  say  before  that  all  degrees 
of  heat  were  equally  real ;  or,  if  there  was  any  differ- 
ence, that  the  greater  were  more  undoubtedly  real 
than  the  lesser? 

Hyl.  True :  but  it  was  because  I  did  not  then  con- 
sider the  ground  there  is  for  distinguishing  between 
them,  which  I  now  plainly  see.  And  it  is  this  : — be- 
cause intense  heat  is  nothing  else  but  a  particular 
kind  of  painful  sensation ;  and  pain  cannot  exist  but 
in  a  perceiving  being ;  it  follows  that  no  intense  heat 
can  really  exist  in  an  unperceiving  corporeal  sub- 
stance. But  this  is  no  reason  why  we  should  deny 
heat  in  an  inferior  degree  to  exist  in  such  a  substance. 

Phil.  But  how  shall  we  be  able  to  discern  those 
degrees  of  heat  which  exist  only  in  the  mind  from 
those  which  exist  without  it? 

Hyl.  That  is  no  difficult  matter.  You  know  the 
least  pain  cannot  exist  unperceived ;  whatever,  there- 
fore, degree  of  heat  is  a  pain  exists  only  in  the  mind. 
But,  as  for  all  other  degrees  of  heat,  nothing  obliges 
us  to  think  the  same  of  them. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  17 

Phil.  I  think  you  granted  before  that  no  unper- 
ceiving  being  was  capable  of  pleasure,  any  more  than 
of  pain. 

Hyl.   I  did. 

Phil.  And  is  not  warmth,  or  a  more  gentle  degree 
of  heat  than  what  causes  uneasiness,  a  pleasure? 

Hyl.   What  then? 

Phil.  Consequently,  it  cannot  exist  without  the 
mind  in  an  unperceiving  substance,  or  body. 

Hyl.   So  it  seems. 

Phil.  Since,  therefore,  as  well  those  degrees  of 
heat  that  are  not  painful,  as  those  that  are,  can  exist 
only  in  a  thinking  substance;  may  we  not  conclude 
that  external  bodies  are  absolutely  incapable  of  any 
degree  of  heat  whatsoever? 

Hyl.  On  second  thoughts,  I  do  not  think  it  is  so 
evident  that  warmth  is  a  pleasure,  as  that  a  great  de- 
gree of  heat  is  a  pain. 

Phil.  I  do  not  pretend  that  warmth  is  as  great  a 
pleasure  as  heat  is  a  pain.  But,  if  you  grant  it  to  be 
even  a  small  pleasure,  it  serves  to  make  good  my 
conclusion. 

Hyl.  I  could  rather  call  it  an  indolence.  It  seems 
to  be  nothing  more  than  a  privation  of  both  pain  and 
pleasure.  And  that  such  a  quality  or  state  as  this 
may  agree  to  an  unthinking  substance,  I  hope  you 
will  not  deny. 

Phil.  If  you  are  resolved  to  maintain  that  warmth, 
or  a  gentle  degree  of  heat,  is  no  pleasure,  I  know  not 
how  to  convince  you  otherwise,  than  by  appealing  to 
your  own  sense.  But  what  think  you  of  cold? 

Hyl.  The  same  that  I  do  of  heat.  An  intense  de- 
gree of  cold  is  a  pain  ;  for  to  feel  a  very  great  cold,  is 
to  perceive  a  great  uneasiness :  it  cannot  therefore 


l8  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

exist  without  the  mind ;  but  a  lesser  degree  of  cold 
may,  as  well  as  a  lesser  degree  of  heat. 

Phil.  Those  bodies,  therefore,  upon  whose  appli- 
cation to  our  own,  we  perceive  a  moderate  degree  of 
heat,  must  be  concluded  to  have  a  moderate  degree 
of  heat  or  warmth  in  them ;  and  those,  upon  whose 
application  we  feel  a  like  degree  of  cold,  must  be 
thought  to  have  cold  in  them. 

Hyl.  They  must. 

Phil.  Can  any  doctrine  be  true  that  necessarily 
leads  a  man  into  an  absurdity? 

Hyl.  Without  doubt  it  cannot. 

Phil.  Is  it  not  an  absurdity  to  think  that  the  same 
thing  should  be  at  the  same  time  both  cold  and  warm? 

Hyl.   It  is. 

Phil.  Suppose  now  one  of  your  hands  hot,  and 
the  other  cold,  and  that  they  are  both  at  once  put 
into  the  same  vessel  of  water,  in  an  intermediate 
state ;  will  not  the  water  seem  cold  to  one  hand,  and 
warm  to  the  other? 

Hyl.   It  will. 

Phil.  Ought  we  not  therefore,  by  our  principles, 
to  conclude  it  is  really  both  cold  and  warm  at  the 
same  time,  that  is,  according  to  your  own  concession, 
to  believe  an  absurdity? 

Hyl.   I  confess  it  seems  so. 

Phil.  Consequently,  the  principles  themselves  are 
false,  since  you  have  granted  that  no  true  principle 
leads  to  an  absurdity. 

Hyl.  But,  after  all,  can  anything  be  more  absurd 
than  to  say,  there  is  no  heat  in  the  fire? 

Phil.  To  make  the  point  still  clearer ;  tell  me 
whether,  in  two  cases  exactly  alike,  we  ought  not  to 
make  the  same  judgment? 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  IQ 

Hyl.   We  ought. 

Phil.  When  a  pin  pricks  your  finger,  doth  it  not 
rend  and  divide  the  fibres  of  your  flesh? 

Hyl.   It  doth. 

Phil.  And  when  a  coal  burns  your  finger,  doth  it 
any  more  ? 

Hyl.   It  doth  not. 

Phil.  Since,  therefore,  you  neither  judge  the  sen- 
sation itself  occasioned  by  the  pin,  nor  anything  like 
it  to  be  in  the  pin ;  you  should  not,  conformably  to 
what  you  have  now  granted,  judge  the  sensation  oc- 
casioned by  the  fire,  or  anything  like  it,  to  be  in  the 
fire. 

Hyl.  Well,  since  it  must  be  so,  I  am  content  to 
yield  this  point,  and  acknowledge  that  heat  and  cold 
are  only  sensations  existing  in  our  minds.  But  there 
still  remain  qualities  enough  to  secure  the  reality  of 
external  things. 

Phil.  But  what  will  you  say,  Hylas,  if  it  shall  ap- 
pear that  the  case  is  the  same  with  regard  to  all  other 
sensible  qualities,  and  that  they  can  no  more  be  sup- 
posed to  exist  without  the  mind,  than  heat  and  cold? 

Hyl.  Then  indeed  you  will  have  done  something 
to  the  purpose  ;  but  that  is  what  I  despair  of  seeing 
proved. 

Phil.  Let  us  examine  them  in  order.  What  think 
you  of  tastes — do  they  exist  without  the  mind,  or  no? 

Hyl.  Can  any  man  in  his  senses  doubt  whether 
sugar  is  sweet,  or  wormwood  bitter? 

Phil.  Inform  me,  Hylas.  Is  a  sweet  taste  a  par- 
ticular kind  of  pleasure  or  pleasant  sensation,  or  is  it 
not? 

Hyl.   It  is. 


20  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

Phil.  And  is  not  bitterness  some  kind  of  uneasi- 
ness or  pain  ? 

Hyl.   I  grant  it. 

'Phil.  If  therefore  sugar  and  wormwood  are  un- 
thinking corporeal  substances  existing  without  the 
mind,  how  can  sweetness  and  bitterness,  that  is,  pleas- 
ure and  pain,  agree  to  them? 

Hyl.  Hold,  Philonous,  I  now  see  what  it  was  de- 
luded me  all  this  time.  You  asked  whether  heat  and 
cold,  sweetness  and  bitterness,  were  not  particular 
sorts  of  pleasure  and  pain  ;  to  which  I  answered  sim- 
ply, that  they  were.  Whereas  I  should  have  thus 
distinguished : — those  qualities,  as  perceived  by  us, 
are  pleasures  or  pains ;  but  not  as  existing  in  the  ex- 
ternal objects.  We  must  not  therefore  conclude  ab- 
solutely, that  there  is  no  heat  in  the  fire,  or  sweetness 
in  the  sugar,  but  only  that  heat  or  sweetness,  as  per- 
ceived by  us,  are  not  in  the  fire  or  sugar.  What  say 
you  to  this? 

Phil.  I  say  it  is  nothing  to  the  purpose.  Our 
discourse  proceeded  altogether  concerning  sensible 
things,  which  you  defined  to  be,  the  things  we  imme- 
diately perceive  by  our  senses.  Whatever  other  quali- 
ties, therefore,  you  speak  of,  as  distinct  from  these,  I 
know  nothing  of  them,  neither  do  they  at  all  belong 
to  the  point  in  dispute.  You  may,  indeed,  pretend  to 
have  discovered  certain  qualities  which  you  do  not 
perceive,  and  assert  those  insensible  qualities  exist  in 
fire  and  sugar.  But  what  use  can  be  made  of  this  to 
your  present  purpose,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  conceive.  Tell 
me  then  once  more,  do  you  acknowledge  that  heat 
and  cold,  sweetness  and  bitterness  (meaning  those 
qualities  which  are  perceived  by  the  senses),  do  not 
exist  without  the  mind  ? 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  21 

HyL  I  see  it  is  to  no  purpose  to  hold  out,  so  I  give 
up  the  cause  as  to  those  mentioned  qualities.  Though 
I  profess  it  sounds  oddly,  to  say  that  sugar  is  not 
sweet. 

Phil.  But,  for  your  farther  satisfaction,  take  this 
along  with  you:  that  which  at  other  times  seems  sweet, 
shall,  to  a  distempered  palate,  appear  bitter.  And, 
nothing  can  be  plainer  than  that  divers  persons  per- 
ceive different  tastes  in  the  same  food ;  since  that 
which  one  man  delights  in,  another  abhors.  And  how 
could  this  be,  if  the  taste  was  something  really  in- 
herent in  the  food? 

HyL    I  acknowledge  I  know  not  how. 

Phil.  In  the  next  place,  odours  are  to  be  consid- 
ered. And,  with  regard  to  these,  I  would  fain  know 
whether  what  has  been  said  of  tastes  doth  not  exactly 
agree  to  them?  Are  they  not  so  many  pleasing  or  dis- 
pleasing sensations? 

HyL  They  are. 

Phil.  Can  you  then  conceive  it  possible  that  they 
should  exist  in  an  unperceiving  thing? 

HyL    I  cannot. 

Phil,  Or,  can  you  imagine  that  filth  and  ordure 
affect  those  brute  animals  that  feed  on  them  out  of 
choice,  with  the  same  smells  which  we  perceive  in 
them? 

HyL   By  no  means. 

Phil.  May  we  not  therefore  conclude  of  smells,  as 
of  the  other  forementioned  qualities,  that  they  cannot 
exist  in  any  but  a  perceiving  substance  or  mind. 

HyL    I  think  so. 

Phil.  Then  as  to  sounds,  what  must  we  think  of 
them :  are  they  accidents  really  inherent  in  external 
bodies,  or  not? 


22  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

Hyl.  That  they  inhere  not  in  the  sonorous  bodies 
is  plain  from  hence;  because  a  bell  struck  in  the  ex- 
hausted receiver  of  an  air-pump  sends  forth  no  sound. 
The  air,  therefore,  must  be  thought  the  subject  of 
sound. 

Phil.  What  reason  is  there  for  that,  Hylas  ? 

Hyl.  Because,  when  any  motion  is  raised  in  the 
air,  we  perceive  a  sound  greater  or  lesser,  according 
to  the  air's  motion  ;  but  without  some  motion  in  the 
air,  we  never  hear  any  sound  at  all. 

Phil.  And  granting  that  we  never  hear  a  sound 
but  when  some  motion  is  produced  in  the  air,  yet  I 
do  not  see  how  you  can  infer  from  thence,  that  the 
sound  itself  is  in  the  air. 

Hyl.  It  is  this  very  motion  in  the  external  air  that 
produces  in  the  mind  the  sensation  of  sound.  For, 
striking  on  the  drum  of  the  ear,  it  causeth  a  vibra- 
tion, which  by  the  auditory  nerves  being  communi- 
cated to  the  brain,  the  soul  is  thereupon  affected  with 
the  sensation  called  sound. 

Phil.  What !  is  sound  then  a  sensation  ? 

Hyl.  I  tell  you,  as  perceived  by  us,  it  is  a  partic- 
ular sensation  in  the  mind. 

Phil.  And  can  any  sensation  exist  without  the 
mind? 

Hyl.   No,  certainly. 

Phil.  How  then  can  sound,  being  a  sensation,  ex- 
ist in  the  air,  if  by  the  air  you  mean  a  senseless  sub- 
stance existing  without  the  mind? 

Hyl.  You  must  distinguish,  Philonous,  between 
sound  as  it  is  perceived  by  us,  and  as  it  is  in  itself; 
or  (which  is  the  same  thing)  between  the  sound  we 
immediately  perceive,  and  that  which  exists  without 
us.  The  former,  indeed,  is  a  particular  kind  of  sen- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHlLONOUS.  23 

sation,  but  the  latter  is  merely  a  vibrative  or  undula- 
tory  motion  in  the  air. 

Phil.  I  thought  I  had  already  obviated  that  dis- 
tinction, by  the  answer  I  gave  when  you  were  apply- 
ing it  in  a  like  case  before.  But,  to  say  no  more  of 
that,  are  you  sure  then  that  sound  is  really  nothing 
but  motion? 

Hyl.   I  am. 

Phil.  Whatever  therefore  agrees  to  real  sound, 
may  with  truth  be  attributed  to  motion? 

Hyl.   It  may. 

Phil.  It  is  then  good  sense  to  speak  of  motion  as 
of  a  thing  that  is  loud,  sweet,  acute,  or  grave. 

Hyl.  I  see  you  are  resolved  not  to  understand  me. 
Is  it  not  evident  those  accidents  or  modes  belong 
only  to  sensible  sound,  or  sound  in  the  common  ac- 
ceptation of  the  word,  but  not  to  sound  in  the  real  and 
philosophic  sense ;  which,  as  I  just  now  told  you,  is 
nothing  but  a  certain  motion  of  the  air? 

Phil.  It  seems  then  there  are  two  sorts  of  sound — 
the  one  vulgar,  or  that  which  is  heard,  the  other  phi- 
losophical and  real? 

Hyl.   Even  so. 

Phil.  And  the  latter  consists  in  motion? 

Hyl.   I  told  you  so  before. 

Phil.  Tell  me,  Hylas,  to  which  of  the  senses,  think 
you,  the  idea  of  motion  belongs?  to  the  hearing? 

Hyl.  No,  certainly ;  but  to  the  sight  and  touch. 

Phil.  It  should  follow  then,  'that,  according  to 
you,  real  sounds  may  possibly  be  seen  or  felt,  but 
never  heard. 

Hyl.  Look  you,  Philonous,  you  may,  if  you  please, 
make  a  jest  of  my  opinion,  but  that  will  not  alter  the 
truth  of  things.  I  own,  indeed,  the  inferences  you 


24  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

draw  me  into,  sound  something  oddly ;  but  common 
language,  you  know,  is  framed  by,  and  for  the  use  of 
the  vulgar :  we  must  not  therefore  wonder,  if  expres- 
sions adapted  to  exact  philosophic  notions  seem  un- 
couth and  out  of  the  way. 

Phil.  Is  it  come  to  that?  I  assure  you,  I  imagine 
myself  to  have  gained  no  small  point,  since  you  make 
so  light  of  departing  from  common  phrases  and  opin- 
ions ;  it  being  a  main  part  of  our  inquiry,  to  examine 
whose  notions  are  widest  of  the  common  road,  and 
most  repugnant  to  the  general  sense  of  the  world. 
But,  can  you  think  it  no  more  than  a  philosophical 
paradox,  to  say  that  real  sounds  are  never  heard,  and 
that  the  idea  of  them  is  obtained  by  some  other  sense? 
And  is  there  nothing  in  this  contrary  to  nature  and 
the  truth  of  things? 

Hyl.  To  deal  ingenuously,  I  do  not  like  it.  And, 
after  the  concessions  already  made,  I  had  as  well 
grant  that  sounds  too  have  no  real  being  without  the 
mind. 

Phil.  And  I  hope  you  will  make  no  difficulty  to 
acknowledge  the  same  of  colours. 

Hyl.  Pardon  me :  the  case  of  colours  is  very  dif- 
ferent. Can  anything  be  plainer  than  that  we  see 
them  on  the  objects? 

Phil.  The  objects  you  speak  of  are,  I  suppose, 
corporeal  Substances  existing  without  the  mind? 

Hyl.  They  are. 

Phil.  And  have  true  and  real  colours  inhering  in 
them? 

Hyl.  Each  visible  object  hath  that  colour  which 
we  see  in  it. 

Phil.  How!  is  there  anything  visible  but  what  we 
perceive  by  sight? 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  25 

Hyl.   There  is  not. 

Phil.  And,  do  we  perceive  anything  by  sense  which 
we  do  not  perceive  immediately? 

Hyl.  How  often  must  I  be  obliged  to  repeat  the 
same  thing?  I  tell  you,  we  do  not. 

Phil.  Have  patience,  good  Hylas ;  and  tell  me 
once  more,  whether  there  is  anything  immediately 
perceived  by  the  senses,  except  sensible  qualities.  I 
know  you  asserted  there  was  not ;  but  I  would  now 
be  informed,  whether  you  still  persist  in  the  same 
opinion. 

Hyl.    I  do. 

Phil.  Pray,  is  your  corporeal  substance  either  a 
sensible  quality,  or  made  up  of  sensible  qualities? 

Hyl.  What  a  question  that  is  !  who  ever  thought 
it  was? 

Phil.  My  reason  for  asking  was,  because  in  saying, 
each  visible  object  hath  that  colour  which  we  see  in  it, 
you  make  visible  objects  to  be  corporeal  substances ; 
which  implies  either  that  corporeal  substances  are 
sensible  qualities,  or  else  that  there  is  something  be- 
side sensible  qualities  perceived  by  sight :  but,  as 
this  point  was  formerly  agreed  between  us,  and  is  still 
maintained  by  you,  it  is  a  clear  consequence,  that 
your  corporeal  substance  is  nothing  distinct  from  sen- 
sible qualities. 

Hyl.  You  may  draw  as  many  absurd  consequences 
as  you  please,  and  endeavour  to  perplex  the  plainest 
things ;  but  you  shall  never  persuade  me  out  of  my 
senses.  I  clearly  understand  my  own  meaning. 

Phil.  I  wish  you  would  make  me  understand  it 
too.  But,  since  you  are  unwilling  to  have  your  notion 
of  corporeal  substance  examined,  I  shall  urge  that 
point  no  farther.  Only  be  pleased  to  let  me  know, 


26  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

whether  the  same  colours  which  we  see  exist  in  exter- 
nal bodies,  or  some  other. 

Hyl.   The  very  same. 

Phil.  What!  are  then  the  beautiful  red  and  purple 
we  see  on  yonder  clouds  really  in  them?  Or  do  you 
imagine  they  have  in  themselves  any  other  form  than 
that  of  a  dark  mist  or  vapour? 

Hyl.  I  must  own,  Philonous,  those  colours  are  not 
really  in  the  clouds  as  they  seem  to  be  at  this  dis- 
tance. They  are  only  apparent  colours. 

Phil.  Apparent  call  you  them?  how  shall  we  dis- 
tinguish these  apparent  colours  from  real  ? 

Hyl.  Very  easily.  Those  are  to  be  thought  ap- 
parent which,  appearing  only  at  a  distance,  vanish 
upon  a  nearer  approach. 

Phil.  And  those,  I  suppose,  are  to  be  thought  real 
which  are  discovered  by  the  most  near  and  exact  sur- 
vey. 

Hyl.   Right. 

Phil.  Is  the  nearest  and  exactest  survey  made  by 
the  help  of  a  microscope,  or  by  the  naked  eye? 

Hyl.  By  a  microscope,  doubtless. 

Phil.  But  a  microscope  often  discovers  colours  in 
an  object  different  from  those  perceived  by  the  unas- 
sisted sight.  And,  in  case  we  had  microscopes  mag- 
nifying to  any  assigned  degree,  it  is  certain  that  no 
object  whatsoever,  viewed  through  them,  would  ap- 
pear in  the  same  colour  which  it  exhibits  to  the  naked 
eye. 

Hyl.  And  what  will  you  conclude  from  all  this? 
You  cannot  argue  that  there  are  really  and  naturally 
no  colours  on  objects :  because  by  artificial  manage- 
ments they  may  be  altered,  or  made  to  vanish. 

Phil.   I  think  it  may  evidently  be  concluded  from 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  27 

your  own  concessions,  that  all  the  colours  we  see  with 
our  naked  eyes  are  only  apparent  as  those  on  the 
clouds,  since  they  vanish  upon  a  more  close  and  ac- 
curate inspection  which  is  afforded  us  by  a  micro- 
scope. Then,  as  to  what  you  say  by  way  of  preven- 
tion :  I  ask  you  whether  the  real  and  natural  state  of 
an  object  is  better  discovered  by  a  very  sharp  and 
piercing  sight,  or  by  one  which  is  less  sharp? 

Hyl.  By  the  former  without  doubt. 

Phil,  Is  it  not  plain  from  Dioptrics  that  micro- 
scopes make  the  sight  more  penetrating,  and  repre- 
sent objects  as  they  would  appear  to  the  eye  in  case 
it  were  naturally  endowed  with  a  most  exquisite  sharp- 
ness? 

Hyl   It  is. 

Phil.  Consequently  the  microscopical  representa- 
tion is  to  be  thought  that  which  best  sets  forth  the 
real  nature  of  the  thing,  or  what  it  is  in  itself.  The 
colours,  therefore,  by  it  perceived  are  more  genuine 
and  real  than  those  perceived  otherwise. 

Hyl.   I  confess  there  is  something  in  what  you  say. 

Phil.  Besides,  it  is  not  only  possible  but  manifest, 
that  there  actually  are  animals  whose  eyes  are  by  na- 
ture framed  to  perceive  those  things  which  by  reason 
of  their  minuteness  escape  our  sight.  What  think 
you  of  those  inconceivably  small  animals  perceived 
by  glasses?  must  we  suppose  they  are  all  stark  blind? 
Or,  in  case  they  see,  can  it  be  imagined  their  sight 
hath  not  the  same  use  in  preserving  their  bodies  from 
injuries,  which  appears  in  that  of  all  other  animals? 
And  if  it  hath,  is  it  not  evident  they  must  see  particles 
less  than  their  own  bodies,  which  will  present  them 
with  a  far  different  view  in  each  object  from  that 
which  strikes  our  senses?  Even  our  own  eyes  do  not 


28  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

always  represent  objects  to  us  after  the  same  manner. 
In  the  jaundice  every  one  knows  that  all  things  seem 
yellow.  Is  it  not  therefore  highly  probable  those  ani- 
mals in  whose  eyes  we  discern  a  very  different  texture 
from  that  of  ours,  and  whose  bodies  abound  with  dif- 
ferent humours,  do  not  see  the  same  colours  in  every 
object  that  we  do?  From  all  which,  should  it  not 
seem  to  follow  that  all  colours  are  equally  apparent, 
and  that  none  of  those  which  we  perceive  are  really 
inherent  in  any  outward  object? 

Hyl.   It  should. 

Phil.  The  point  will  be  past  all  doubt,  if  you  con- 
sider that,  in  case  colours  were  real  properties  or 
affections  inherent  in  external  bodies,  they  could  ad- 
mit of  no  alteration  without  some  change  wrought  in 
the  very  bodies  themselves :  but,  is  it  not  evident 
from  what  hath  been  said  that,  upon  the  use  of  micro- 
scopes, upon  a  change  happening  in  the  humours  of 
the  eye,  or  a  variation  of  distance,  without  any  man- 
ner of  real  alteration  in  the  thing  itself,  the  colours  of 
any  object  are  either  changed,  or  totally  disappear  ? 
Nay,  all  other  circumstances  remaining  the  same, 
change  but  the  situation  of  some  objects,  and  they 
shall  present  different  colours  to  the  eye.  The  same 
thing  happens  upon  viewing  an  object  in  various  de- 
grees of  light.  And  what  is  more  known  than  that 
the  same  bodies  appear  differently  coloured  by  candle- 
light from  what  they  do  in  the  open  day?  Add  to 
these  the  experiment  of  a  prism  which,  separating  the 
heterogeneous  rays  of  light,  alters  the  colour  of  any 
object,  and  will  cause  the  whitest  to  appear  of  a  deep 
blue  or  red  to  the  naked  eye.  And  now  tell  me  whether 
you  are  still  of  opinion  that  every  body  hath  its  true 
real  colour  inhering  in  it ;  and,  if  you  think  it  hath,  I 


BETWEEN. HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  2Q 

would  fain  know  farther  from  you,  what  certain  dis- 
tance and  position  of  the  object,  what  peculiar  texture 
and  formation  of  the  eye,  what  degree  or  kind  of  light 
is  necessary  for  ascertaining  that  true  colour,  and  dis- 
tinguishing it  from  apparent  ones. 

Hyl.  I  own  myself  entirely  satisfied,  that  they  are 
all  equally  apparent,  and  that  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  colour  really  inhering  in  external  bodies,  but  that 
it  is  altogether  in  the  light.  And  what  confirms  me 
in  this  opinion  is  that  in  proportion  to  the  light  col- 
ours are  still  more  or  less  vivid ;  and  if  there  be  no 
light,  then  are  there  no  colours  perceived.  Besides, 
allowing  there  are  colours  on  external  objects,  yet, 
how  is  it  possible  for  us  to  perceive  them  ?  For  no 
external  body  affects  the  mind,  unless  it  acts  first  on 
our  organs  of  sense.  But  the  only  action  of  bodies 
is  motion ;  and  motion  cannot  be  communicated  other- 
wise than  by  impulse.  A  distant  object  therefore  can- 
not act  on  the  eye,  nor  consequently  make  itself  or  its 
properties  perceivable  to  the  soul.  Whence  it  plainly 
follows  that  it  is  immediately  some  contiguous  sub- 
stance, which,  operating  on  the  eye,  occasions  a  per- 
ception of  colours :  and  such  is  light. 

Phil.   How  !  is  light  then  a  substance  ? 

Hyl.  I  tell  you,  Philonous,  external  light  is  noth- 
ing but  a  thin  fluid  substance,  whose  minute  particles 
being  agitated  with  a  brisk  motion,  and  in  various 
manners  reflected  from  the  different  surfaces  of  out- 
ward objects  to  the  eyes,  communicate  different  mo- 
tions to  the  optic  nerves ;  which,  being  propagated  to 
the  brain,  cause  therein  various  impressions;  and 
these  are  attended  with  the  sensations  of  red,  blue, 
yellow,  &c. 


30  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

Phil.  It  seems  then  the  light  doth  no  more  than 
shake  the  optic  nerves. 

Hyl.   Nothing  else. 

Phil.  And,  consequent  to  each  particular  motion 
of  the  nerves,  the  mind  is  affected  with  a  sensation, 
which  is  some  particular  colour. 

Hyl.   Right. 

Phil.  And  these  sensations  have  no  existence  with- 
out the  mind. 

Hyl.  They  have  not. 

Phil.  How  then  do  you  affirm  that  colours  are  in 
the  light ;  since  by  light  you  understand  a  corporeal 
substance  external  to  the  mind? 

Hyl.  Light  and  colours,  as  immediately  perceived 
by  us,  I  grant  cannot  exist  without  the  mind.  But, 
in  themselves  they  are  only  the  motions  and  configu- 
rations of  certain  insensible  particles  of  matter. 

Phil.  Colours,  then,  in  the  vulgar  sense,  or  taken 
for  the  immediate  objects  of  sight,  cannot  agree  to 
any  but  a  perceiving  substance. 

Hyl.  That  is  what  I  say. 

Phil.  Well  then,  since  you  give  up  the  point  as  to 
those  sensible  qualities  which  are  alone  thought  col- 
ours by  all  mankind  beside,  you  may  hold  what  you 
please  with  regard  to  those  invisible  ones  of  the  phi- 
losophers. It  is  not  my  business  to  dispute  about 
them ;  only  I  would  advise  you  to  bethink  yourself, 
whether,  considering  the  inquiry  we  are  upon,  it  be 
prudent  for  you  to  affirm — the  red  and  blue  which  we 
see  are  not  real  colours,  but  certain  unknown  motions  ana 
figures,  which  no  man  ever  did  or  can  see,  are  truly  so. 
Are  not  these  shocking  notions,  and  are  not  they  sub- 
ject to  as  many  ridiculous  inferences,  as  those  you 
were  obliged  to  renounce  before  in  the  case  of  sounds? 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  31 

Hyl.  I  frankly  own,  Philonous,  that  it  is  in  vain  to 
stand  out  any  longer.  Colours,  sounds,  tastes,  in  a 
word  all  those  termed  secondary  qualities,  have  cer- 
tainly no  existence  without  the  mind.  But,  by  this 
acknowledgment  I  must  not  be  supposed  to  derogate 
anything  from  the  reality  of  Matter  or  external  ob- 
jects ;  seeing  it  is  no  more  than  several  philosophers 
maintain,  who  nevertheless  are  the  farthesf^imagin- 
able  from  denying  Matter.  For  the  clearer  under- 
standing of  this,  you  must  know  sensible  qualities  are 
by  philosophers  divided  into  primary  and  secondary. 
The  former  are  Extension,  Figure,  Solidity,  Gravity, 
Motion,  and  Rest.  And  these  they  hold  exist  really 
in  bodies.  The  latter  are  those  above  enumerated ; 
or,  briefly,  all  sensible  qualities  beside  the  Primary, 
which  they  assert  are  only  so  many  sensations  or  ideas 
existing  nowhere  but  in  the  mind.  But  all  this,  I 
doubt  not,  you  are  apprised  of.  For  my  part,  I  have 
been  a  long  time  sensible  there  was  such  an  opinion 
current  among  philosophers,  but  was  never  thoroughly 
convinced  of  its  truth  until  now. 

Phil.  You  are  still  then  of  opinion  that  extension 
and  figures  are  inherent  in  external  unthinking  sub- 
stances? 

Hyl.   I  am. 

Phil.  But  what  if  the  same  arguments  which  are 
brought  against  Secondary  Qualities  will  hold  good 
against  these  also? 

Hyl.  Why  then  I  shall  be  obliged  to  think,  they 
too  exist  only  in  the  mind. 

Phil.  Is  it  your  opinion  the  very  figure  and  exten- 
sion which  you  perceive  by  sense  exist  in  the  outward 
object  or  material  substance? 

Hyl.  It  is. 


32  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

Phil.  Have  all  other  animals  as  good  grounds  to 
think  the  same  of  the  figure  and  extension  which  they 
see  and  feel? 

Hyl.  Without  doubt,  if  they  have  any  thought  at 
all. 

Phil.  Answer  me,  Hylas.  Think  you  the  senses 
were  bestowed  upon  all  animals  for  their  preservation 
and  well-being  in  life?  or  were  they  given  to  men 
alone  for  this  end  ? 

Hyl.  I  make  no  question  but  they  have  the  same 
use  in  all  other  animals. 

Phil.  If  so,  is  it  not  necessary  they  should  be  en- 
abled by  them  to  perceive  their  own  limbs,  and  those 
bodies  which  are  capable  of  harming  them? 

Hyl.  Certainly. 

Phil.  A  mite  therefore  must  be  supposed  to  see 
his  own  foot,  and  things  equal  or  even  less  than  it,  as 
bodies  of  some  considerable  dimension ;  though  at 
the  same  time  they  appear  to  you  scarce  discernible, 
or  at  best  as  so  many  visible  points? 

Hyl.   I  cannot  deny  it. 

Phil.  And  to  creatures  less  than  the  mite  they  will 
seem  yet  larger? 

Hyl.  They  will. 

Phil.  Insomuch  that  what  you  can  hardly  discern 
will  to  another  extremely  minute  animal  appear  as 
some  huge  mountain? 

Hyl.  All  this  I  grant. 

Phil.  Can  one  and  the  same  thing  be  at  the  same 
time  in  itself  of  different  dimensions? 

Hyl.  That  were  absurd  to  imagine. 

Phil.  But,  from  what  you  have  laid  down  it  follows 
that  both  the  extension  by  you  perceived,  and  that 
perceived  by  the  mite  itself,  as  likewise  all  those  per- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  33 

ceived  by  lesser  animals,  are  each  of  them  the  true 
extension  of  the  mite's  foot ;  that  is  to  say,  by  your 
own  principles  you  are  led  into  an  absurdity. 

Hyl.  There  seems  to  be  some  difficulty  in  the 
point. 

Phil.  Again,  have  you  not  acknowledged  that  no 
real  inherent  property  of  any  object  can  be  changed 
without  some  change  in  the  thing  itself? 

Hyl.   I  have. 

Phil.  But,  as  we  approach  to  or  recede  from  an 
object,  the  visible  extension  varies,  being  at  one  dis- 
tance ten  or  a  hundred  times  greater  than  at  another. 
Doth  it  not  therefore  follow  from  hence  likewise  that 
it  is  not  really  inherent  in  the  object  ? 

Hyl.   I  own  I  am  at  a  loss  what  to  think. 

Phil.  Your  judgment  will  soon  be  determined,  if 
you  will  venture  to  think  as  freely  concerning  this 
quality  as  you  have  done  concerning  the  rest.  Was 
it  not  admitted  as  a  good  argument,  that  neither  heat 
nor  cold  was  in  the  water,  because  it  seemed  warm  to 
one  hand  and  cold  to  the  other? 

Hyl.   It  was. 

Phil.  Is  it  not  the  very  same  reasoning  to  conclude 
there  is  no  extension  or  figure  in  an  object,  because 
to  one  eye  it  shall  seem  little,  smooth,  and  round, 
when  at  the  same  time  it  appears  to  the  other,  great, 
uneven,  and  angular? 

Hyl.  The  very  same.  But  does  this  latter  fact 
ever  happen  ? 

Phil.  You  may  at  any  time  make  the  experiment, 
by  looking  with  one  eye  bare,  and  with  the  other 
through  a  microscope. 

Hyl.   I  know  not  how  to  maintain  it,  and  yet  I  am 


34  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

loath  to  give  up  extension,  I  see  so  many  odd  conse- 
quences following  upon  such  a  concession. 

Phil.  Odd,  say  you?  After  the  concessions  already 
made,  I  hope  you  will  stick  at  nothing  for  its  oddness.1 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  should  it  not  seem  very  odd, 
if  the  general  reasoning  which  includes  all  other  sen- 
sible qualities  did  not  also  include  extension?  If  it 
be  allowed  that  no  idea  nor  anything  like  an  idea  can 
exist  in  an  unperceiving  substance,  then  surely  it  fol- 
lows that  no  figure  or  mode  of  extension,  which  we 
can  either  perceive  or  imagine,  or  have  any  idea  of, 
can  be  really  inherent  in  Matter ;  not  to  mention  the 
peculiar  difficulty  there  must  be  in  conceiving  a  ma- 
terial substance,  prior  to  and  distinct  from  extension, 
to  be  the  substratum  of  extension.  Be  the  sensible 
quality  what  it  will — figure,  or  sound,  or  colour ;  it 
seems  alike  impossible  it  should  subsist  in  that  which 
doth  not  perceive  it. 

Hyl.  I  give  up  the  point  for  the  present,  reserving 
still  a  right  to  retract  my  opinion,  in  case  I  shall  here- 
after discover  any  false  step  in  my  progress  to  it. 

Phil.  That  is  a  right  you  cannot  be  denied.  Fig- 
ures and  extension  being  despatched,  we  proceed  next 
to  motion.  Can  a  real  motion  in  any  external  body 
be  at  the  same  time  both  very  swift  and  very  slow? 

Hyl.   It  cannot. 

Phil.  Is  not  the  motion  of  a  body  swift  in  a  recip- 
rocal proportion  to  the  time  it  takes  up  in  describing 
any  given  space?  Thus  a  body  that  describes  a  mile 
in  an  hour  moves  three  times  faster  than  it  would  in 
case  it  described  only  a  mile  in  three  hours. 

Hyl.   I  agree  with  you. 

1  The  remainder  of  the  present  paragraph  was  not  contained  in  the  first 
and  second  editions. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  35 

Phil.  And  is  not  time  measured  by  the  succession 
of  ideas  in  our  minds? 

Hyl.   It  is. 

Phil.  And  is  it  not  possible  ideas  should  succeed 
one  another  twice  as  fast  in  your  mind  as  they  do  in 
mine,  or  in  that  of  some  spirit  of  another  kind? 

Hyl.   I  own  it. 

Phil.  Consequently,  the  same  body  may  to  another 
seem  to  perform  its  motion  over  any  space  in  half  the 
time  that  it  doth  to  you.  And  the  same  reasoning 
will  hold  as  to  any  other  proportion :  that  is  to  say, 
according  to  your  principles  (since  the  motions  per- 
ceived are  both  really  in  the  object)  it  is  possible  one 
and  the  same  body  shall  be  really  moved  the  same  way 
at  once,  both  very  swift  and  very  slow.  How  is  this 
consistent  either  with  common  sense,  or  with  what 
you  just  now  granted? 

Hyl.   I  have  nothing  to  say  to  it. 

Phil.  Then  as  for  solidity;  either  you  do  not  mean 
any  sensible  quality  by  that  word,  and  so  it  is  beside 
our  inquiry :  or  if  you  do,  it  must  be  either  hardness 
or  resistance.  But  both  the  one  and  the  other  are 
plainly  relative  to  our  senses  :  it  being  evident  that 
what  seems  hard  to  one  animal  may  appear  soft  to 
another,  who  hath  greater  force  and  firmness  of  limbs. 
Nor  is  it  less  plain  that  the  resistance  I  feel  is  not  in 
the  body. 

Hyl.  I  own  the  very  sensation  of  resistance,  which 
is  all  you  immediately  perceive,  is  not  in  the  body, 
but  the  cause  of  that  sensation  is. 

Phil.  But  the  causes  of  our  sensations  are  not 
things  immediately  perceived,  and  therefore  not  sen- 
sible. This  point  I  thought  had  been  already  deter- 
mined. 


36  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

Hyl.  I  own  it  was ;  but  you  will  pardon  me  if  I 
seem  a  little  embarrassed :  I  know  not  how  to  quit 
my  old  notions. 

Phil.  To  help  you  out,  do  but  consider  that  if  ex- 
tension be  once  acknowledged  to  have  no  existence 
without  the  mind,  the  same  must  necessarily  be  granted 
of  motion,  solidity,  and  gravity — since  they  all  evi- 
dently suppose  extension.  It  is  therefore  superfluous 
to  inquire  particularly  concerning  each  of  them.  In 
denying  extension,  you  have  denied  them  all  to  have 
any  real  existence. 

Hyl.  I  wonder,  Philonous,  if  what  you  say  be  true, 
why  those  philosophers  who  deny  the  Secondary  Qual- 
ities any  real  existence,  should  yet  attribute  it  to  the 
Primary.  If  there  is  no  difference  between  them,  how 
can  this  be  accounted  for? 

Phil.  It  is  not  my  business  to  account  for  every 
opinion  of  the  philosophers.  But,  among  other  rea- 
sons which  may  be  assigned  for  this,  it  seems  prob- 
able that  pleasure  and  pain  being  rather  annexed  to 
the  former  than  the  latter  may  be  one.  Heat  and  cold, 
tastes  and  smells,  have  something  more  vividly  pleas- 
ing or  disagreeable  than  the  ideas  of  extension,  figure, 
and  motion  affect  us  with.  And,  it  being  too  visibly 
absurd  to  hold  that  pain  or  pleasure  can  be  in  an  un- 
perceiving  Substance,  men  are  more  easily  weaned 
from  believing  the  external  existence  of  the  Secondary 
than  the  Primary  Qualities.  You  will  be  satisfied 
there  is  something  in  this,  if  you  recollect  the  differ- 
ence you  made  between  an  intense  and  more  mod- 
erate degree  of  heat ;  allowing  the  one  a  real  exist- 
ence, while  you  denied  it  to  the  other.  But,  after  all, 
there  is  no  rational  ground  for  that  distinction ;  for, 
surely  an  indifferent  sensation  is  as  truly  a  sensation 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  37 

as  one  more  pleasing  or  painful ;  and  consequently 
should  not  any  more  than  they  be  supposed  to  exist 
in  an  unthinking  subject. 

Hyl.  It  is  just  come  into  my  head,  Philonous,  that 
I  have  somewhere  heard  of  a  distinction  between  ab- 
solute and  sensible  extension.  Now,  though  it  be 
acknowledged  that  great  and  small,  consisting  merely 
in  the  relation  which  other  extended  beings  have  to 
the  parts  of  our  own  bodies,  do  not  really  inhere  in 
the  Substances  themselves ;  yet  nothing  obliges  us  to 
hold  the  same  with  regard  to  absolute  extension,  which 
is  something  abstracted  from  great  and  small,  from 
this  or  that  particular  magnitude  or  figure.  So  like- 
wise as  to  motion ;  swift  and  slow  are  altogether  rela- 
tive to  the  succession  of  ideas  in  our  own  minds.  But, 
it  doth  not  follow,  because  those  modifications  of  mo- 
tion exist  not  without  the  mind,  that  therefore  abso- 
lute motion  abstracted  from  them  doth  not. 

Phil,  Pray  what  is  it  that  distinguishes  one  mo- 
tion, or  one  part  of  extension,  from  another?  Is  it 
not  something  sensible,  as  some  degree  of  swiftness 
or  slowness,  some  certain  magnitude  or  figure  peculiar 
to  each? 

Hyl.    I  think  so. 

Phil.  These  qualities,  therefore,  stripped  of  all 
sensible  properties,  are  without  all  specific  and  nu- 
merical differences,  as  the  schools  call  them. 

Hyl.  They  are. 

Phil.  That  is  to  say,  they  are  extension  in  general, 
and  motion  in  general. 

Hyl.   Let  it  be  so. 

Phil.  But  it  is  a  universally  received  maxim  that 
Everything  which  exists  is  particular.  How  then  can 


38  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

motion  in  general,  or  extension  in  general,  exist  in 
any  corporeal  Substance? 

Hyl.   I  will  take  time  to  solve  your  difficulty. 

Phil.  But  I  think  the  point  may  be  speedily  de- 
cided. Without  doubt  you  can  tell  whether  you  are 
able  to  frame  this  or  that  idea.  Now  I  am  content  to 
put  our  dispute  on  this  issue.  If  you  can  frame  in 
your  thoughts  a  distinct  abstract  idea  of  motion  or 
extension ;  divested  of  all  those  sensible  modes,  as 
swift  and  slow,  great  and  small,  round  and  square, 
and  the  like,  which  are  acknowledged  to  exist  only  in 
the  mind,  I  will  then  yield  the  point  you  contend  for. 
But,  if  you  cannot,  it  will  be  unreasonable  on  your 
side  to  insist  any  longer  upon  what  you  have  no  no- 
tion of. 

Hyl.  To  confess  ingenuously,  I  cannot. 

Phil.  Can  you  even  separate  the  ideas  of  extension 
and  motion  from  the  ideas  of  all  those  qualities  which 
they  who  make  the  distinction  term  secondary? 

Hyl.  What!  is  it  not  an  easy  matter  to  consider 
extension  and  motion  by  themselves,  abstracted  from 
all  other  sensible  qualities?  Pray  how  do  the  mathe- 
maticians treat  of  them  ? 

Phil.  I  acknowledge,  Hylas,  it  is  not  difficult  to 
form  general  propositions  and  reasonings  about  those 
qualities,  without  mentioning  any  other;  and,  in  this 
sense,  to  consider  or  treat  of  them  abstractedly.  But, 
how  doth  it  follow  that,  because  I  can  pronounce  the 
word  motion  by  itself,  I  can  form  the  idea  of  it  in  my 
mind  exclusive  of  body?  Or,  because  theorems  may 
be  made  of  extension  and  figures,  without  any  men- 
tion of  great  or  small,  or  any  other  sensible  mode  or 
quality,  that  therefore  it  is  possible  such  an  abstract 
idea  of  extension,  without  any  particular  size  or  fig- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  39 

ure,  or  sensible  quality,  should  be  distinctly  formed, 
and  apprehended  by  the  mind  ?  Mathematicians  treat 
of  quantity,  without  regarding  what  other  sensible 
qualities  it  is  attended  with,  as  being  altogether  in- 
different to  their  demonstrations.  But,  when  laying 
aside  the  words,  they  contemplate  the  bare  ideas,  I 
believe  you  will  find,  they  are  not  the  pure  abstracted 
ideas  of  extension. 

Hyl.  But  what  say  you  to  pure  intellect?  May  not 
abstracted  idea  be  framed  by  that  faculty? 

Phil.  Since  I  cannot  frame  abstract  ideas  at  all,  it 
is  plain  I  cannot  frame  them  by  the  help  of  pure  in- 
tellect; whatsoever  faculty  you  understand  by  those 
words.  Besides,  not  to  inquire  into  the  nature  of 
pure  intellect  and  its  spiritual  objects,  as  virtue,  rea- 
son, God,  or  the  like,  thus  much  seems  manifest,  that 
sensible  things  are  only  to  be  perceived  by  sense,  or 
represented  by  the  imagination.  Figures,  therefore, 
and  extension,  being  originally  perceived  by  sense, 
do  not  belong  to  pure  intellect :  but,  for  your  farther 
satisfaction,  try  if  you  can  frame  the  idea  of  any  fig- 
ure, abstracted  from  all  particularities  of  size,  or  even 
from  other  sensible  qualities. 

Hyl.  Let  me  think  a  little I  do  not  find  that  I 

can. 

Phil.  And  can  you  think  it  possible  that  should 
really  exist  in  nature  which  implies  a  repugnancy  in 
its  conception? 

Hyl.   By  no  means. 

Phil.  Since  therefore  it  is  impossible  even  for  the 
mind  to  disunite  the  ideas  of  extension  and  motion 
from  all  other  sensible  qualities,  doth  it  not  follow, 
that  where  the  one  exist  there  necessarily  the  other 
exist  likewise? 


40  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

Hyl.   It  should  seem  so. 

Phil.  Consequently,  the  very  same  arguments 
which  you  admitted  as  conclusive  against  the  Secon- 
dary Qualities  are,  without  any  farther  application  of 
force,  against  the  Primary  too.  Besides,  if  you  will 
trust  your  senses,  is  it  not  plain  all  sensible  qualities 
coexist,  or  to  them  appear  as  being  in  the  same  place? 
Do  they  ever  represent  a  motion,  or  figure,  as  being 
divested  of  all  other  visible  and  tangible  qualities? 

Hyl.  You  need  say  no  more  on  this  head.  I  am 
free  to  own,  if  there  be  no  secret  error  or  oversight  in 
our  proceedings  hitherto,  that  all  sensible  qualities 
are  alike  to  be  denied  existence  without  the  mind. 
But,  my  fear  is  that  I  have  been  too  liberal  in  my 
former  concessions,  or  overlooked  some  fallacy  or 
other.  In  short,  I  did  not  take  time  to  think. 

Phil.  For  that  matter,  Hylas,  you  may  take  what 
time  you  please  in  reviewing  the  progress  of  our  in- 
quiry. You  are  at  liberty  to  recover  any  slips  you 
might  have  made,  or  offer  whatever  you  have  omitted 
which  makes  for  your  first  opinion. 

Hyl.  One  great  oversight  I  take  to  be  this — that  I 
did  not  sufficiently  distinguish  the  object  from  the  sen- 
sation. Now,  though  this  latter  may  not  exist  without 
the  mind,  yet  it  will  not  thence  follow  that  the  former 
cannot. 

Phil.  What  object  do  you  mean?  The  object  of 
the  senses? 

Hyl.   The  same. 

Phil.   It  is  then  immediately  perceived? 

Hyl.   Right. 

Phii.  Make  me  to  understand  the  difference  be- 
tween what  is  immediately  perceived,  and  a  sensation. 

Hyl.  The  sensation  I  take  to  be  an  act  of  the  mind 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  4! 

perceiving ;  besides  which,  there  is  something  per- 
ceived ;  and  this  I  call  the  object.  For  example,  there 
is  red  and  yellow  on  that  tulip.  But  then  the  act  of 
perceiving  those  colours  is  in  me  only,  and  not  in  the 
tulip. 

Phtl.  What  tulip  do  you  speak  of?  Is  it  that 
which  you  see? 

Hyl.  The  same. 

Phil.  And  what  do  you  see  beside  colour,  figure, 
and  extension? 

Hyl.   Nothing. 

Phil.  What  you  would  say  then  is  that  the  red  and 
yellow  are  coexistent  with  the  extension;  is  it  not? 

Hyl.  That  is  not  all ;  I  would  say  they  have  a  real 
existence  without  the  mind,  in  some  unthinking  sub- 
stance. 

Phil.  That  the  colours  are  really  in  the  tulip  which 
I  see  is  manifest.  Neither  can  it  be  denied  that  this 
tulip  may  exist  independent  of  your  mind  or  mine; 
but,  that  any  immediate  object  of  the  senses — that  is, 
any  idea,  or  combination  of  ideas — should  exist  in  an 
unthinking  substance,  or  exterior  to  all  minds,  is  in 
itself  an  evident  contradiction.  Nor  can  I  imagine 
how  this  follows  from  what  you  said  just  now,  to  wit, 
that  the  red  and  yellow  were  on  the  tulip  you  saw, 
since  you  do  not  pretend  to  see  that  unthinking  sub- 
stance. 

Hyl.  You  have  an  artful  way,  Philonous,  of  divert- 
ing our  inquiry  from  the  subject. 

Phil.  I  see  you  have  no  mind  to  be  pressed  that 
way.  To  return  then  to  your  distinction  between  sen- 
sation and  object;  if  I  take  you  right,  you  distinguish 
in  every  perception  two  things,  the  one  an  action  of 
the  mind,  the  other  not. 


42  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

Hyl.   True. 

PhiL  And  this  action  cannot  exist  in,  or  belong  to, 
any  unthinking  thing ;  but,  whatever  beside  is  implied 
in  a  perception  may? 

Hyl.  That  is  my  meaning. 

Phil.  So  that  if  there  was  a  perception  without 
any  act  of  the  mind,  it  were  possible  such  a  percep- 
tion should  exist  in  an  unthinking  substance? 

Hyl.  I  grant  it.  But  it  is  impossible  there  should 
be  such  a  perception. 

Phil.  When  is  the  mind  said  to  be  active? 

Hyl.  When  it  produces,  puts  an  end  to,  or  changes, 
anything. 

Phil.  Can  the  mind  produce,  discontinue,  or  change 
anything,  but  by  an  act  of  the  will? 

Hyl.   It  cannot. 

Phil.  The  mind  therefore  is  to  be  accounted  active 
in  its  perceptions  so  far  forth  as  -volition  is  included  in 
them? 

Hyl.   It  is. 

Phil.  In  plucking  this  flower  I  am  active ;  because 
I  do  it  by  the  motion  of  my  hand,  which  was  conse- 
quent upon  my  volition ;  so  likewise  in  applying  it  to 
my  nose.  But  is  either  of  these  smelling? 

Hyl.   No. 

Phil  I  act  too  in  drawing  the  air  through  my 
nose;  because  my  breathing  so  rather  than  otherwise 
is  the  effect  of  my  volition.  But  neither  can  this  be 
called  smelling :  for,  if  it  were,  I  should  smell  every 
time  I  breathed  in  that  manner? 

Hyl.  True. 

Phil.  Smelling  then  is  somewhat  consequent  to  all 
this? 

Hyl.   It  is. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  43 

Phil.  But  I  do  not  find  my  will  concerned  any 
farther.  Whatever  more  there  is — as  that  I  perceive 
such  a  particular  smell,  or  any  smell  at  all — this  is  in- 
dependent of  my  will,  and  therein  I  am  altogether 
passive.  Do  you  find  it  otherwise  with  you,  Hylas? 

Hyl.    No,  the  very  same. 

Phil.  Then,  as  to  seeing,  is  it  not  in  your  power 
to  open  your  eyes,  or  keep  them  shut ;  to  turn  them 
this  or  that  way? 

Hyl.   Without  doubt. 

Phil.  But,  doth  it  in  like  manner  depend  on  your 
will  that  in  looking  on  this  flower  you  perceive  white 
rather  than  any  other  colour?  Or,  directing  your  open 
eyes  towards  yonder  part  of  the  heaven,  can  you  avoid 
seeing  the  sun?  Or  is  light  or  darkness  the  effect  of 
your  volition? 

Hyl.   No  certainly. 

Phil.  You  are  then  in  these  respects  altogether 
passive? 

Hyl.   I  am. 

Phil.  Tell  me  now,  whether  seeing  consists  in  per- 
ceiving light  and  colours,  or  in  opening  and  turning 
the  eyes? 

Hyl.  Without  doubt,  in  the  former. 

Phil.  Since  therefore  you  are  in  the  very  percep- 
tion of  light  and  colours  altogether  passive,  what  is 
become  of  that  action  you  were  speaking  of  as  an  in- 
gredient in  every  sensation?  And,  doth  it  not  follow 
from  your  own  concessions,  that  the  perception  of 
light  and  colours,  including  no  action  in  it,  may  exist 
in  an  unperceiving  substance?  And  is  not  this  a  plain 
contradiction? 

Hyl.   I  know  not  what  to  think  of  it. 

Phil.    Besides,  since  you  distinguish  the  active  and 


44  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

passive  in  every  perception,  you  must  do  it  in  that  of 
pain.  But  how  is  it  possible  that  pain,  be  it  as  little 
active  as  you  please,  should  exist  in  an  unperceiving 
substance?  In  short,  do  but  consider  the  point,  and 
then  confess  ingenuously,  whether  light  and  colours, 
tastes,  sounds,  &c.,  are  not  all  equally  passions  or 
sensations  in  the  soul.  You  may  indeed  call  them  ex- 
ternal objects,  and  give  them  in  words  what  subsist- 
ence you  please.  But,  examine  your  own  thoughts, 
and  then  tell  me  whether  it  be  not  as  I  say? 

HyL  I  acknowledge,  Philonous,  that,  upon  a  fair 
observation  of  what  passes  in  my  mind,  I  can  discover 
nothing  else  but  that  I  am  a  thinking  being,  affected 
with  variety  of  sensations;  neither  is  it  possible  to 
conceive  how  a  sensation  should  exist  in  an  unper- 
ceiving substance.  But  then,  on  the  other  hand,  when 
I  look  on  sensible  things  in  a  different  view,  consider- 
ing them  as  so  many  modes  and  qualities,  I  find  it 
necessary  to  suppose  a  material  substratum,  without 
which  they  cannot  be  conceived  to  exist. 

Phil.  Material  substratum  call  you  it?  Pray,  by 
which  of  your  senses  came  you  acquainted  with  that 
being? 

HyL  It  is  not  itself  sensible ;  its  modes  and  qual- 
ities only  being  perceived  by  the  senses. 

Phil.  I  presume  then  it  was  by  reflection  and  rea- 
son you  obtained  the  idea  of  it? 

Hyl.  I  do  not  pretend  to  any  proper  positive  idea 
of  it.  However,  I  conclude  it  exists,  because  qual- 
ities cannot  be  conceived  to  exist  without  a  support. 

Phil.  It  seems  then  you  have  only  a  relative  notion 
of  it,  or  that  you  conceive  it  not  otherwise  than  by 
conceiving  the  relation  it  bears  to  sensible  qualities? 

Hyl.   Right. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  45 

Phil.  Be  pleased  therefore  to  let  me  know  wherein 
that  relation  consists. 

Hyl.  Is  it  not  sufficiently  expressed  in  the  term 
substratum  or  substance? 

Phil.  If  so,  the  word  substratum  should  import 
that  it  is  spread  under  the  sensible  qualities  or  acci- 
dents? 

Hyl.   True. 

Phil.   And  consequently  under  extension? 

Hyl.   I  own  it. 

Phil.  It  is  therefore  somewhat  in  its  own  nature 
entirely  distinct  from  extension? 

Hyl.  I  tell  you,  extension  is  only  a  mode,  and 
Matter  is  something  that  supports  modes.  And  is  it 
not  evident  the  thing  supported  is  different  from  the 
thing  supporting? 

Phil.  So  that  something  distinct  from,  and  exclu- 
sive of,  extension  is  supposed  to  be  the  substratum  of 
extension? 

Hyl.  Just  so. 

Phil.  Answer  me,  Hylas.  Can  a  thing  be  spread 
without  extension  ?  or  is  not  the  idea  of  extension 
necessarily  included  in  spreading? 

Hyl.    It  is. 

Phil.  Whatsoever  therefore  you  suppose  spread 
under  anything  must  have  in  itself  an  extension  dis- 
tinct from  the  extension  of  that  thing  under  which  it 
is  spread  ? 

Hyl.   It  must. 

Phil.  Consequently,  every  corporeal  substance 
being  the  substratum  of  extension  must  have  in  itself 
another  extension,  by  which  it  is  qualified  to  be  a  sub- 
stratum :  and  so  on  to  infinity?  And  I  ask  whether 
this  be  not  absurd  in  itself,  and  repugnant  to  what 


46  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

you  granted  just  now,  to  wit,  that  the  substratum  was 
something  distinct  from  and  exclusive  of  extension? 

Hyl.  Aye,  but,  Philonous,  you  take  me  wrong.  I 
do  not  mean  that  Matter  is  spread  in  a  gross  literal 
sense  under  extension.  The  word  substratum  is  used 
only  to  express  in  general  the  same  thing  with  sub- 
stance. 

Phil.  Well  then,  let  us  examine  the  relation  im- 
plied in  the  term  substance.  Is  it  not  that  it  stands 
under  accidents? 

Hyl.   The  very  same. 

Phil.  But,  that  one  thing  may  stand  under  or  sup- 
port another,  must  it  not  be  extended? 

Hyl.   It  must. 

Phil.  Is  not  therefore  this  supposition  liable  to  the 
same  absurdity  with  the  former? 

Hyl.  You  still  take  things  in  a  strict  literal  sense  ; 
that  is  not  fair,  Philonous. 

Phil.  I  am  not  for  imposing  any  sense  on  your 
words:  you  are  at  liberty  to  explain  them  as  you 
please.  Only,  I  beseech  you,  make  me  understand 
something  by  them.  You  tell  me  Matter  supports  or 
stands  under  accidents.  How  !  is  it  as  your  legs  sup- 
port your  body? 

Hyl.   No ;  that  is  the  literal  sense. 

Phil.  Pray  let  me  know  any  sense,  literal  or  not 
literal,  that  you  understand  it  in.  ...  How  long  must 
I  wait  for  an  answer,  Hylas? 

Hyl.  I  declare  I  know  not  what  to  say.  I  once 
thought  I  understood  well  enough  what  was  meant  by 
Matter's  supporting  accidents.  But  now,  the  more  I 
think  on  it  the  less  can  I  comprehend  it ;  in  short  I 
find  that  I  know  nothing  of  it. 

Phil.   It  seems  then  you  have  no  idea  at  all,  neither 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  47 

relative  nor  positive,  of  Matter;  you  know  neither 
what  it  is  in  itself,  nor  what  relation  it  bears  to  acci- 
dents? 

Hyl.   I  acknowledge  it. 

Phil.  And  yet  you  asserted  that  you  could  not  con- 
ceive how  qualities  or  accidents  should  really  exist, 
without  conceiving  at  the  same  time  a  material  sup- 
port of  them? 

Hyl.   I  did. 

Phil.  That  is  to  say,  when  you  conceive  the  real 
existence  of  qualities,  you  do  withal  conceive  some- 
thing which  you  cannot  conceive? 

Hyl.  It  was  wrong  I  own.  But  still  I  fear  there  is 
some  fallacy  or  other.  Pray  what  think  you  of  this? 
It  is  just  come  into  my  head  that  the  ground  of  all 
our  mistake  lies  in  your  treating  of  each  quality  by  it- 
self. Now,  I  grant  that  each  quality  cannot  singly 
subsist  without  the  mind.  Colour  cannot  without  ex- 
tension, neither  can  figure  without  some  other  sensible 
quality.  But,  as  the  several  qualities  united  or  blended 
together  form  entire  sensible  things,  nothing  hinders 
why  such  things  may  not  be  supposed  to  exist  with- 
out the  mind. 

Phil.  Either,  Hylas,  you  are  jesting,  or  have  a  very 
bad  memory.  Though  indeed  we  went  through  all 
the  qualities  by  name  one  after  another ;  yet  my  argu- 
ments, or  rather  your  concessions,  nowhere  tended 
to  prove  that  the  Secondary  Qualities  did  not  subsist 
each  alone  by  itself ;  but,  that  they  were  not  at  alt 
without  the  mind.  Indeed,  in  treating  of  figure  and 
motion  we  concluded  they  could  not  exist  without  the 
mind,  because  it  was  impossible  even  in  thought  to 
separate  them  from  all  secondary  qualities,  so  as  to 
conceive  them  existing  by  themselves.  But  then  this 


48  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

was  not  the  only  argument  made  use  of  upon  that  oc- 
casion. But  (to  pass  by  all  that  hath  been  hitherto 
said,  and  reckon  it  for  nothing,  if  you  will  have  it  so) 
I  am  content  to  put  the  whole  upon  this  issue.  If  you 
can  conceive  it  possible  for  any  mixture  or  combina- 
tion of  qualities,  or  any  sensible  object  whatever,  to 
exist  without  the  mind,  then  I  will  grant  it  actually  to 
be  so. 

Hyl.  If  it  comes  to  that  the  point  will  soon  be  de- 
cided. What  more  easy  than  to  conceive  a  tree  or 
house  existing  by  itself,  independent  of,  and  unper- 
ceived  by,  any  mind  whatsoever?  I  do  at  this  present 
.time  conceive  them  existing  after  that  manner. 

Phil.  How  say  you,  Hylas,  can  you  see  a  thing 
which  is  at  the  same  time  unseen? 

Hyl.   No,  that  were  a  contradiction. 

Phil.  Is  it  not  as  great  a  contradiction  to  talk  of 
conceiving  a  thing  which  is  unconceived? 

Hyl.   It  is. 

Phil.  The  tree  or  house  therefore  which  you  think 
of  is  conceived  by  you? 

Hyl.   How  should  it  be  otherwise? 

Phil.   And  what  is  conceived  is  surely  in  the  mind? 

Hyl.  Without  question,  that  which  is  conceived  is 
in  the  mind. 

Phil.  How  then  came  you  to  say,  you  conceived  a 
house  or  tree  existing  independent  and  out  of  all  minds 
whatsoever? 

Hyl.  That  was  I  own  an  oversight ;  but  stay,  let 
me  consider  what  led  me  into  it. — It  is  a  pleasant  mis- 
take enough.  As  I  was  thinking  of  a  tree  in  a  solitary 
place  where  no  one  was  present  to  see  it,  methought 
that  was  to  conceive  a  tree  as  existing  unperceived  or 
unthought  of — not  considering  that  I  myself  conceived 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  49 

it  all  the  while.  But  now  I  plainly  see  that  all  I  can 
do  is  to  frame  ideas  in  my  own  mind.  I  may  indeed 
conceive  in  my  own  thoughts  the  idea  of  a  tree,  or  a 
house,  or  a  mountain,  but  that  is  all.  And  this  is  far 
from  proving  that  I  can  conceive  them  existing  out  of 
the  minds  of  all  Spirits. 

Phil.  You  acknowledge  then  that  you  cannot  pos- 
sibly conceive  how  any  one  corporeal  sensible  thing 
should  exist  otherwise  than  in  a  mind? 

Hyl.   I  do. 

Phil.  And  yet  you  will  earnestly  contend  for  the 
truth  of  that  which  you  cannot  so  much  as  conceive  ? 

Hyl.  I  profess  I  know  not  what  to  think ;  but  still 
there  are  some  scruples  remain  with  me.  Is  it  not 
certain  I  see  things  at  a  distance?  Do  we  not  per- 
ceive the  stars  and  moon,  for  example,  to  be  a  great 
way  off?  Is  not  this,  I  say,  manifest  to  the  senses? 

Phil.  Do  you  not  in  a  dream  too  perceive  those  or 
the  like  objects? 

Hyl.   I  do. 

Phil.  And  have  they  not  then  the  same  appearance 
of  being  distant? 

Hyl.  They  have. 

Phil.  But  you  do  not  thence  conclude  the  appari- 
tions in  a  dream  to  be  without  the  mind? 

Hyl.   By  no  means. 

Phil.  You  ought  not  therefore  to  conclude  that 
sensible  objects  are  without  the  mind,  from  their  ap- 
pearance or  manner  wherein  they  are  perceived. 

Hyl.  I  acknowledge  it.  But  doth  not  my  sense 
deceive  me  in  those  cases? 

Phil.  By  no  means.  The  idea  or  thing  which  you 
immediately  perceive,  neither  sense  nor  reason  in- 
forms you  that  it  actually  exists  without  the  mind. 


50  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

By  sense  you  only  know  that  you  are  affected  with 
such  certain  sensations  of  light  and  colours,  &c.  And 
these  you  will  not  say  are  without  the  mind. 

Hyl.  True :  but,  beside  all  that,  do  you  not  think 
the  sight  suggests  something  of  outness  or  distance? 

Phil.  Upon  approaching  a  distant  object,  do  the 
visible  size  and  figure  change  perpetually,  or  do  they 
appear  the  same  at  all  distances? 

Hyl.   They  are  in  a  continual  change. 

Phil.  Sight  therefore  doth  not  suggest  or  any  way 
inform  you  that  the  visible  object  you  immediately 
perceive  exists  at  a  distance,1  or  will  be  perceived 
when  you  advance  farther  onward  ;  there  being  a  con- 
tinued series  of  visible  objects  succeeding  each  other 
during  the  whole  time  of  your  approach. 

Hyl.  It  doth  not;  but  still  I  know,  upon  seeing 
an  object,  what  object  I  shall  perceive  after  having 
passed  over  a  certain  distance :  no  matter  whether  it 
be  exactly  the  same  or  no :  there  is  still  something  of 
distance  suggested  in  the  case. 

Phil.  Good  Hylas,  do  but  reflect  a  little  on  the 
point,  and  then  tell  me  whether  there  be  any  more  in 
it  than  this : — From  the  ideas  you  actually  perceive 
by  sight,  you  have  by  experience  learned  to  collect 
what  other  ideas  you  will  (according  to  the  standing 
order  of  nature)  be  affected  with,  after  such  a  certain 
succession  of  time  and  motion. 

Hyl.   Upon  the  whole,  I  take  it  to  be  nothing  else. 

Phil.  Now,  is  it  not  plain  that  if  we  suppose  a 
man  born  blind  was  on  a  sudden  made  to  see,  he 
could  at  first  have  no  experience  of  what  may  be  sug- 
gested by  sight? 

1  See  the  "Essay  towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision,"  and  its  "Vindica- 
tion. "—AUTHOR,  1734. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  51 

Hyl.   It  is. 

Phil.  He  would  not  then,  according  to  you,  have 
any  notion  of  distance  annexed  to  the  things  he  saw ; 
but  would  take  them  for  a  new  set  of  sensations  ex- 
isting only  in  his  mind? 

Hyl.   It  is  undeniable. 

Phil.  But,  to  make  it  still  more  plain :  is  not  dis- 
tance a  line  turned  endwise  to  the  eye? 

Hyl.   It  is. 

Phil.  And  can  a  line  so  situated  be  perceived  by 
sight? 

Hyl.   It  cannot. 

Phil.  Doth  it  not  therefore  follow  that  distance  is 
not  properly  and  immediately  perceived  by  sight? 

Hyl.   It  should  seem  so. 

Phil.  Again,  is  it  your  opinion  that  colours  are  at 
a  distance? 

Hyl.  It  must  be  acknowledged  they  are  only  in 
the  mind. 

Phil.  But  do  not  colours  appear  to  the  eye  as  co- 
existing in  the  same  place  with  extension  and  figures? 

Hyl.   They  do. 

Phil.  How  can  you  then  conclude  from  sight  that 
figures  exist  without,  when  you  acknowledge  colours 
do  not ;  the  sensible  appearance  being  the  very  same 
with  regard  to  both  ? 

Hyl.   I  know  not  what  to  answer. 

Phil.  But,  allowing  that  distance  was  truly  and 
immediately  perceived  by  the  mind,  yet  it  would  not 
thence  follow  it  existed  out  of  the  mind.  For,  what- 
ever is  immediately  perceived  is  an  idea:  and  can 
any  idea  exist  out  of  the  mind? 

Hyl.    To  suppose  that  were  absurd :   but,  inform 


52  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

me,  Philonous,  can  we  perceive  or  know  nothing  be- 
side our  ideas? 

Phil.  As  for  the  rational  deducing  of  causes  from 
effects,  that  is  beside  our  inquiry.  And,  by  the  senses 
you  can  best  tell  whether  you  perceive  anything  which 
is  not  immediately  perceived.  And  I  ask  you,  whether 
the  things  immediately  perceived  are  other  than  your 
own  sensations  or  ideas?  You  have  indeed  more  than 
once,  in  the  course  of  this  conversation,  declared 
yourself  on  those  points ;  but  you  seem,  by  this  last 
question,  to  have  departed  from  what  you  then 
thought. 

Hyl.  To  speak  the  truth,  Philonous,  I  think  there 
are  two  kinds  of  objects : — the  one  perceived  immedi- 
ately, which  are  likewise  called  ideas ;  the  other  are 
real  things  or  external  objects,  perceived  by  the  me- 
diation of  ideas,  which  are  their  images  and  represen- 
tations. Now,  I  own  ideas  do  not  exist  without  the 
mind ;  but  the  latter  sort  of  objects  do.  I  am  sorry  I 
did  not  think  of  this  distinction  sooner;  it  would 
probably  have  cut  short  your  discourse. 

Phil.  Are  those  external  objects  perceived  by 
sense,  or  by  some  other  faculty? 

Hyl.  They  are  perceived  by  sense. 

Phil.  How!  is  there  anything  perceived  by  sense 
which  is  not  immediately  perceived? 

Hyl.  Yes,  Philonous,  in  some  sort  there  is.  For 
example,  when  I  look  on  a  picture  or  statue  of  Julius 
Caesar,  I  may  be  said  after  a  manner  to  perceive  him 
(though  not  immediately)  by  my  senses. 

Phil.  It  seems  then  you  will  have  our  ideas,  which 
alone  are  immediately  perceived,  to  be  pictures  of  ex- 
ternal things  :  and  that  these  also  are  perceived  by 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  53 

sense,  inasmuch  as  they  have  a  conformity  or  resem- 
blance to  our  ideas? 

Hyl.   That  is  my  meaning. 

Phil.  And,  in  the  same  way  that  Julius  Caesar,  in 
himself  invisible,  is  nevertheless  perceived  by  sight; 
real  things,  in  themselves  imperceptible,  are  per- 
ceived by  sense. 

Hyl.   In  the  very  same. 

Phil.  Tell  me,  Hylas,  when  you  behold  the  picture 
of  Julius  Caesar,  do  you  see  with  your  eyes  any  more 
than  some  colours  and  figures,  with  a  certain  sym- 
metry and  composition  of  the  whole? 

Hyl.   Nothing  else. 

Phil.  And  would  not  a  man  who  had  never  known 
anything  of  Julius  Caesar  see  as  much  ? 

Hyl.   He  would. 

Phil.  Consequently  he  hath  his  sight,  and  the  use 
of  it,  in  as  perfect  a  degree  as  you? 

Hyl.    I  agree  with  you. 

Phil.  Whence  comes  it  then  that  your  thoughts 
are  directed  to  the  Roman  emperor,  and  his  are  not? 
This  cannot  proceed  from  the  sensations  or  ideas  of 
sense  by  you  then  perceived ;  since  you  acknowledge 
you  have  no  advantage  over  him  in  that  respect.  It 
should  seem  therefore  to  proceed  from  reason  and 
memory:  should  it  not? 

Hyl.   It  should. 

Phil.  Consequently,  it  will  not  follow  from  that  in- 
stance that  anything  is  perceived  by  sense  which  is 
not  immediately  perceived.  Though  I  grant  we  may, 
in  one  acceptation,  be  said  to  perceive  sensible  things 
mediately  by  sense — that  is,  when,  from  a  frequently 
perceived  connexion,  the  immediate  perception  of 
ideas  by  one  sense  suggest  to  the  mind  others!  per- 


54  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

haps  belonging  to  another  sense,  which  are  wont  to 
be  connected  with  them.  For  instance,  when  I  hear 
a  coach  drive  along  the  streets,  immediately  I  per- 
ceive only  the  sound ;  but,  from  the  experience  I  have 
had  that  such  a  sound  is  connected  with  a  coach,  I 
am  said  to  hear  the  coach.  It  is  nevertheless  evident 
that,  in  truth  and  strictness,  nothing  can  be  heard  but 
sound ;  and  the  coach  is  not  then  properly  perceived 
by  sense,  but  suggested  from  experience.  So  like- 
wise when  we  are  said  to  see  a  red-hot  bar  of  iron ; 
the  solidity  and  heat  of  the  iron  are  not  the  objects  of 
sight,  but  suggested  to  the  imagination  by  the  colour 
and  figure  which  are  properly  perceived  by  that  sense. 
In  short,  those  things  alone  are  actually  and  strictly 
perceived  by  any  sense,  which  would  have  been  per- 
ceived in  case  that  same  sense  had  then  been  first 
conferred  on  us.  As  for  other  things,  it  is  plain  they 
are  only  suggested  to  the  mind  by  experience,  grounded 
on  former  perceptions.  But,  to  return  to  your  com- 
parison of  Caesar's  picture,  it  is  plain,  if  you  keep  to 
that,  you  must  hold  the  real  things  or  archetypes  of 
our  ideas  are  not  perceived  by  sense,  but  by  some  in- 
ternal faculty  of  the  soul,  as  reason  or  memory.  I 
would  therefore  fain  know  what  arguments  you  can 
draw  from  reason  for  the  existence  of  what  you  call 
real  things  or  material  objects.  Or,  whether  you  re- 
member to  have  seen  them  formerly  as  they  are  in 
themselves ;  or,  if  you  have  heard  or  read  of  any  one 
that  did. 

Hyl.  I  see,  Philonous,  you  are  disposed  to  raillery; 
but  that  will  never  convince  me. 

Phil.  My  aim  is  only  to  learn  from  you  the  way  to 
come  at  the  knowledge  of  material  beings.  Whatever 
we  perceive  is  perceived  immediately  or  mediately : 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  55 

by  sense ;  or  by  reason  and  reflection.  But,  as  you 
have  excluded  sense,  pray  shew  me  what  reason  you 
have  to  believe  their  existence ;  or  what  medium  you 
can  possibly  make  use  of  to  prove  it,  either  to  mine 
or  your  own  understanding. 

Hyl.  To  deal  ingenuously,  Philonous,  now  I  con- 
sider the  point,  I  do  not  find  I  can  give  you  any  good 
reason  for  it.  But,  thus  much  seems  pretty  plain, 
that  it  is  at  least  possible  such  things  may  really  exist. 
And,  as  long  as  there  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing 
them,  I  am  resolved  to  believe  as  I  did,  till  you  bring 
good  reasons  to  the  contrary. 

Phil.  What !  is  it  come  to  this,  that  you  only  be- 
lieve the  existence  of  material  objects,  and  that  your 
belief  is  founded  barely  on  the  possibility  of  its  being 
true?  Then  you  will  have  me  bring  reasons  against 
it :  though  another  would  think  it  reasonable  the  proof 
should  lie  on  him  who  holds  the  affirmative.  And, 
after  all,  this  very  point  which  you  are  now  resolved 
to  maintain,  without  any  reason,  is  in  effect  what  you 
have  more  than  once  during  this  discourse  seen  good 
reason  to  give  up.  But,  to  pass  over  all  this ;  if  I 
understand  you  rightly,  you  say  our  ideas  do  not  exist 
without  the  mind  ;  but  that  they  are  copies,  images, 
or  representations,  of  certain  originals  that  do? 

Hyl.  You  take  me  right. 

Phil.  They  are  then  like  external  things? 

Hyl.  They  are. 

Phil.  Have  those  things  a  stable  and  permanent 
nature,  independent  of  our  senses ;  or  are  they  in  a 
perpetual  change,  upon  our  producing  any  motions  in 
our  bodies,  suspending,  exerting,  or  altering,  our  fac- 
ulties or  organs  of  sense? 

Hyl.    Real  things,  it  is  plain,  have  a  fixed  and  real 


56  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

nature,  which  remains  the  same  notwithstanding  any 
change  in  our  senses,  or  in  the  posture  and  motion  of 
our  bodies ;  which  indeed  may  affect  the  ideas  in  our 
minds,  but  it  were  absurd  to  think  they  had  the  same 
effect  on  things  existing  without  the  mind. 

Phil.  How  then  is  it  possible  that  things  perpetu- 
ally fleeting  and  variable  as  our  ideas  should  be  copies 
or  images  of  anything  fixed  and  constant?  Or,  in 
other  words,  since  all  sensible  qualities,  as  size,  figure, 
colour,  &c.,  that  is,  our  ideas,  are  continually  chan- 
ging upon  every  alteration  in  the  distance,  medium, 
or  instruments  of  sensation  ;  how  can  any  determinate 
material  objects  be  properly  represented  or  painted 
forth  by  several  distinct  things,  each  of  which  is  so 
different  from  and  unlike  the  rest  ?  Or,  if  you  say  it 
resembles  some  one  only  of  our  ideas,  how  shall  we 
be  able  to  distinguish  the  true  copy  from  all  the  false 
ones? 

Hyl.  I  profess,  Philonous,  I  am  at  a  loss.  I  know 
not  what  to  say  to  this. 

Phil.  But  neither  is  this  all.  Which  are  material 
objects  in  themselves — perceptible  or  imperceptible? 

Hyl.  Properly  and  immediately  nothing  can  be 
perceived  but  ideas.  All  material  things,  therefore, 
are  in  themselves  insensible,  and  to  be  perceived  only 
by  our  ideas. 

Phil.  Ideas  then  are  sensible,  and  their  archetypes 
or  originals  insensible? 

Hyl.   Right. 

Phil.  But  how  can  that  which  is  sensible  be  like 
that  which  is  insensible?  Can  a  real  thing,  in  itself 
invisible,  be  like  a  colour;  or  a  real  thing,  which  is  not 
audible,  be  like  a  sound?  In  a  word,  can  anything 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  57 

be  like  a  sensation  or  idea,  but  another  sensation  or 
idea? 

Hyl.   I  must  own,  I  think  not. 

Phil.  Is  it  possible  there  should  be  any  doubt  on 
the  point?  Do  you  not  perfectly  know  your  own 
ideas? 

Hyl.  I  know  them  perfectly ;  since  what  I  do  not 
perceive  or  know  can  be  no  part  of  my  idea. 

Phil.  Consider,  therefore,  and  examine  them,  and 
then  tell  me  if  there  be  anything  in  them  which  can 
exist  without  the  mind?  or  if  you  can  conceive  any- 
thing like  them  existing  without  the  mind? 

Hyl.  Upon  inquiry,  I  find  it  is  impossible  for  me 
to  conceive  or  understand  how  anything  but  an  idea 
can  be  like  an  idea.  And  it  is  most  evident  that  no 
idea  can  exist  without  the  mind. 

Phil.  You  are  therefore,  by  our  principles,  forced 
to  deny  the  reality  of  sensible  things ;  since  you  made 
it  to  consist  in  an  absolute  existence  exterior  to  the 
mind.  That  is  to  say,  you  are  a  downright  sceptic. 
So  I  have  gained  my  point,  which  was  to  shew  your 
principles  led  to  Scepticism. 

Hyl.  For  the  present  I  am,  if  not  entirely  con- 
vinced, at  least  silenced. 

Phil.  I  would  fain  know  what  more  you  would  re- 
quire in  order  to  a  perfect  conviction.  Have  you  not 
had  the  liberty  of  explaining  yourself  all  manner  of 
ways?  Were  any  little  slips  in  discourse  laid  hold 
and  insisted  on?  Or  were  you  not  allowed  to  retract 
or  reinforce  anything  you  had  offered,  as  best  served 
your  purpose?  Hath  not  everything  you  could  say 
been  heard  and  examined  with  all  the  fairness  imagin- 
able? In  a  word,  have  you  not  in  every  point  been 
convinced  out  of  your  own  mouth?  and,  if  you  can  at 


58  THE  FIRST  DIALOGUE 

present  discover  any  flaw  in  any  of  your  former  con- 
cessions, or  think  of  any  remaining  subterfuge,  any 
new  distinction,  colour,  or  comment  whatsoever,  why 
do  you  not  produce  it  ? 

Hyl.  A  little  patience,  Philonous.  I  am  at  present 
so  amazed  to  see  myself  ensnared,  and  as  it  were  im- 
prisoned in  the  labyrinths  you  have  drawn  me  into, 
that  on  the  sudden  it  cannot  be  expected  I  should 
find  my  way  out.  You  must  give  me  time  to  look 
about  me  and  recollect  myself? 

Phil.   Hark ;  is  not  this  the  college  bell  ? 

Hyl.   It  rings  for  prayers. 

Phil.  We  will  go  in  then,  if  you  please,  and  meet 
here  again  to-morrow  morning.  In  the  meantime, 
you  may  employ  your  thoughts  on  this  morning's  dis- 
course, and  try  if  you  can  find  any  fallacy  in  it,  or  in- 
vent any  new  means  to  extricate  yourself. 

Hyl.  Agreed. 


THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE. 

Hylas. 

I  BEG  your  pardon,  Philonous,  for  not  meeting  you 
sooner.  All  this  morning  my  head  was  so  filled 
with  our  late  conversation  that  I  had  not  leisure  to 
think  of  the  time  of  the  day,  or  indeed  of  anything 
else. 

Philonous.  I  am  glad  you  were  so  intent  upon  it, 
in  hopes  if  there  were  any  mistakes  in  your  conces- 
sions, or  fallacies  in  my  reasonings  from  them,  you 
will  now  discover  them  to  me. 

Hyl.  I  assure  you  I  have  done  nothing  ever  since 
I  saw  you  but  search  after  mistakes  and  fallacies, 
and,  with  that  view,  have  minutely  examined  the 
whole  series  of  yesterday's  discourse :  but  all  in  vain, 
for  the  notions  it  led  me  into,  upon  review,  appear 
still  more  clear  and  evident ;  and,  the  more  I  consider 
them,  the  more  irresistibly  do  they  force  my  assent. 

Phil.  And  is  not  this,  think  you,  a  sign  that  they 
are  genuine,  that  they  proceed  from  nature,  and  are 
conformable  to  right  reason?  Truth  and  beauty  are 
in  this  alike,  that  the  strictest  survey  sets  them  both 
off  to  advantage ;  while  the  false  lustre  of  error  and 
disguise  cannot  endure  being  reviewed,  or  too  nearly 
inspected. 

Hyl.   I  own  there  is  a  great  deal  in  what  you  say. 


60  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

Nor  can  any  one"  be  more  entirely  satisfied  of  the  truth 
of  those  odd  consequences,  so  long  as  I  have  in  view 
the  reasonings  that  lead  to  them.  But,  when  these 
are  out  of  my  thoughts,  there  seems,  on  the  other 
hand,  something  so  satisfactory,  so  natural  and  intel- 
ligible, in  the  modern  way  of  explaining  things  that, 
I  profess,  I  know  not  how  to  reject  it. 

Phil.   I  know  not  what  way  you  mean. 

Hyl.  I  mean  the  way  of  accounting  for  our  sensa- 
tions or  ideas. 

Phil.    How  is  that? 

Hyl.  It  is  supposed  the  soul  makes  her  residence 
in  some  part  of  the  brain,  from  which  the  nerves  take 
their  rise,  and  are  thence  extended  to  all  parts  of  the 
body;  and  that  outward  objects,  by  the  different  im- 
pressions they  make  on  the  organs  of  sense,  commu- 
nicate certain  vibrative  motions  to  the  nerves ;  and 
these  being  filled  with  spirits  propagate  them  to  the 
brain  or  seat  of  the  soul,  which,  according  to  the  va- 
rious impressions  or  traces  thereby  made  in  the  brain, 
is  variously  affected  with  ideas. 

Phil.  And  call  you  this  an  explication  of  the  man- 
ner whereby  we  are  affected  with  ideas  ? 

Hyl.  Why  not,  Philonous;  have  you  anything  to 
object  against  it  ? 

Phil.  I  would  first  know  whether  I  rightly  under- 
stand your  hypothesis.  You  make  certain  traces  in 
the  brain  to  be  the  causes  or  occasions  of  our  ideas. 
Pray  tell  me  whether  by  the  brain  you  mean  any  sen- 
sible thing. 

Hyl.  What  else  think  you  I  could  mean  ? 

Phil.  Sensible  things  are  all  immediately  perceiv- 
able ;  and  those  things  which  are  immediately  per- 
ceivable are  ideas  ;  and  these  exist  only  in  the  mind. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  6l 

Thus  much  you  have,  if  I  mistake  not,  long  since 
agreed  to. 

HyL   I  do  not  deny  it. 

Phil.  The  brain  therefore  you  speak  of,  being  a 
sensible  thing,  exists  only  in  the  mind.  Now,  I  would 
fain  know  whether  you  think  it  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  one  idea  or  thing  existing  in  the  mind  occasions 
all  other  ideas.  And,  if  you  think  so,  pray  how  do 
you  account  for  the  origin  of  that  primary  idea  or 
brain  itself? 

HyL  I  do  not  explain  the  origin  of  our  ideas  by 
that  brain  which  is  perceivable  to  sense,  this  being  it- 
self only  a  combination  of  sensible  ideas,  but  by  an- 
other which  I  imagine. 

Phil.  But  are  not  things  imagined  as  truly  in  the 
mind  as  things  perceived? 

Hyl.   I  must  confess  they  are. 

Phil.  It  comes,  therefore,  to  the  same  thing ;  and 
you  have  been  all  this  while  accounting  for  ideas  by 
certain  motions  or  impressions  of  the  brain,  that  is, 
by  some  alterations  in  an  idea,  whether  sensible  or 
imaginable  it  matters  not. 

HyL   I  begin  to  suspect  my  hypothesis. 

Phil.  Besides  spirits,  all  that  we  know  or  conceive 
are  our  own  ideas.  When,  therefore,  you  say  all  ideas 
are  occasioned  by  impressions  in  the  brain,  do  you 
conceive  this  brain  or  no?  If  you  do,  then  you  talk 
of  ideas  imprinted  in  an  idea  causing  that  same  idea, 
which  is  absurd.  If  you  do  not  conceive  it,  you  talk 
unintelligibly,  instead  of  forming  a  reasonable  hy- 
pothesis. 

HyL  I  now  clearly  see  it  was  a  mere  dream.  There 
is  nothing  in  it. 

Phil.  You  need  not  be  much  concerned  at  it;  for 


62  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

after  all,  this  way  of  explaining  things,  as  you  called 
it,  could  never  have  satisfied  any  reasonable  man. 
What  connexion  is  there  between  a  motion  in  the 
nerves,  and  the  sensations  of  sound  or  colour  in  the 
mind?  Or  how  is  it  possible  these  should  be  the  effect 
of  that? 

Hyl.  But  I  could  never  think  it  had  so  little  in  it 
as  now  it  seems  to  have. 

Phil.  Well  then,  are  you  at  length  satisfied  that 
no  sensible  things  have  a  real  existence ;  and  that  you 
are  in  truth  an  arrant  sceptic? 

Hyl.   It  is  too  plain  to  be  denied. 

Phil.  Look  !  are  not  the  fields  covered  with  a  de- 
lightful verdure?  Is  there  not  something  in  the  woods 
and  groves,  in  the  rivers  and  clear  springs,  that 
sooths,  that  delights,  that  transports  the  soul?  At 
the  prospect  of  the  wide  and  deep  ocean,  or  some 
huge  mountain  whose  top  is  lost  in  the  clouds,  or  of 
an  old  gloomy  forest,  are  not  our  minds  filled  with  a 
pleasing  horror?  Even  in  rocks  and  deserts  is  there 
not  an  agreeable  wildness?  How  sincere  a  pleasure 
is  it  to  behold  the  natural  beauties  of  the  earth !  To 
preserve  and  renew  our  relish  for  them,  is  not  the  veil 
of  night  alternately  drawn  over  her  face,  and  doth  she 
not  change  her  dress  with  the  seasons?  How  aptly 
are  the  elements  disposed  !  What  variety  and  use  in 
the  meanest  productions  of  nature  !  What  delicacy, 
what  beauty,  what  contrivance,  in  animal  and  vege- 
table bodies  !  How  exquisitely  are  all  things  suited, 
as  well  to  their  particular  ends,  as  to  constitute  oppo- 
site parts  of  the  whole  !  And,  while  they  mutually 
aid  and  support,  do  they  not  also  set  off  and  illustrate 
each  other?  Raise  now  your  thoughts  from  this  ball 
of  earth  to  all  those  glorious  luminaries  that  adorn 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  63 

the  high  arch  of  heaven.  The  motion  and  situation 
of  the  planets,  are  they  not  admirable  for  use  and 
order?  Were  those  (miscalled  erratic)  globes  ever 
known  to  stray,  in  their  repeated  journeys  through 
the  pathless  void?  Do  they  not  measure  areas  round 
the  sun  ever  proportioned  to  the  times?  So  fixed,  so 
immutable  are  the  laws  by  which  the  unseen  Author 
of  nature  actuates  the  universe.  How  vivid  and  ra- 
diant is  the  lustre  of  the  fixed  stars  !  How  magnifi- 
cent and  rich  that  negligent  profusion  with  which  they 
appear  to  be  scattered  throughout  the  whole  azure 
vault !  Yet,  if  you  take  the  telescope,  it  brings  into 
your  sight  a  new  host  of  stars  that  escape  the  naked 
eye.  Here  they  seem  contiguous  and  minute,  but  to 
a  nearer  view  immense  orbs  of  light  at  various  dis- 
tances, far  sunk  in  the  abyss  of  space.  Now  you  must 
call  imagination  to  your  aid.  The  feeble  narrow  sense 
cannot  descry  innumerable  worlds  revolving  round 
the  central  fires ;  and  in  those  worlds  the  energy  of 
an  all-perfect  Mind  displayed  in  endless  forms.  But, 
neither  sense  nor  imagination  are  big  enough  to  com- 
prehend the  boundless  extent,  with  all  its  glittering 
furniture.  Though  the  labouring  mind  exert  and 
strain  each  power  to  its  utmost  reach,  there  still  stands 
out  ungrasped  a  surplusage  immeasurable.  Yet  all 
the  vast  bodies  that  compose  this  mighty  frame,  how 
distant  and  remote  soever,  are  by  some  secret  mech- 
anism, some  divine  art  and  force,  linked  in  a  mutual 
dependence  and  intercourse  with  each  other,  even  with 
this  earth,  which  was  almost  slipt  from  my  thoughts 
and  lost  in  the  crowd  of  worlds.  Is  not  the  whole 
system  immense,  beautiful,  glorious  beyond  expres- 
sion and  beyond  thought !  What  treatment,  then,  do 
those  philosophers  deserve,  who  would  deprive  these 


64  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

noble  and  delightful  scenes  of  all  reality?  How  should 
those  Principles  be  entertained  that  lead  us  to  think 
all  the  visible  beauty  of  the  creation  a  false  imaginary 
glare?  To  be  plain,  can  you  expect  this  Scepticism 
of  yours  will  not  be  thought  extravagantly  absurd  by 
all  men  of  sense? 

Hyl.  Other  men  may  think  as  they  please ;  but  for 
your  part  you  have  nothing  to  reproach  me  with.  My 
comfort  is,  you  are  as  much  a  sceptic  as  I  am. 

Phil.  There,  Hylas,  I  must  beg  leave  to  differ  from 
you. 

Hyl.  What !  have  you  all  along  agreed  to  the  prem- 
ises, and  do  you  now  deny  the  conclusion,  and  leave 
me  to  maintain  those  paradoxes  by  myself  which  you 
led  me  into?  This  surely  is  not  fair. 

Phil.  I  deny  that  I  agreed  with  you  in  those  no- 
tions that  led  to  Scepticism.  You  indeed  said  the 
reality  of  sensible  things  consisted  in  an  absolute  exist- 
ence out  of  the  minds  of  spirits,  or  distinct  from  their 
being  perceived.  And,  pursuant  to  this  notion  of 
reality,  you  are  obliged  to  deny  sensible  things  any 
real  existence :  that  is,  according  to  your  own  defini- 
tion, you  profess  yourself  a  sceptic.  But  I  neither 
said  nor  thought  the  reality  of  sensible  things  was  to 
be  defined  after  that  manner.  To  me  it  is  evident, 
for  the  reasons  you  allow  of,  that  sensible  things  can- 
not exist  otherwise  than  in  a  mind  or  spirit.  Whence 
I  conclude,  not  that  they  have  no  real  existence,  but 
that,  seeing  they  depend  not  on  my  thought,  and  have 
an  existence  distinct  from  being  perceived  by  me, 
there  must  be  some  other  mind  wherein  they  exist.  As 
sure,  therefore,  as  the  sensible  world  really  exists,  so 
sure  is  there  an  infinite  omnipresent  Spirit,  who  con- 
tains and  supports  it. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  65 

Hyl.  What !  this  is  no  more  than  I  and  all  Chris- 
tians hold ;  nay,  and  all  others  too  who  believe  there 
is  a  God,  and  that  He  knows  and  comprehends  all 
things. 

Phil.  Aye,  but  here  lies  the  difference.  Men  com- 
monly believe  that  all  things  are  known  or  perceived 
by  God,  because  they  believe  the  being  of  a  God ; 
whereas  I,  on  the  other  side,  immediately  and  neces- 
sarily conclude  the  being  of  a  God,  because  all  sen- 
sible things  must  be  perceived  by  him. 

Hyl.  But  so  long  as  we  all  believe  the  same  thing, 
what  matter  is  it  how  we  come  by  that  belief? 

Phil.  But  neither  do  we  agree  in  the  same  opin- 
ion. For  philosophers,  though  they  acknowledge  all 
corporeal  beings  to  be  perceived  by  God,  yet  they  at- 
tribute to  them  an  absolute  subsistence  distinct  from 
their  being  perceived  by  any  mind  whatever,  which  I 
do  not.  Besides,  is  there  no  difference  between  say- 
ing, There  is  a  God,  therefore  He  perceives  all  things, 
and  saying,  Sensible  things  do  really  exist;  and,  if  they 
really  exist,  they  are  necessarily  perceived  by  an  infinite 
mind:  therefore  there  is  an  infinite  mind,  or  God?  This 
furnishes  you  with  a  direct  and  immediate  demon- 
stration, from  a  most  evident  principle,  of  the  being 
of  a  God.  Divines  and  philosophers  had  proved  be- 
yond all  controversy,  from  the  beauty  and  usefulness 
of  the  several  parts  of  the  creation,  that  it  was  the 
workmanship  of  God.  But  that — setting  aside  all  help 
of  astronomy  and  natural  philosophy,  all  contempla- 
tion of  the  contrivance,  order  and  adjustment  of  things 
— an  infinite  mind  should  be  necessarily  inferred  from 
the  bare  existence  of  the  sensible  world,  is  an  advan- 
tage to  them  only  who  have  made  this  easy  reflexion, 
that  the  sensible  world  is  that  which  we  perceive  by 


66  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

our  several  senses ;  and  that  nothing  is  perceived  by 
the  senses  beside  ideas ;  and  that  no  idea  or  arche- 
type of  an  idea  can  exist  otherwise  than  in  a  mind. 
You  may  now,  without  any  laborious  search  into  the 
sciences,  without  any  subtlety  of  reason,  or  tedious 
length  of  discourse,  oppose  and  baffle  the  most  stren- 
uous advocate  for  Atheism  ;  those  miserable  refuges, 
whether  in  an  eternal  succession  of  unthinking  causes 
and  effects,  or  in  a  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms ; 
those  wild  imaginations  of  Vanini,  Hobbes,  and  Spi- 
noza :  in  a  word,  the  whole  system  of  Atheism,  is  it 
not  entirely  overthrown,  by  this  single  reflexion  on 
the  repugnancy  included  in  supposing  the  whole,  or 
any  part,  even  the  most  rude  and  shapeless,  of  the 
visible  world,  to  exist  without  a  mind?  Let  any  one 
of  those  abettors  of  impiety  but  look  into  his  own 
thoughts,  and  there  try  if  he  can  conceive  how  so 
much  as  a  rock,  a  desert,  a  chaos,  or  confused  jumble 
of  atoms ;  how  anything  at  all,  either  sensible  or  im- 
aginable, can  exist  independent  of  a  mind,  and  he 
need  go  no  farther  to  be  convinced  of  his  folly.  Can 
anything  be  fairer  than  to  put  a  dispute  on  such  an 
issue,  and  leave  it  to  a  man  himself  to  see  if  'he  can 
conceive,  even  in  thought,  what  he  holds  to  be  true 
in  fact,  and  from  a  notional  to  allow  it  a  real  exist- 
ence? 

Hyl.  It  cannot  be  denied  there  is  something  highly 
serviceable  to  religion  in  what  you  advance.  But  do 
you  not  think  it  looks  very  like  a  notion  entertained 
by  some  eminent  moderns,  of  seeing  all  things  in  God? 

Phil.  I  would  gladly  know  that  opinion  :  pray  ex- 
plain it  to  me. 

Hyl.  They  conceive  that  the  soul,  being  immate- 
rial, is  incapable  of  being  united  with  material  things, 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  67 

so  as  to  perceive  them  in  themselves ;  but  that  she  per- 
ceives them  by  her  union  with  the  substance  of  God, 
which,  being  spiritual,  is  therefore  purely  intelligible, 
or  capable  of  being  the  immediate  object  of  a  spirit's 
thought.  Besides,  the  Divine  essence  contains  in  it 
perfections  correspondent  to  each  created  being  ;  and 
which  are,  for  that  reason,  proper  to  exhibit  or  repre- 
sent them  to  the  mind. 

Phil.  I  do  not  understand  how  our  ideas,  which 
are  things  altogether  passive  and  inert,  can  be  the 
essence,  or  any  part  (or  like  any  part)  of  the  essence 
or  substance  of  God,  who  is  an  impassive,  indivisible, 
purely  active  being.  Many  more  difficulties  and  ob- 
jections there  are  which  occur  at  first  view  against 
this  hypothesis ;  but  I  shall  only  add  that  it  is  liable 
to  all  the  absurdities  of  the  common  hypothesis,  in 
making  a  created  world  exist  otherwise  than  in  the 
mind  of  a  Spirit.  Beside  all  which  it  hath  this  pe. 
culiar  to  itself;  that  it  makes  that  material  world 
serve  to  no  purpose.  And,  if  it  pass  for  a  good  argu- 
ment against  other  hypotheses  in  the  sciences  that 
they  suppose  nature  or  the  Divine  wisdom  to  make 
something  in  vain,  or  do  that  by  tedious  roundabout 
methods  which  might  have  been  performed  in  a  much 
more  easy  and  compendious  way,  what  shall  we  think 
of  that  hypothesis  which  supposes  the  whole  world 
made  in  vain? 

Hyl.  But  what  say  you,  are  not  you  too  of  opinion 
that  we  see  all  things  in  God?  If  I  mistake  not,  what 
you  advance  comes  near  it. 

Phil.  [Few  men  think,  yet  all  have  opinions. 
Hence  men's  opinions  are  superficial  and  confused. 
It  is  nothing  strange  that  tenets,  which  in  themselves 
are  ever  so  different  should  nevertheless  be  confounded 


68  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

with  each  other  by  those  who  do  not  consider  them 
attentively.  I  shall  not  therefore  be  surprised  if  some 
men  imagine  that  I  run  into  the  enthusiasm  of  Male- 
branche ;  though  in  truth  I  am  very  remote  from  it. 
He  builds  on  the  most  abstract  general  ideas,  which  I 
entirely  disclaim.  He  asserts  an  absolute  external 
world,  which  I  deny.  He  maintains  that  we  are  de- 
ceived by  our  senses,  and  know  not  the  real  natures 
or  the  true  forms  and  figures  of  extended  beings;  of 
all  which  I  hold  the  direct  contrary.  .  So  that  upon 
the  whole  there  are  no  principles  more  fundamentally 
opposite  than  his  and  mine.  It  must  be  owned  that,]i 
I  entirely  agree  with  what  the  holy  Scripture  saith, 
"That  in  God  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being." 
But  that  we  see  things  in  His  essence,  after  the  man- 
ner above  set  forth,  I  am  far  from  believing.  Take 
here  in  brief  my  meaning. — It  is  evident  that  the 
things  I  perceive  are  my  own  ideas,  and  that  no  idea 
can  exist  unless  it  be  in  a  mind.  Nor  is  it  less  plain 
that  these  ideas  or  things  by  me  perceived,  either 
themselves  or  their  archetypes,  exist  independently 
of  my  mind ;  since  I  know  myself  not  to  be  their 
author,  it  being  out  of  my  power  to  determine  at 
pleasure  what  particular  ideas  I  shall  be  affected  with 
upon  opening  my  eyes  or  ears.  They  must  therefore 
exist  in  some  other  mind,  whose  will  it  is  they  should 
be  exhibited  to  me.  The  things,  I  say,  immediately 
perceived  are  ideas  or  sensations,  call  them  which  you 
will.  But  how  can  any  idea  or  sensation  exist  in,  or 
be  produced  by,  anything  but  a  mind  or  spirit?  This 
indeed  is  inconceivable ;  and  to  assert  that  which  is 
inconceivable  is  to  talk  nonsense:  is  it  not? 

I  What  precedes  in  this  paragraph  did  not  appear  in  the  first  and  second 
editions. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS   AND  PHILONOUS.  69 

Hyl.  Without  doubt. 

Phil.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  very  conceiv- 
able that  they  should  exist  in  and  be  produced  by  a 
Spirit ;  since  this  is  no  more  than  I  daily  experience 
in  myself,  inasmuch  as  I  perceive  numberless  ideas ; 
and,  by  an  act  of  my  will,  can  form  a  great  variety  of 
them,  and  raise  them  up  in  my  imagination :  though, 
it  must  be  confessed,  these  creatures  of  the  fancy  are 
not  altogether  so  distinct,  so  strong,  vivid,  and  per- 
manent, as  those  perceived  by  my  senses,  which  latter 
are  called  real  things.  From  all  which  I  conclude, 
there  is  a  Mind  which  affects  me  every  moment  with  all 
the  sensible  impressions  I  perceive.  And,  from  the  va- 
riety, order,  and  manner  of  these,  I  conclude  the 
Author  of  them  to  be  wise,  powerful,  and  good,  beyond 
comprehension.  Mark  it  well ;  I  do  not  say,  I  see  things 
by  perceiving  that  which  represents  them  in  the  in- 
telligible Substance  of  God.  This  I  do  not  under- 
stand; but  I  say,  the  things  by  me  perceived  are 
known  by  the  understanding,  and  produced  by  the 
will  of  an  infinite  Spirit.  And  is  not  all  this  most 
plain  and  evident?  Is  there  any  more  in  it  than  what 
a  little  observation  of  our  own  minds,  and  that  which 
passeth  in  them,  not  only  enableth  us  to  conceive, 
but  also  obligeth  us  to  acknowledge? 

Hyl.  I  think  I  understand  you  very  clearly ;  and 
own  the  proof  you  give  of  a  Deity  seems  no  less  evi- 
dent than  surprising.  But,  allowing  that  God  is  the 
supreme  and  universal  Cause  of  all  things,  yet,  may 
there  not  be  still  a  third  nature  besides  Spirits  and 
Ideas?  May  we  not  admit  a  subordinate  and  limited 
cause  of  our  ideas?  In  a  word,  may  there  not  for  all 
that  be  Matter? 

Phil.   How  often  must  I  inculcate  the  same  thing? 


70  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

You  allow  the  things  immediately  perceived  by  sense 
to  exist  nowhere  without  the  mind  ;  but  there  is  noth- 
ing perceived  by  sense  which  is  not  perceived  imme- 
diately :  therefore  there  is  nothing  sensible  that  exists 
without  the  mind.  The  Matter,  therefore,  which  you 
still  insist  on  is  something  intelligible,  I  suppose ; 
something  that  may  be  discovered  by  reason,  and  not 
by  sense. 

Hyl.   You  are  in  the  right. 

Phil.  Pray  let  me  know  what  reasoning  your  belief 
of  Matter  is  grounded  on  ;  and  what  this  Matter  is  in 
your  present  sense  of  it. 

Hyl.  I  find  myself  affected  with  various  ideas, 
whereof  I  know  I  am  not  the  cause ;  neither  are  they 
the  cause  of  themselves,  or  of  one  another,  or  capable 
of  subsisting  by  themselves,  as  being  altogether  in- 
active, fleeting,  dependent  beings.  They  have  there- 
fore some  cause  distinct  from  me  and  them  :  of  which 
I  pretend  to  know  no  more  than  that  it  is  the  cause  of 
my  ideas.  And  this  thing,  whatever  it  be,  I  call  Matter. 

Phil.  Tell  me,  Hylas,  hath  every  one  a  liberty  to 
change  the  current  proper  signification  attached  to  a 
common  name  in  any  language?  For  example,  sup- 
pose a  traveller  should  tell  you  that  in  a  certain  coun- 
try men  pass  unhurt  through  the  fire ;  and,  upon  ex- 
plaining himself,  you  found  he  meant  by  the  word 
fire  that  which  others  call  water :  or,  if  he  should  as- 
sert that  there  are  trees  that  walk  upon  two  legs, 
meaning  men  by  the  term  trees.  Would  you  think 
this  reasonable? 

Hyl.  No,  I  should  think  it  very  absurd.  Common 
custom  is  the  standard  of  propriety  in  language.  And 
for  any  man  to  affect  speaking  improperly  is  to  per- 
vert the  use  of  speech,  and  can  never  serve  to  a  better 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  71 

purpose  than  to  protract  and  multiply  disputes  where 
there  is  no  difference  in  opinion. 

Phil.  And  doth  not  Matter,  in  the  common  current 
acceptation  of  the  word,  signify  an  extended,  solid, 
moveable,  unthinking,  inactive  Substance? 

HyL   It  doth. 

Phil.  And,  hath  it  not  been  made  evident  that  no 
such  substance  can  possibly  exist?  And,  though  it 
should  be  allowed  to  exist,  yet  how  can  that  which  is 
inactive  be  a  cause ;  or  that  which  is  unthinking  be  a 
cause  of  thought?  You  may,  indeed,  if  you  please,  an- 
nex to  the  word  Matter  a  contrary  meaning  to  what  is 
vulgarly  received ;  and  tell  me  you  understand  by  it 
an  unextended,  thinking,  active  being,  which  is  the 
cause  of  our  ideas.  But  what  else  is  this  than  to  play 
with  words,  and  run  into  that  very  fault  you  just  now 
condemned  with  so  much  reason  ?  I  do  by  no  means 
find  fault  with  your  reasoning,  in  that  you  collect  a 
cause  from  the  phenomena :  but  I  deny  that  the  cause 
deducible  by  reason  can  properly  be  termed  Matter. 

HyL  There  is  indeed  something  in  what  you  say. 
But  I  am  afraid  you  do  not  thoroughly  comprehend 
my  meaning.  I  would  by  no  means  be  thought  to 
deny  that  God,  or  an  infinite  Spirit,  is  the  Supreme 
Cause  of  all  things.  All  I  contend  for  is,  that,  sub- 
ordinate to  the  Supreme  Agent,  there  is  a  cause  of  a 
limited  and  inferior  nature,  which  concurs  in  the  pro- 
duction of  our  ideas,  not  by  any  act  of  will  or  spiritual 
efficiency,  but  by  that  kind  of  action  which  belongs  to 
Matter,  viz.,  motion. 

Phil.  I  find  you  are  at  every  turn  relapsing  into 
your  old  exploded  conceit,  of  a  moveable,  and  conse- 
quently an  extended,  substance  existing  without  the 
mind.  What!  have  you  already  forgotten  you  were 


72  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

convinced,  or  are  you  willing  I  should  repeat  what 
has  been  said  on  that  head?  In  truth  this  is  not  fair 
dealing  in  you,  still  to  suppose  the  being  of  that  which 
you  have  so  often  acknowledged  to  have  no  being. 
But,  not  to  insist  farther  on  what  has  been  so  largely 
handled,  I  ask  whether  all  your  ideas  are  not  perfectly 
passive  and  inert,  including  nothing  of  action  in  them. 

HyL  They  are. 

Phil.  And  are  sensible  qualities  anything  else  but 
ideas  ? 

Hyl.  How  often  have  I  acknowledged  that  they 
are  not. 

Phil.   But  is  not  motion  a  sensible  quality? 

HyL   It  is. 

Phil.   Consequently  it  is  no  action? 

Hyl.  I  agree  with  you.  And  indeed  it  is  very  plain 
that  when  I  stir  my  finger  it  remains  passive ;  but  my 
will  which  produced  the  motion  is  active. 

Phil.  Now,  I  desire  to  know,  in  the  first  place, 
whether,  motion  being  allowed  to  be  no  action,  you 
can  conceive  any  action  besides  volition :  and,  in  the 
second  place,  whether  to  say  something  and  conceive 
nothing  be  not  to  talk  nonsense  :  and,  lastly,  whether, 
having  considered  the  premises,  you  do  not  perceive 
that  to  suppose  any  efficient  or  active  cause  of  our 
ideas,  other  than  Spirit,  is  highly  absurd  and  unrea- 
sonable ? 

Hyl.  I  give  up  the  point  entirely.  But,  though 
Matter  may  not  be  a  cause,  yet  what  hinders  its  being 
an  instrument  subservient  to  the  supreme  Agent  in  the 
production  of  our  ideas? 

Phil.  An  instrument  say  you ;  pray  what  may  be 
the  figure,  springs,  wheels,  and  motions,  of  that  in- 
strument? 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  73 

Hyl.  Those  I  pretend  to  determine  nothing  of, 
both  the  substance  and  its  qualities  being  entirely  un- 
known to  me. 

Phil.  What!  You  are  then  of  opinion  it  is  made 
up  of  unknown  parts,  that  it  hath  unknown  motions, 
and  an  unknown  shape? 

Hyl.  I  do  not  believe  that  it  hath  any  figure  or 
motion  at  all,  being  already  convinced,  that  no  sen- 
sible qualities  can  exist  in  an  unperceiving  substance. 

Phil.  But  what  notion  is  it  possible  to  frame  of  an 
instrument  void  of  all  sensible  qualities,  even  exten- 
sion itself? 

Hyl.   I  do  not  pretend  to  have  any  notion  of  it. 

Phil.  And  what  reason  have  you  to  think  this  un- 
known, this  inconceivable  Somewhat  doth  exist?  Is 
it  that  you  imagine  God  cannot  act  as  well  without 
it ;  or  that  you  find  by  experience  the  use  of  some 
such  thing,  when  you  form  ideas  in  your  own  mind  ? 

Hyl.  You  are  always  teasing  me  for  reasons  of  my 
belief.  Pray  what  reasons  have  you  not  to  believe  it? 

Phil.  It  is  to  me  a  sufficient  reason  not  to  believe 
the  existence  of  anything,  if  I  see  no  reason  for  believ- 
ing it.  But,  not  to  insist  on  reasons  for  believing, 
you  will  not  so  much  as  let  me  know  what  it  is  you 
would  have  me  believe ;  since  you  say  you  have  no 
manner  of  notion  of  it.  After  all,  let  me  entreat  you 
to  consider  whether  it  be  like  a  philosopher,  or  even 
like  a  man  of  common  sense,  to  pretend  to  believe 
you  know  not  what,  and  you  know  not  why. 

Hyl.  Hold,  Philonous.  When  I  tell  you  matter  is 
an  instrument,  I  do  not  mean  altogether  nothing.  It 
is  true,  I  know  not  the  particular  kind  of  instrument; 
but,  however,  I  have  some  notion  of  instrument  in  gen- 
eral, which  I  apply  to  it. 


74  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

Phil.  But  what  if  it  should  prove  that  there  is 
something,  even  in  the  most  general  notion  of  instru- 
ment, as  taken  in  a  distinct  sense  from  cause,  which 
makes  the  use  of  it  inconsistent  with  the  Divine  at- 
tributes? 

Hyl.  Make  that  appear  and  I  shall  give  up  the 
point. 

Phil.  What  mean  you  by  the  general  nature  or  no- 
tion of  instrument? 

Hyl.  That  which  is  common  to  all  particular  in- 
struments composeth  the  general  notion. 

Phil.  Is  it  not  common  to  all  instruments,  that 
they  are  applied  to  the  doing  those  things  only  which 
cannot  be  performed  by  the  mere  act  of  our  wills  ? 
Thus,  for  instance,  I  never  use  an  instrument  to  move 
my  finger,  because  it  is  done  by  a  volition.  But  I 
should  use  one  if  I  were  to  remove  part  of  a  rock,  or 
tear  up  a  tree  by  the  roots.  Are  you  of  the  same 
mind?  Or,  can  you  shew  any  example  where  an  in- 
strument is  made  use  of  in  producing  an  effect  imme- 
diately depending  on  the  will  of  the  agent  ? 

Hyl.   I  own  I  cannot. 

Phil.  How  therefore  can  you  suppose  that  an  all- 
perfect  Spirit,  on  whose  will  all  things  have  an  abso- 
lute and  immediate  dependence,  should  need  an  in- 
strument in  his  operations,  or,  not  needing  it,  make 
use  of  it?  Thus,  it  seems  to  me  that  you  are  obliged 
to  own  the  use  of  a  lifeless  inactive  instrument  to  be 
incompatible  with  the  infinite  perfection  of  God;  that 
is,  by  your  own  confession,  to  give  up  the  point. 

Hyl.  It  doth  not  readily  occur  what  I  can  answer 
you. 

Phil.  But,  methinks  you  should  be  ready  to  own 
the  truth,  when  it  hath  been  fairly  proved  to  you.  We 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PH1LONOUS.  75 

indeed,  who  are  beings  of  finite  powers,  are  forced  to 
make  use  of  instruments.  And  the  use  of  an  instru- 
ment sheweth  the  agent  to  be  limited  by  rules  of  an- 
other's prescription,  and  that  he  cannot  obtain  his  end 
but  in  such  a  way,  and  by  such  conditions.  Whence 
it  seems  a  clear  consequence,  that  the  supreme  un- 
limited Agent  useth  no  tool  or  instrument  at  all.  The 
will  of  an  Omnipotent  Spirit  is  no  sooner  exerted  than 
executed,  without  the  application  of  means — which,  if 
they  are  employed  by  inferior  agents,  it  is  not  upon 
account  of  any  real  efficacy  that  is  in  them,  or  neces- 
sary aptitude  to  produce  any  effect,  but  merely  in 
compliance  with  the  laws  of  nature,  or  those  condi- 
tions prescribed  to  them  by  the  First  Cause,  who  is 
Himself  above  all  limitation  or  prescription  whatso- 
ever. 

Hyl.  I  will  no  longer  maintain  that  Matter  is  an 
instrument.  However,  I  would  not  be  understood  to 
give  up  its  existence  neither ;  since,  notwithstanding 
what  hath  been  said,  it  may  still  be  an  occasion. 

Phil.  How  many  shapes  is  your  Matter  to  take? 
Or,  how  often  must  it  be  proved  not  to  exist,  before 
you  are  content  to  part  with  it?  But,  to  say  no  more 
of  this  (though  by  all  the  laws  of  disputation  I  may 
justly  blame  you  for  so  frequently  changing  the  sig- 
nification of  the  principal  term)  I  would  fain  know 
what  you  mean  by  affirming  that  matter  is  an  occa- 
sion, having  already  denied  it  to  be  a  cause.  And, 
when  you  have  shewn  in  what  sense  you  understand 
occasion,  pray,  in  the  next  place,  be  pleased  to  shew 
me  what  reason  induceth  you  to  believe  there  is  such 
an  occasion  of  our  ideas? 

Hyl.   As  to  the  first  point :  by  occasion  I  mean  an 


76  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

inactive  unthinking  being,  at  the  presence  whereof 
God  excites  ideas  in  our  minds. 

Phil.  And  what  may  be  the  nature  of  that  inactive 
unthinking  being? 

Hyl.   I  know  nothing  of  its  nature. 

Phil.  Proceed  then  to  the  second  point,  and  assign 
some  reason  why  we  should  allow  an  existence  to  this 
inactive,  unthinking,  unknown  thing. 

Hyl.  When  we  see  ideas  produced  in  our  minds 
after  an  orderly  and  constant  manner,  it  is  natural  to 
think  they  have  some  fixed  and  regular  occasions,  at 
the  presence  of  which  they  are  excited. 

Phil.  You  acknowledge  then  God  alone  to  be  the 
cause  of  our  ideas,  and  that  He  causes  them  at  the 
presence  of  those  occasions. 

Hyl.  That  is  my  opinion. 

Phil.  Those  things  which  you  say  are  present  to 
God,  without  doubt  He  perceives. 

Hyl.  Certainly ;  otherwise  they  could  not  be  to 
Him  an  occasion  of  acting. 

Phil.  Not  to  insist  now  on  your  making  sense  of 
this  hypothesis,  or  answering  all  the  puzzling  ques- 
tions and  difficulties  it  is  liable  to :  I  only  ask  whether 
the  order  and  regularity  observable  in  the  series  of 
our  ideas,  or  the  course  of  nature,  be  not  sufficiently 
accounted  for  by  the  wisdom  and  power  of  God ;  and 
whether  it  doth  not  derogate  from  those  attributes,  to 
suppose  He  is  influenced,  directed,  or  put  in  mind, 
when  and  what  He  is  to  act,  by  an  unthinking  sub- 
stance? And,  lastly,  whether,  in  case  I  granted  all 
you  contend  for,  it  would  make  anything  to  your  pur- 
pose, it  not  being  easy  to  conceive  how  the  external 
or  absolute  existence  of  an  unthinking  substance,  dis- 
tinct from  its  being  perceived,  can  be  inferred  from 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  77 

my  allowing  that  there  are  certain  things  perceived 
by  the  mind  of  God,  which  are  to  Him  the  occasion 
of  producing  ideas  in  us? 

Hyl.  I  am  perfectly  at  a  loss  what  to  think,  this 
notion  of  occasion  seeming  now  altogether  as  ground- 
less as  the  rest. 

Phil.  Do  you  not  at  length  perceive  that  in  all 
these  different  acceptations  of  Matter,  you  have  been 
only  supposing  you  know  not  what,  for  no  manner  of 
reason,  and  to  no  kind  of  use? 

Hyl.  I  freely  own  myself  less  fond  of  my  notions 
since  they  have  been  so  accurately  examined.  But 
still,  methinks,  I  have  some  confused  perception  that 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  Matter. 

Phil.  Either  you  perceive  the  being  of  Matter  im- 
mediately, or  mediately.  If  immediately,  pray  inform 
me  by  which  of  the  senses  you  perceive  it.  If  medi- 
ately, let  me  know  by  what  reasoning  it  is  inferred 
from  those  things  which  you  perceive  immediately. 
So  much  for  the  perception.  Then  for  the  Matter  it- 
self, I  ask  whether  it  is  object,  substratum,  cause,  in- 
strument, or  occasion?  You  have  already  pleaded  for 
each  of  these,  shifting  your  notions,  and  making  Mat- 
ter to  appear  sometimes  in  one  shape,  then  in  an- 
other. And  what  you  have  offered  hath  been  disap- 
proved and  rejected  by  yourself.  If  you  have  anything 
new  to  advance  I  would  gladly  hear  it. 

Hyl.  I  think  I  have  already  offered  all  I  had  to 
say  on  those  heads.  I  am  at  a  loss  what  more  to 
urge. 

Phil.  And  yet  you  are  loath  to  part  with  your  old 
prejudice.  But,  to  make  you  quit  it  more  easily,  I 
desire  that,  beside  what  has  been  hitherto  suggested, 
you  will  farther  consider  whether,  upon  supposition 


78  THE  SECOND    DIALOGUE 

that  Matter  exists,  you  can  possibly  conceive  how  you 
should  be  affected  by  it?  Or,  supposing  it  did  not 
exist,  whether  it  be  not  evident  you  might  for  all  that 
be  affected  with  the  same  ideas  you  now  are,  and  con- 
sequently have  the  very  same  reasons  to  believe  its 
existence  that  you  now  can  have? 

Hyl.  I  acknowledge  it  is  possible  we  might  per- 
ceive all  things  just  as  we  do  now,  though  there  was 
no  Matter  in  the  world ;  neither  can  I  conceive,  if 
there  be  Matter,  how  it  should  produce  any  idea  in 
our  minds.  And,  I  do  farther  grant  you  have  entirely 
satisfied  me  that  it  is  impossible  there  should  be  such 
a  thing  as  Matter  in  any  of  the  foregoing  acceptations. 
But  still  I  cannot  help  supposing  that  there  is  Matter 
in  some  sense  or  other.  What  that  is  I  do  not  indeed 
pretend  to  determine. 

Phil.  I  do  not  expect  you  should  define  exactly 
the  nature  of  that  unknown  being.  Only  be  pleased  to 
tell  me  whether  it  is  a  Substance — and  if  so,  whether 
you  can  suppose  a  substance  without  accidents ;  or, 
in  case  you  suppose  it  to  have  accidents  or  qualities, 
I  desire  you  will  let  me  know  what  those  qualities  are, 
at  least  what  is  meant  by  Matter's  supporting  them? 

Hyl.  We  have  already  argued  on  those  points.  I 
have  no  more  to  say  to  them.  But,  to  prevent  any 
farther  questions,  let  me  tell  you  I  at  present  under- 
stand by  Matter  neither  substance  nor  accident,  think- 
ing nor  extended  being,  neither  cause,  instrument, 
nor  occasion,  but  something  entirely  unknown,  dis- 
tinct from  all  these. 

Phil.  It  seems  then  you  include  in  your  present 
notion  of  Matter  nothing  but  the  general  abstract  idea 
of  entity. 

Hyl.  Nothing  else,  save  only  that  I  superadd  to 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  79 

this  general  idea  the  negation  of  all  those  particular 
things,  qualities,  or  ideas,  that  I  perceive,  imagine, 
or  in  anywise  apprehend. 

Phil.  Pray  where  do  you  suppose  this  unknown 
Matter  to  exist? 

Hyl.  Oh  Philonous!  now  you  think  you  have  en- 
tangled me ;  for,  if  I  say  it  exists  in  place  then  you 
will  infer  that  it  exists  in  the  mind,  since  it  is  agreed 
that  place  or  extension  exists  only  in  the  mind :  but  I 
am  not  ashamed  to  own  my  ignorance.  I  know  not 
where  it  exists ;  only  I  am  sure  it  exists  not  in  place. 
There  is  a  negative  answer  for  you.  And  you  must 
expect  no  other  to  all.  the  questions  you  put  for  the 
future  about  Matter. 

Phil.  Since  you  will  not  tell  me  where  it  exists,  be 
pleased  to  inform  me  after  what  manner  you  suppose 
it  to  exist,  or  what  you  mean  by  its  existence? 

Hyl.  It  neither  thinks  nor  acts,  neither  perceives 
nor  is  perceived. 

Phil.  But  what  is  there  positive  in  your  abstracted 
notion  of  its  existence? 

Hyl.  Upon  a  nice  observation,  I  do  not  find  I  have 
any  positive  notion  or  meaning  at  all.  I  tell  you 
again,  I  am  not  ashamed  to  own  my  ignorance.  I 
know  not  what  is  meant  by  its  existence,  or  how  it  ex- 
ists. 

Phil.  Continue,  good  Hylas,  to  act  the  same  in- 
genuous part,  and  tell  me  sincerely  whether  you  can 
frame  a  distinct  idea  of  Entity  in  general,  prescinded 
from  and  exclusive  of  all  thinking  and  corporeal  be- 
ings, all  particular  things  whatsoever. 

Hyl.  Hold,  let  me  think  a  little 1  profess, 

Philonous,  I  do  not  find  that  I  can.  At  first  glance, 
methought  I  had  some  dilute  and  airy  notion  of  pure 


80  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

Entity  in  abstract ;  but,  upon  closer  attention,  it  hath 
quite  vanished  out  of  sight.  The  more  I  think  on  it, 
the  more  am  I  confirmed  in  my  prudent  resolution  of 
giving  none  but  negative  answers,  and  not  pretending 
to  the  least  degree  of  any  positive  knowledge  or  con- 
ception of  Matter,  its  where,  its  how,  its  entity,  or  any- 
thing belonging  to  it. 

Phil.  When,  therefore,  you  speak  of  the  existence 
of  Matter,  you  have  not  any  notion  in  your  mind? 

Hyl.   None  at  all. 

Phil.  Pray  tell  me  if  the  case  stands  not  thus : — at 
first,  from  a  belief  of  material  substance,  you  would 
have  it  that  the  immediate  objects  existed  without  the 
mind ;  then  that  they  are  archetypes ;  then  causes ; 
next  instruments  ;  then  occasions  :  lastly,  something  in 
general,  which  being  interpreted  proves  nothing.  So 
Matter  comes  to  nothing.  What  think  you,  Hylas,  is 
not  this  a  fair  summary  of  your  whole  proceeding? 

Hyl.  Be  that  as  it  will,  yet  I  still  insist  upon  it, 
that  our  not  being  able  to  conceive  a  thing  is  no  argu- 
ment against  its  existence. 

Phil.  That  from  a  cause,  effect,  operation,  sign, 
or  other  circumstance  there  may  reasonably  be  in- 
ferred the  existence  of  a  thing  not  immediately  per- 
ceived ;  and  that  it  were  absurd  for  any  man  to  argue 
against  the  existence  of  that  thing,  from  his  having 
no  direct  and  positive  notion  of  it,  I  freely  own.  But, 
where  there  is  nothing  of  all  this ;  where  neither  rea- 
son nor  revelation  induces  us  to  believe  the  existence 
of  a  thing ;  where  we  have  not  even  a  relative  notion 
of  it ;  where  an  abstraction  is  made  from  perceiving 
and  being  perceived,  from  Spirit  and  idea :  lastly, 
where  there  is  not  so  much  as  the  most  inadequate  or 
faint  idea  pretended  to :  I  will  not  indeed  thence  con- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  8 1 

elude  against  the  reality  of  any  notion,  or  existence 
of  anything  ;  but  my  inference  shall  be,  that  you  mean 
nothing  at  all ;  that  you  employ  words  to  no  manner 
of  purpose,  without  any  design  or  signification  what- 
soever. And  I  leave  it  to  you  to  consider  how  mere 
jargon  should  be  treated. 

Hyl.  To  deal  frankly  with  you,  Philonous,  your 
arguments  seem  in  themselves  unanswerable ;  but 
they  have  not  so  great  an  effect  on  me  as  to  produce 
that  entire  conviction,  that  hearty  acquiescence,  which 
attends  demonstration.  I  find  myself  still  relapsing 
into  an  obscure  surmise  of  I  know  not  what,  matter. 

Phil.  But,  are  you  not  sensible,  Hylas,  that  two 
things  must  concur  to  take  away  all  scruple,  and  work 
a  plenary  assent  in  the  mind  ?  Let  a  visible  object  be 
set  in  never  so  clear  a  light,  yet,  if  there  is  any  imper- 
fection in  the  sight,  or  if  the  eye  is  not  directed  to- 
wards it,  it  will  not  be  distinctly  seen.  And,  though 
a  demonstration  be  never  so  well  grounded  and  fairly 
proposed,  yet,  if  there  is  withal  a  stain  of  prejudice, 
or  a  wrong  bias  on  the  understanding,  can  it  be  ex- 
pected on  a  sudden  to  perceive  clearly  and  adhere 
firmly  to  the  truth?  No,  there  is  need  of  time  and 
pains :  the  attention  must  be  awakened  and  detained 
by  a  frequent  repetition  of  the  same  thing  placed  oft 
in  the  same,  oft  in  different  lights.  I  have  said  it 
already,  and  find  I  must  still  repeat  and  inculcate, 
that  it  is  an  unaccountable  licence  you  take,  in  pre- 
tending to  maintain  you  know  not  what,  for  you  know 
not  what  reason,  to  you  know  not  what  purpose.  Can 
this  be  paralleled  in  any  art  or  science,  any  sect  or 
profession  of  men?  Or  is  there  anything  so  bare- 
facedly groundless  and  unreasonable  to  be  met  with 
even  in  the  lowest  of  common  conversation?  But, 


82  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

perhaps  you  will  still  say,  Matter  may  exist ;  though 
at  the  same  time  you  neither  know  what  is  meant  by 
Matter,  or  by  its  existence.  This  indeed  is  surprising, 
and  the  more  so  because  it  is  altogether  voluntary, 
you  not  being  led  to  it  by  any  one  reason ;  for  I  chal- 
lenge you  to  shew  me  that  thing  in  nature  which 
needs  matter  to  explain  or  account  for  it. 

Hyl.  The  reality  of  things  cannot  be  maintained 
without  supposing  the  existence  of  Matter.  And  is 
not  this,  think  you,  a  good  reason  why  I  should  be 
earnest  in  its  defence? 

Phil.  The  reality  of  things !  What  things,  sensible 
or  intelligible? 

Hyl.  Sensible  things. 

Phil.   My  glove,  for  example? 

Hyl.  That  or  any  other  thing  perceived  by  the 
senses. 

Phil.  But  to  fix  on  some  particular  thing  ;  is  it  not 
a  sufficient  evidence  to  me  of  the  existence  of  this 
glove,  that  I  see  it,  and  feel  it,  and  wear  it?  Or,  if 
this  will  not  do,  how  is  it  possible  I  should  be  assured 
of  the  reality  of  this  thing,  which  I  actually  see  in  this 
place,  by  supposing  that  some  unknown  thing,  which 
I  never  did  or  can  see,  exists  after  an  unknown  man- 
ner, in  an  unknown  place,  or  in  no  place  at  all?  How 
can  the  supposed  reality  of  that  which  is  intangible 
be  a  proof  that  anything  tangible  really  exists?  Or, 
of  that  which  is  invisible,  that  any  visible  thing,  or, 
in  general  of  anything  which  is  imperceptible,  that  a 
perceptible  exists?  Do  but  explain  this  and  I  shall 
think  nothing  too  hard  for  you. 

Hyl.  Upon  the  whole,  I  am  content  to  own  the 
existence  of  Matter  is  highly  improbable ;  but  the  di- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  83 

rect  and  absolute  impossibility  of  it  does  not  appear 
to  me. 

Phil.  But,  granting  Matter  to  be  possible,  yet, 
upon  that  account  merely,  it  can  have  no  more  claim 
to  existence  than  a  golden  mountain  or  a  centaur. 

Hyl.  I  acknowledge  it ;  but  still  you  do  not  deny 
it  is  possible ;  and  that  which  is  possible,  for  aught 
you  know,  may  actually  exist. 

Phil.  I  deny  it  to  be  possible  ;  and  have,  if  I  mis- 
take not,  evidently  proved,  from  your  own  conces- 
sions, that  it  is  not.  In  the  common  sense  of  the 
word  Matter,  is  there  any  more  implied  than  an  ex- 
tended, solid,  figured,  moveable  substance  existing 
without  the  mind  ?  And  have  not  you  acknowledged, 
over  and  over,  that  you  have  seen  evident  reason  for 
denying  the  possibility  of  such  a  substance? 

Hyl.  True,  but  that  is  only  one  sense  of  the  term 
Matter. 

Phil.  But,  is  it  not  the  only  proper  genuine  re- 
ceived sense?  and,  if  Matter  in  such  a  sense  be  proved 
impossible,  may  it  not  be  thought  with  good  grounds 
absolutely  impossible?  Else  how  could  anything  be 
proved  impossible  ?  Or,  indeed,  how  could  there  be 
any  proof  at  all  one  way  or  other,  to  a  man  who  takes 
the  liberty  to  unsettle  and  change  the  common  signifi- 
cation of  words? 

Hyl.  I  thought  philosophers  might  be  allowed  to 
speak  more  accurately  than  the  vulgar,  and  were  not 
always  confined  to  the  common  acceptation  of  a  term. 

Phil.  But  this  now  mentioned  is  the  common  re- 
ceived sense  among  philosophers  themselves.  But, 
not  to  insist  on  that,  have  you  not  been  allowed  to 
take  Matter  in  what  sense  you  pleased?  And  have 
you  not  used  this  privilege  in  the  utmost  extent,  some- 


84  THE  SECOND  DIALOGUE 

times  entirely  changing,  at  others  leaving  out  or  put- 
ting into  the  definition  of  it  whatever,  for  the  present, 
best  served  your  design,  contrary  to  all  the  known 
rules  of  reason  and  logic?  And  hath  not  this  shifting, 
unfair  method  of  yours  spun  out  our  dispute  to  an 
unnecessary  length ;  Matter  having  been  particularly 
examined,  and  by  your  own  confession  refuted  in  each 
of  those  senses  ?  And  can  any  more  be  required  to 
prove  the  absolute  impossibility  of  a  thing,  than  the 
proving  it  impossible  in  every  particular  sense  that 
either  you  or  any  one  else  understands  it  in? 

Hyl.  But  I  am  not  so  thoroughly  satisfied  that  you 
have  proved  the  impossibility  of  matter,  in  the  last 
most  obscure  abstracted  and  indefinite  sense. 

Phil.  When  is  a  thing  shewn  to  be  impossible? 

Hyl.  When  a  repugnancy  is  demonstrated  between 
the  ideas  comprehended  in  its  definition. 

Phil.  But  where  there  are  no  ideas,  there  no  re- 
pugnancy can  be  demonstrated  between  ideas? 

Hyl.   I  agree  with  you. 

Phil.  Now,  in  that  which  you  call  the  obscure  in- 
definite sense  of  the  word  Matter,  it  is  plain,  by  your 
own  confession,  there  was  included  no  idea  at  all,  no 
sense  except  an  unknown  sense,  which  is  the  same 
thing  as  none.  You  are  not,  therefore,  to  expect  I 
should  prove  a  repugnancy  between  ideas,  where  there 
are  no  ideas:  or  the  impossibility  of  Matter  taken  in 
an  unknown  sense,  that  is,  no  sense  at  all.  My  busi- 
ness was  only  to  shew  you  meant  nothing;  and  this 
you  were  brought  to  own.  So  that,  in  all  your  vari- 
ous senses,  you  have  been  shewed  either  to  mean 
nothing  at  all,  or,  if  anything,  an  absurdity.  And  if 
this  be  not  sufficient  to  prove  the  impossibility  of  a 
thing,  I  desire  you  will  let  me  know  what  is. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  85 

Hyl.  I  acknowledge  you  have  proved  that  Matter 
is  impossible ;  nor  do  I  see  what  more  can  be  said  in 
defence  of  it.  But,  at  the  same  time  that  I  give  up 
this,  I  suspect  all  my  other  notions.  For  surely  none 
could  be  more  seemingly  evident  than  this  once  was : 
and  yet  it  now  seems  as  false  and  absurd  as  ever  it 
did  true  before.  But  I  think  we  have  discussed  the 
point  sufficiently  for  the  present.  The  remaining  part 
of  the  day  I  would  willingly  spend  in  running  over  in 
my  thoughts  the  several  heads  of  this  morning's  con- 
versation, and  to-morrow  shall  be  glad  to  meet  you 
here  again  about  the  same  time. 

Phil.   I  will  not  fail  to  attend  you. 


THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE. 

Philonous. 

rT~VELL  me,  Hylas,  what  are  the  fruits  of  yesterday's 
JL  meditation?  Hath  it  confirmed  you  in  the  same 
mind  you  were  in  at  parting?  or  have  you  since  seen 
cause  to  change  your  opinion? 

HyL  Truly  my  opinion  is  that  all  our  opinions  are 
alike  vain  and  uncertain.  What  we  approve  to-day, 
we  condemn  to-morrow.  We  keep  a  stir  about  knowl- 
edge, and  spend  our  lives  in  the  pursuit  of  it,  when, 
alas !  we  know  nothing  all  the  while  :  nor  do  I  think 
it  possible  for  us  ever  to  know  anything  in  this  life. 
Our  faculties  are  too  narrow  and  too  few.  Nature 
certainly  never  intended  us  for  speculation. 

Phil.  What!  say  you  we  can  know  nothing, Hy las? 

Hyl.  There  is  not  that  single  thing  in  the  world 
whereof  we  can  know  the  real  nature,  or  what  it  is  in 
itself. 

Phil.  Will  you  tell  me  I  do  not  really  know  what 
fire  or  water  is? 

Hyl.  You  may  indeed  know  that  fire  appears  hot, 
and  water  fluid;  but  this  is  no  more  than  knowing 
what  sensations  are  produced  in  your  own  mind,  upon 
the  application  of  fire  and  water  to  your  organs  of 
sense.  Their  internal  constitution,  their  true  and  real 
nature,  you  are  utterly  in  the  dark  as  to  that. 


THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE  87 

Phil.  Do  I  not  know  this  to  be  a  real  stone  that  I 
stand  on,  and  that  which  1  see  before  my  eyes  to  be  a 
real  tree? 

Hyl.  Know?  No,  it  is  impossible  you  or  any  man 
alive  should  know  it.  All  you  know  is,  that  you  have 
such  a  certain  idea  or  appearance  in  your  own  mind. 
But  what  is  this  to  the  real  tree  or  stone?  I  tell  you 
that  colour,  figure,  and  hardness,  which  you  perceive, 
are  not  the  real  natures  of  those  things,  or  in  the  least 
like  them.  The  same  may  be  said  of  all  other  real 
things  or  corporeal  substances  which  compose  the 
world.  They  have  none  of  them  anything  of  them- 
selves, like  those  sensible  qualities  by  us  perceived. 
We  should  not  therefore  pretend  to  affirm  or  know 
anything  of  them,  as  they  are  in  their  own  nature. 

Phil.  But  surely,  Hylas,  I  can  distinguish  gold, 
for  example,  from  iron  :  and  how  could  this  be,  if  I 
knew  not  what  either  truly  was? 

Hyl.  Believe  me,  Philonous,  you  can  only  distin- 
guish between  your  own  ideas.  That  yellowness,  that 
weight,  and  other  sensible  qualities,  think  you  they 
are  really  in  the  gold?  They  are  only  relative  to  the 
senses  and  have  no  absolute  existence  in  nature.  And 
in  pretending  to  distinguish  the  species  of  real  things, 
by  the  appearances  in  your  mind,  you  may  perhaps 
act  as  wisely  as  he  that  should  conclude  two  men 
were  of  a  different  species,  because  their  clothes  were 
not  of  the  same  colour. 

Phil.  It  seems,  then,  we  are  altogether  put  off 
with  the  appearances  of  things,  and  those  false  ones 
too.  The  very  meat  I  eat,  and  the  cloth  I  wear,  have 
nothing  in  them  like  what  I  see  and  feel. 

Hyl.   Even  so. 

Phil.   But  is  it  not  strange  the  whole  world  should 


88  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

be  thus  imposed  on,  and  so  foolish  as  to  believe  their 
senses?  And  yet  I  know  not  how  it  is,  but  men  eat, 
and  drink,  and  sleep,  and  perform  all  the  offices  of 
life,  as  comfortably  and  conveniently  as  if  they  really 
knew  the  things  they  are  conversant  about. 

Hyl.  They  do  so :  but  you  know  ordinary  practice 
does  not  require  a  nicety  of  speculative  knowledge. 
Hence  the  vulgar  retain  their  mistakes,  and  for  all 
that  make  a  shift  to  bustle  through  the  affairs  of  life. 
But  philosophers  know  better  things. 

Phil.   You  mean,  they  know  that  they  know  nothing. 

Hyl.  That  is  the  very  top  and  perfection  of  human 
knowledge. 

Phil.  But  are  you  all  this  while  in  earnest,  Hylas; 
and  are  you  seriously  persuaded  that  you  know  noth- 
ing real  in  the  world?  Suppose  you  are  going  to 
write,  would  you  not  call  for  pen,  ink,  and  paper,  like 
another  man ;  and  do  you  not  know  what  it  is  you  call 
for? 

Hyl.  How  often  must  I  tell  you,  that  I  know  not 
the  real  nature  of  any  one  thing  in  the  universe?  I 
may  indeed  upon  occasion  make  use  of  pen,  ink,  and 
paper.  But,  what  any  one  of  them  is  in  its  own  true 
nature,  I  declare  positively  I  know  not.  And  the  same 
is  true  with  regard  to  every  other  corporeal  thing. 
And,  what  is  more,  we  are  not  only  ignorant  of  the 
true  and  real  nature  of  things,  but  even  of  their  exist- 
ence. It  cannot  be  denied  that  we  perceive  such  cer- 
tain appearances  or  ideas ;  but  it  cannot  be  concluded 
from  thence  that  bodies  really  exist.  Nay,  now  I  think 
on  it,  I  must,  agreeably  to  my  former  concessions, 
farther  declare  that  it  is  impossible  any  real  corporeal 
thing  should  exist  in  nature. 

Phil.  You  amaze  me.     Was  ever  anything  more 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  89 

wild  and  extravagant  than  the  notions  you  now  main- 
tain :  and  is  it  not  evident  you  are  led  into  all  these 
extravagances  by  the  belief  of  material  substance?  This 
makes  you  dream  of  those  unknown  natures  in  every- 
thing. It  is  this  occasions  your  distinguishing  be- 
tween the  reality  and  sensible  appearances  of  things. 
It  is  to  this  you  are  indebted  for  being  ignorant  of 
what  everybody  else  knows  perfectly  well.  Nor  is 
this  all :  you  are  not  only  ignorant  of  the  true  nature 
of  everything,  but  you  know  not  whether  any  thing 
really  exists,  or  whether  there  are  any  true  natures  at 
all ;  forasmuch  as  you  attribute  to  your  material  beings 
an  absolute  or  external  existence,  wherein  you  sup- 
pose their  reality  consists.  And,  as  you  are  forced  in 
the  end  to  acknowledge  such  an  existence  means 
either  a  direct  repugnancy,  or  nothing  at  all,  it  fol- 
lows that  you  are  obliged  to  pull  down  your  own  hy- 
pothesis of  material  Substance,  and  positively  to  deny 
the  real  existence  of  any  part  of  the  universe.  And 
so  you  are  plunged  into  the  deepest  and  most  deplor- 
able Scepticism  that  ever  man  was.  Tell  me,  Hylas,  is 
it  not  as  I  say? 

Hyl.  I  agree  with  you.  Material  substance  was  no 
more  than  an  hypothesis,  and  a  false  and  groundless 
one  too.  I  will  no  longer  spend  my  breath  in  defence 
of  it.  But,  whatever  hypothesis  you  advance,  or  what- 
soever scheme  of  things  you  introduce  in  its  stead,  I 
doubt  not  it  will  appear  every  whit  as  false :  let  me 
but  be  allowed  to  question  you  upon  it.  That  is,  suf- 
fer me  to  serve  you  in  your  own  kind,  and  I  warrant 
it  shall  conduct  you  through  as  many  perplexities  and 
contradictions,  to  the  very  same  state  of  Scepticism 
that  I  myself  am  in  at  present. 

Phil.   I   assure  you,   Hylas,    I   do  not  pretend  to 


9O  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

frame  any  hypothesis  at  all.  I  am  of  a  vulgar  cast, 
simple  enough  to  believe  my  senses,  and  leave  things 
as  I  find  them.  To  be  plain,  it  is  my  opinion  that  the 
real  things  are  those  very  things  I  see  and  feel,  and 
perceive  by  my  senses.  These  I  know,  and,  finding 
they  answer  all  the  necessities  and  purposes  of  life, 
have  no  reason  to  be  solicitous  about  any  other  un- 
known beings.  A  piece  of  sensible  bread,  for  instance, 
would  stay  my  stomach  better  than  ten  thousand 
times  as  much  of  that  insensible,  unintelligible,  real 
bread  you  speak  of.  It  is  likewise  my  opinion  that 
colours  and  other  sensible  qualities  are  on  the  objects. 
I  cannot  for  my  life  help  thinking  that  snow  is  white, 
and  fire  hot.  You  indeed,  who  by  snow  andyfrr  mean 
certain  external, unperceived,  unperceiving  substances, 
are  in  the  right  to  deny  whiteness  or  heat  to  be  affec- 
tions inherent  in  them.  But  I,  who  understand  by 
those  words  the  things  I  see  and  feel,  am  obliged  to 
think  like  other  folks.  And,  as  I  am  no  sceptic  with 
regard  to  the  nature  of  things,  so  neither  am  I  as  to 
their  existence.  That  a  thing  should  be  really  per- 
ceived by  my  senses,  and  at  the  same  time  not  really 
exist,  is  to  me  a  plain  contradiction ;  since  I  cannot 
prescind  or  abstract,  even  in  thought,  the  existence 
of  a  sensible  thing  from  its  being  perceived.  Wood, 
stones,  fire,  water,  flesh,  iron,  and  the  like  things, 
which  I  name  and  discourse  of,  are  things  that  I 
know.  And  I  should  not  have  known  them  but  that 
I  perceived  them  by  my  senses ;  and  things  perceived 
by  the  senses  are  immediately  perceived ;  and  things 
immediately  perceived  are  ideas ;  and  ideas  cannot 
exist  without  the  mind ;  their  existence  therefore  con- 
sists in  being  perceived ;  when,  therefore,  they  are 
actually  perceived  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  their  ex- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  QI 

istence.  Away  then  with  all  that  Scepticism,  all  those 
ridiculous  philosophical  doubts.  What  a  jest  is  it  for 
a  philosopher  to  question  the  existence  of  sensible 
things,  till  he  hath  it  proved  to  him  from  the  veracity 
of  God ;  or  to  pretend  our  knowledge  in  this  point 
falls  short  of  intuition  or  demonstration  !  I  might  as 
well  doubt  of  my  own  being,  as  of  the  being  of  those 
things  I  actually  see  and  feel. 

Hyl.  Not  so  fast,  Philonous:  you  say  you  cannot 
conceive  how  sensible  things  should  exist  without  the 
mind.  Do  you  not? 

Phil.   I  do. 

Hyl.  Supposing  you  were  annihilated,  cannot  you 
conceive  it  possible  that  things  perceivable  by  sense 
may  still  exist? 

Phil.  I  can ;  but  then  it  must  be  in  another  mind. 
When  I  deny  sensible  things  an  existence  out  of  the 
mind,  I  do  not  mean  my  mind  in  particular,  but  all 
minds.  Now,  it  is  plain,  they  have  an  existence  ex- 
terior to  my  mind  ;  since  I  find  them  by  experience  to 
be  independent  of  it.  There  is  therefore  some  other 
mind  wherein  they  exist,  during  the  intervals  between 
the  times  of  my  perceiving  them  :  as  likewise  they  did 
before  my  birth,  and  would  do  after  my  supposed  an- 
nihilation. And,  as  the  same  is  true  with  regard  to 
all  other  finite  created  spirits,  it  necessarily  follows 
there  is  an  omnipresent  eternal  Mind,  which  knows  and 
comprehends  all  things,  and  exhibits  them  to  our  view 
in  such  a  manner,  and  according  to  such  rules,  as  He 
Himself  hath  ordained,  and  are  by  us  termed  the  laws 
of  nature. 

Hyl.  Answer  me,  Philonous.  Are  all  our  ideas  per- 
fectly inert  beings?  Or  have  they  any  agency  included 
in  them? 


Q2  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

Phil.   They  are  altogether  passive  and  inert. 

Hyl.  And  is  not  God  an  agent,  a  being  purely  ac- 
tive? 

Phil.   I  acknowledge  it. 

Hyl.  No  idea  therefore  can  be  like  unto,  or  repre- 
sent the  nature  of  God? 

Phil.   It  cannot. 

Hyl.  Since  therefore  you  have  no  idea  of  the  mind 
of  God,  how  can  you  conceive  it  possible  that  things 
should  exist  in  His  mind?  Or,  if  you  can  conceive 
the  mind  of  God,  without  having  an  idea  of  it,  why 
may  not  I  be  allowed  to  conceive  the  existence  of 
Matter,  notwithstanding  I  have  no  idea  of  it  ? 

Phil.  As  to  your  first  question  :  I  own  I  have  prop- 
erly no  idea,  either  of  God  or  any  other  spirit ;  for 
these  being  active,  cannot  be  represented  by  things 
perfectly  inert,  as  our  ideas  are.  I  do  nevertheless 
know  that  I,  who  am  a  spirit  or  thinking  substance, 
exist  as  certainly  as  I  know  my  ideas  exist.  Farther, 
I  know  what  I  mean  by  the  terms  /  and  myself;  and  I 
know  this  immediately  or  intuitively,  though  I  do  not 
perceive  it  as  I  perceive  a  triangle,  a  colour,  or  a 
sound.  The  Mind,  Spirit,  or  Soul  is  that  indivisible 
unextended  thing  which  thinks,  acts,  and  perceives. 
I  say  indivisible,  because  unextended ;  and  unextended, 
because  extended,  figured,  moveable  things  are  ideas  ; 
and  that  which  perceives  ideas,  which  thinks  and 
wills,  is  plainly  itself  no  idea,  nor  like  an  idea.  Ideas 
are  things  inactive,  and  perceived.  And  Spirits  a  sort 
of  beings  altogether  different  from  them.  I  do  not 
therefore  say  my  soul  is  an  idea,  or  like  an  idea. 
However,  taking  the  word  idea  in  a  large  sense,  my 
soul  may  be  said  to  furnish  me  with  an  idea,  that  is, 
an  image  or  likeness  of  God,  though  indeed  extremely 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  93 

inadequate.  For,  all  the  notion  I  have  of  God  is  ob- 
tained by  reflecting  on  my  own  soul,  heightening  its 
powers,  and  removing  its  imperfections.  I  have,  there- 
fore, though  not  an  inactive  idea,  yet  in  myself  some, 
sort  of  an  active  thinking  image  of  the  Deity.  And, 
though  I  perceive  Him  not  by  sense,  yet  I  have  a  no- 
tion of  Him,  or  know  Him  by  reflexion  and  reason- 
ing. My  own  mind  and  my  own  ideas  I  have  an  im- 
mediate knowledge  of;  and,  by  the  help  of  these,  do 
mediately  apprehend  the  possibility  of  the  existence 
of  other  spirits  and  ideas.  Farther,  from  my  own 
being,  and  from  the  dependency  I  find  in  myself  and 
my  ideas,  I  do,  by  an  act  of  reason,  necessarily  infer 
the  existence  of  a  God,  and  of  all  created  things  in 
the  mind  of  God.  So  much  for  your  first  question. 
For  the  second :  I  suppose  by  this  time  you  can  an- 
swer it  yourself.  For  you  neither  perceive  Matter 
objectively,  as  you  do  an  inactive  being  or  idea ;  nor 
know  it,  as  you  do  yourself,  by  a  reflex  act ;  neither 
do  you  mediately  apprehend  it  by  similitude  of  the 
one  or  the  other ;  nor  yet  collect  it  by  reasoning  from 
that  which  you  know  immediately.  All  which  makes 
the  case  of  Matter  widely  different  from  that  of  the 
Deity. J 

Hyl.  You  say  your  own  soul  supplies  you  with 
some  sort  of  an  idea  or  image  of  God.  But,  at  the 
same  time,  you  acknowledge  you  have,  properly  speak- 
ing, no  idea  of  your  own  soul.  You  even  affirm  that 
spirits  are  a  sort  of  beings  altogether  different  from 
ideas.  Consequently  that  no  idea  can  be  like  a  spirit. 
We  have  therefore  no  idea  of  any  spirit.  You  admit 
nevertheless  that  there  is  spiritual  Substance,  although 

1  The  four  following  paragraphs  were  not  contained  in  the  first  and  sec- 
ond editions. 


94  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

you  have  no  idea  of  it ;  while  you  deny  there  can  be 
such  a  thing  as  material  Substance,  because  you  have 
no  notion  or  idea  of  it.  Is  this  fair  dealing?  To  act 
consistently,  you  must  either  admit  Matter  or  reject 
Spirit.  What  say  you  to  this? 

Phil.  I  say,  in  the  first  place,  that  I  do  not  deny 
the  existence  of  material  substance,  merely  because  I 
have  no  notion  of  it,  but  because  the  notion  of  it  is 
inconsistent;  or,  in  other  words,  because  it  is  repug- 
nant that  there  should  be  a  notion  of  it.  Many  things, 
for  aught  I  know,  may  exist,  whereof  neither  I  nor 
any  other  man  hath  or  can  have  any  idea  or  notion 
whatsoever.  But  then  those  things  must  be  possible, 
that  is,  nothing  inconsistent  must  be  included  in  their 
definition.  I  say,  secondly,  that,  although  we  believe 
things  to  exist  which  we  do  not  perceive,  yet  we  may 
not  believe  that  any  particular  thing  exists,  without 
some  reason  for  such  belief :  but  I  have  no  reason  for 
believing  the  existence  of  Matter.  I  have  no  imme- 
diate intuition  thereof :  neither  can  I  immediately 
from  my  sensations,  ideas,  notions,  actions,  or  pas- 
sions, infer  an  unthinking,  unperceiving,  inactive  Sub- 
stance, either  by  probable  deduction,  or  necessary 
consequence.  Whereas  the  being  of  my  Self,  that  is, 
my  own  soul,  mind,  or  thinking  principle,  I  evidently 
know  by  reflexion.  You  will  forgive  me  if  I  repeat 
the  same  things  in  answer  to  the  same  objections.  In 
the  very  notion  or  definition  of  material  Substance, 
there  is  included  a  manifest  repugnance  and  incon 
sistency.  But  this  cannot  be  said  of  the  notion  of 
Spirit.  That  ideas  should  exist  in  what  doth  not  per- 
ceive, or  be  produced  by  what  doth  not  act,  is  repug- 
nant. But,  it  is  no  repugnancy  to  say  that  a  perceiv- 
ing thing  should  be  the  subject  of  ideas,  or  an  active 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  Q5 

thing  the  cause  of  them.  It  is  granted  we  have  neither 
an  immediate  evidence  nor  a  demonstrative  knowl- 
edge of  the  existence  of  other  finite  spirits ;  but  it  will 
not  thence  follow  that  such  spirits  are  on  a  foot  with 
material  substances  :  if  to  suppose  the  one  be  incon- 
sistent, and  it  be  not  inconsistent  to  suppose  the 
other ;  if  the  one  can  be  inferred  by  no  argument,  and 
there  is  a  probability  for  the  other;  if  we  see  signs 
and  effects  indicating  distinct  finite  agents  like  our- 
selves, and  see  no  sign  or  symptom  whatever  that 
leads  to  a  rational  belief  of  Matter.  I  say,  lastly, 
that  I  have  a  notion  of  Spirit,  though  I  have  not, 
strictly  speaking,  an  idea  of  it.  I  do  not  perceive  k 
as  an  idea,  or  by  means  of  an  idea,  but  know  it  by  re- 
flexion. 

Hyl.  Notwithstanding  all  you  have  said,  to  me  it 
seems  that,  according  to  your  own  way  of  thinking^ 
and  in  consequence  of  your  own  principles,  it  should 
follow  that  you  are  only  a  system  of  floating  ideas, 
without  any  substance  to  support  them.  Words  are 
not  to  be  used  without  a  meaning.  And,  as  there  is 
no  more  meaning  in  spiritual  Substance  than  in  material 
Substance,  the  one  is  to  be  exploded  as  well  as  the 
other. 

Phil.  How  often  must  I  repeat,  that  I  know  or  am 
conscious  of  my  own  being;  and  that  I  myself  ^.va.  not 
my  ideas,  but  somewhat  else,  a  thinking,  active  prin- 
ciple that  perceives,  knows,  wills,  and  operates  about 
ideas.  I  know  that  I,  one  and  the  same  self,  perceive 
both  colours  and  sounds :  that  a  colour  cannot  per- 
ceive a  sound,  nor  a  sound  a  colour :  that  I  am  there- 
fore one  individual  principle,  distinct  from  colour  and 
sound  ;  and,  for  the  same  reason,  from  all  other  sen- 
sible things  and  inert  ideas.  But,  I  am  not  in  like 


96  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

manner  conscious  either  of  the  existence  or  essence 
of  Matter.  On  the  contrary,  I  know  that  nothing  in- 
consistent can  exist,  and  that  the  existence  of  Matter 
implies  an  inconsistency.  Farther,  I  know  what  I 
mean  when  I  affirm  that  there  is  a  spiritual  substance 
or  support  of  ideas,  that  is,  that  a  spirit  knows  and 
perceives  ideas.  But,  I  do  not  know  what  is  meant 
when  it  is  said  that  an  unperceiving  substance  hath 
inherent  in  it  and  supports  either  ideas  or  the  arche- 
types of  ideas.  There  is  therefore  upon  the  whole  no 
parity  of  case  between  Spirit  and  Matter. 

Hyl,  I  own  myself  satisfied  in  this  point.  But,  do 
you  in  earnest  think  the  real  existence  of  sensible 
things  consists  in  their  being  actually  perceived?  If 
so;  how  comes  it  that  all  mankind  distinguish  be- 
tween them?  Ask  the  first  man  you  meet,  and  he 
shall  tell  you,  to  be  perceived  is  one  thing,  and  to  exist 
is  another. 

Phil,  I  am  content,  Hylas,  to  appeal  to  the  com- 
mon sense  of  the  world  for  the  truth  of  my  notion. 
Ask  the  gardener  why  he  thinks  yonder  cherry-tree 
exists  in  the  garden,  and  he  shall  tell  you,  because  he 
sees  and  feels  it ;  in  a  word,  because  he  perceives  it 
by  his  senses.  Ask  him  why  he  thinks  an  orange-tree 
not  to  be  there,  and  he  shall  tell  you,  because  he  does 
not  perceive  it.  What  he  perceives  by  sense,  that  he 
terms  a  real  being,  and  saith  it  is  or  exists;  but,  that 
which  is  not  perceivable,  the  same,  he  saith,  hath  no 
being. 

Hyl.  Yes,  Philonous,  I  grant  the  existence  of  a  sen- 
sible thing  consists  in  being  perceivable,  but  not  in 
being  actually  perceived. 

Phil.  And  what  is  perceivable  but  an  idea  ?     And 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  Q7 

can  an  idea  exist  without  being  actually  perceived? 
These  are  points  long  since  agreed  between  us. 

HyL  But,  be  your  opinion  never  so  true,  yet  surely 
you  will  not  deny  it  is  shocking,  and  contrary  to  the 
common  sense  of  men.  Ask  the  fellow  whether  yon- 
der tree  hath  an  existence  out  of  his  mind :  what  an- 
swer think  you  he  would  make? 

Phil.  The  same  that  I  should  myself,  to  wit,  that 
it  doth  exist  out  of  his  mind.  But  then  to  a  Christian 
it  cannot  surely  be  shocking  to  say,  the  real  tree,  ex- 
isting without  his  mind,  is  truly  known  and  compre- 
hended by  (that  is,  exists  in)  the  infinite  mind  of  God. 
Probably  he  may  not  at  first  glance  be  aware  of  the 
direct  and  immediate  proof  there  is  of  this;  inasmuch 
as  the  very  being  of  a  tree,  or  any  other  sensible 
thing,  implies  a  mind  wherein  it  is.  But  the  point 
itself  he  cannot  deny.  The  question  between  the  Ma- 
terialists and  me  is  not,  whether  things  have  a  real 
existence  out  of  the  mind  of  this  or  that  person,  but, 
whether  they  have  an  absolute  existence,  distinct  from 
being  perceived  by  God,  and  exterior  to  all  minds. 
This  indeed  some  heathens  and  philosophers  have 
affirmed,  but  whoever  entertains  notions  of  the  Deity 
suitable  to  the  Holy  Scriptures  will  be  of  another 
opinion. 

Hyl.  But,  according  to  your  notions,  what  differ- 
ence is  there  between  real  things,  and  chimeras  formed 
by  the  imagination,  or  the  visions  of  a  dream,  since 
they  are  all  equally  in  the  mind  ? 

Phil.  The  ideas  formed  by  the  imagination  are 
faint  and  indistinct ;  they  have,  besides,  an  entire  de- 
pendence on  the  will.  But  the  ideas  perceived  by 
sense,  that  is,  real  things,  are  more  vivid  and  clear; 
and,  being  imprinted  on  the  mind  by  a  spirit  distinct 


98  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

from  us,  have  not  the  like  dependence  on  our  will. 
There  is  therefore  no  danger  of  confounding  these 
with  the  foregoing  :  and  there  is  as  little  of  confound- 
ing them  with  the  visions  of  a  dream,  which  are  dim, 
irregular,  and  confused.  And,  though  they  should 
happen  to  be  never  so  lively  and  natural,  yet,  by  their 
not  being  connected,  and  of  a  piece  with  the  preced- 
ing and  subsequent  transactions  of  our  lives,  they 
might  easily  be  distinguished  from  realities.  In  short, 
by  whatever  method  you  distinguish  things  from  chi- 
meras on  your  scheme,  the  same,  it  is  evident,  will 
hold  also  upon  mine.  For,  it  must  be,  I  presume,  by 
some  perceived  difference ;  and  I  am  not  for  depriv- 
ing you  of  any  one  thing  that  you  perceive. 

Hyl.  But  still,  Philonous,  you  hold,  there  is  noth- 
ing in  the  world  but  spirits  and  ideas.  And  this,  you 
must  needs  acknowledge,  sounds  very  oddly. 

Phil.  I  own  the  word  idea,  not  being  commonly 
used  for  thing,  sounds  something  out  of  the  way.  My 
reason  for  using  it  was,  because  a  necessary  relation 
to  the  mind  is  understood  to  be  implied  by  that  term ; 
and  it  is  now  commonly  used  by  philosophers  to  de- 
note the  immediate  objects  of  the  understanding.  But, 
however  oddly  the  proposition  may  sound  in  words, 
yet  it  includes  nothing  so  very  strange  or  shocking  in 
its  sense ;  which  in  effect  amounts  to  no  more  than 
this,  to  wit,  that  there  are  only  things  perceiving,  and 
things  perceived ;  or  that  every  unthinking  being  is 
necessarily,  and  from  the  very  nature  of  its  existence, 
perceived  by  some  mind ;  if  not  by  a  finite  created 
mind,  yet  certainly  by  the  infinite  mind  of  God,  in 
whom  "we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our  being."  Is 
this  as  strange  as  to  say,  the  sensible  qualities  are  not 
on  the  objects :  or  that  we  cannot  be  sure  of  the  ex- 


BETWEEN   HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  99 

istence  of  things,  or  know  anything  of  their  real  na- 
tures, though  we  both  see  and  feel  them,  and  perceive 
them  by  all  our  senses? 

Hyl.  And,  in  consequence  of  this,  must  we  not 
think  there  are  no  such  things  as  physical  or  corporeal 
causes ;  but  that  a  Spirit  is  the  immediate  cause  of 
all  the  phenomena  in  nature?  Can  there  be  anything 
more  extravagant  than  this? 

Phil.  Yes,  it  is  infinitely  more  extravagant  to  say 
a  thing  which  is  inert  operates  on  the  mind,  and  which 
is  unperceiving,  is  the  cause  of  our  perceptions,  with- 
out any  regard  either  to  consistency,  or  the  old  known 
axiom,  Nothing  can  give  to  another  that  which  it  hath 
not  itself.^-  Besides,  that  which  to  you,  I  know  not 
for  what  reason,  seems  so  extravagant  is  no  more 
than  the  Holy  Scriptures  assert  in  a  hundred  places. 
In  them  God  is  represented  as  the  sole  and  imme- 
diate Author  of  all  those  effects  which  some  heathens 
and  philosophers  are  wont  to  ascribe  to  Nature,  Mat- 
ter, Fate,  or  the  like  unthinking  principle.  This  is 
so  much  the  constant  language  of  Scripture  that  it 
were  needless  to  confirm  it  by  citations. 

Hyl.  You  are  not  aware,  Philonous,  that,  in  making 
God  the  immediate  Author  of  all  the  motions  in  na- 
ture, you  make  Him  the  Author  of  murder,  sacrilege, 
adultery,  and  the  like  heinous  sins. 

Phil.  In  answer  to  that,  I  observe,  first,  that  the 
imputation  of  guilt  is  the  same,  whether  a  person 
commits  an  action  with  or  without  an  instrument.  In 
case  therefore  you  suppose  God  to  act  by  the  media- 
tion of  an  instrument,  or  occasion,  called  Matter,  you 
as  truly  make  Him  the  author  of  sin  as  I,  who  think 

1  The  words  of  this  sentence  from  "  without "  to  the  end  were  omitted 
from  the  last  edition. 


IOO  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

Him  the  immediate  agent  in  all  those  operations  vul- 
garly ascribed  to  Nature.  I  farther  observe  that  sin 
or  moral  turpitude  doth  not  consist  in  the  outward 
physical  action  or  motion,  but  in  the  internal  devia- 
tion of  the  will  from  the  laws  of  reason  and  religion. 
This  is  plain,  in  that  the  killing  an  enemy  in  a  battle, 
or  putting  a  criminal  legally  to  death,  is  not  thought 
sinful ;  though  the  outward  act  be  the  very  same  with 
that  in  the  case  of  murder.  Since,  therefore,  sin  doth 
not  consist  in  the  physical  action,  the  making  God  an 
immediate  cause  of  all  such  actions  is  not  making  Him 
the  Author  of  sin.  Lastly,  I  have  nowhere  said  that 
God  is  the  only  agent  who  produces  all  the  motions  in 
bodies.  It  is  true  I  have  denied  there  are  any  other 
agents  besides  spirits ;  but  this  is  very  consistent  with 
allowing  to  thinking  rational  beings,  in  the  produc- 
tion of  motions,  the  use  of  limited  powers,  ultimately 
indeed  derived  from  God,  but  immediately  under  the 
direction  of  their  own  wills,  which  is  sufficient  to  en- 
title them  to  all  the  guilt  of  their  actions. 

Hyl.  But  the  denying  Matter,  Philonous,  or  cor- 
poreal Substance ;  there  is  the  point.  You  can  never 
persuade  me  that  this  is  not  repugnant  to  the  uni- 
versal sense  of  mankind.  Were  our  dispute  to  be  de- 
termined by  most  voices,  I  am  confident  you  would 
give  up  the  point,  without  gathering  the  votes. 

Phil.  I  wish  both  our  opinions  were  fairly  stated 
and  submitted  to  the  judgment  of  men  who  had  plain 
common  sense,  without  the  prejudices  of  a  learned 
education.  Let  me  be  represented  as  one  who  trusts 
his  senses,  who  thinks  he  knows  the  things  he  sees 
and  feels,  and  entertains  no  doubts  of  their  existence ; 
and  you  fairly  set  forth  with  all  your  doubts,  your  par- 
adoxes, and  your  scepticism  about  you,  and  I  shall 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  IOI 

willingly  acquiesce  in  the  determination  of  any  indiffer- 
ent person.  That  there  is  no  substance  wherein  ideas 
can  exist  beside  spirit  is  to  me  evident.  And  that  the 
objects  immediately  perceived  are  ideas,  is  on  all  hands 
agreed.  And  that  sensible  qualities  are  objects  imme- 
diately perceived  no  one  can  deny.  It  is  therefore  evi- 
dent there  can  be  no  substratum  of  those  qualities  but 
spirit ;  in  which  they  exist,  not  by  way  of  mode  or  prop- 
erty, but  as  a  thing  perceived  in  that  which  perceives 
it.  I  deny  therefore  that  there  is  any  unthinking  sub- 
stratum of  the  objects  of  sense,  and  in  that  acceptation 
that  there  is  any  material  substance.  But  if  by  material 
substance  is  meant  only  sensible  body,  that  which  is 
seen  and  felt  (and  the  unphilosophical  part  of  the 
world,  I  dare  say,  mean  no  more),  then  I  am  more 
certain  of  matter's  existence  than  you  or  any  other 
philosopher  pretend  to  be.  If  there  be  anything  which 
makes  the  generality  of  mankind  averse  from  the  no- 
tions I  espouse,  it  is  a  misapprehension  that  I  deny 
the  reality  of  sensible  things :  but,  as  it  is  you  who 
are  guilty  of  that  and  not  I,  it  follows  that  in  truth 
their  aversion  is  against  your  notions  and  not  mine.  I 
do  therefore  assert  that  I  am  as  certain  as  of  my  own 
being,  that  there  are  bodies  or  corporeal  substances 
(meaning  the  things  I  perceive  by  my  senses) ;  and 
that,  granting  this,  the  bulk  of  mankind  will  take  no 
thought  about,  nor  think  themselves  at  all  concerned 
in  the  fate  of  those  unknown  natures  and  philosoph- 
ical quiddities  which  some  men  are  so  fond  of. 

Hyl.  What  say  you  to  this?  Since,  according  to 
you,  men  judge  of  the  reality  of  things  by  their  senses, 
how  can  a  man  be  mistaken  in  thinking  the  moon  a 
plain  lucid  surface,  about  a  foot  in  diameter;  or  a 


IO2  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

square  tower,  seen  at  a  distance,  round ;  or  an  oar, 
with  one  end  in  the  water,  crooked? 

Phil.  He  is  not  mistaken  with  regard  to  the  ideas 
he  actually  perceives,  but  in  the  inferences  he  makes 
from  his  present  perceptions.  Thus,  in  the  case  of 
the  oar,  what  he  immediately  perceives  by  sight  is 
certainly  crooked ;  and  so  far  he  is  in  the  right.  But, 
if  he  thence  conclude  that  upon  taking  the  oar  out  of 
the  water  he  shall  perceive  the  same  crookedness ;  or 
that  it  would  affect  his  touch  as  crooked  things  are 
wont  to  do :  in  that  he  is  mistaken.  In  like  manner, 
if  he  shall  conclude  from  what  he  perceives  in  one 
station,  that,  in  case  he  advances  towards  the  moon 
or  tower,  he  should  still  be  affected  with  the  like  ideas, 
he  is  mistaken.  But  his  mistake  lies  not  in  what  he 
perceives  immediately  and  at  present  (it  being  a  mani- 
fest contradiction  to  suppose  he  should  err  in  respect 
of  that),  but  in  the  wrong  judgment  he  makes  con- 
cerning the  ideas  he  apprehends  to  be  connected  with 
those  immediately  perceived :  or,  concerning  the  ideas 
that,  from  what  he  perceives  at  present,  he  imagines 
would  be  perceived  in  other  circumstances.  The  case 
is  the  same  with  regard  to  the  Copernican  system. 
We  do  not  here  perceive  any  motion  of  the  earth  : 
but  it  were  erroneous  thence  to  conclude,  that,  in  case 
we  were  placed  at  as  great  a  distance  from  that  as  we 
are  now  from  the  other  planets,  we  should  not  then 
perceive  its  motion. 

Hyl.  I  understand  you ;  and  must  needs  own  you 
say  things  plausible  enough :  but,  give  me  leave  to 
put  you  in  mind  of  one  thing.  Pray,  Philonous,  were 
you  not  formerly  as  positive  that  Matter  existed,  as 
you  are  now  that  it  does  not? 

Phil.   I  was.    But  here  lies  the  difference.     Before, 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  IO3 

my  positiveness  was  founded,  without  examination, 
upon  prejudice;  but  now,  after  inquiry,  upon  evi- 
dence. 

Hyl.  After  all,  it  seems  our  dispute  is  rather  about 
words  than  things.  We  agree  in  the  thing,  but  differ 
in  the  name.  That  we  are  affected  with  ideas  from 
without  is  evident ;  and  it  is  no  less  evident  that  there 
must  be  (I  will  not  say  archetypes,  but)  powers  with- 
out the  mind,  corresponding  to  those  ideas.  And,  as 
these  powers  cannot  subsist  by  themselves,  there  is 
some  subject  of  them  necessarily  to  be  admitted, 
which  I  call  Matter,  and  you  call  Spirit.  This  is  all 
the  difference. 

Phil.  Pray,  Hylas,  is  that  powerful  being,  or  sub- 
ject of  powers,  extended? 

Hyl.  It  hath  not  extension ;  but  it  hath  the  power 
to  raise  in  you  the  idea  of  extension. 

Phil.  It  is  therefore  itself  unextended  ? 

Hyl.  I  grant  it. 

Phil.   Is  it  not  also  active? 

Hyl.  Without  doubt :  otherwise,  how  could  we  at- 
tribute powers  to  it? 

Phil.  Now  let  me  ask  you  two  questions :  First, 
whether  it  be  agreeable  to  the  usage  either  of  philos- 
ophers or  others  to  give  the  name  Matter  to  an  unex- 
tended active  being  ?  And,  Secondly,  whether  it  be 
not  ridiculously  absurd  to  misapply  names  contrary 
to  the  common  use  of  language  ? 

Hyl.  Well  then,  let  it  not  be  called  Matter,  since 
you  will  have  it  so,  but  some  third  nature  distinct 
from  Matter  and  Spirit.  For  what  reason  is  there 
why  you  should  call  it  Spirit?  Does  not  the  notion 
of  spirit  imply  that  it  is  thinking,  as  well  as  active 
and  unextended? 


104  THE  TH1RD  DIALOGUE 

Phil.  My  reason  is  this :  because  I  have  a  mind  to 
have  some  notion  of  meaning  in  what  I  say :  but  I 
have  no  notion  of  any  action  distinct  from  volition, 
neither  can  I  conceive  volition  to  be  anywhere  but  in 
a  spirit;  therefore,  when  I  speak  of  an  active  being,  I 
am  obliged  to  mean  a  spirit.  Beside,  what  can  be 
plainer  than  that  a  thing  which  hath  no  ideas  in  itself 
cannot  impart  them  to  me;  and,  if  it  hath  ideas, 
surely  it  must  be  a  spirit.  To  make  you  comprehend 
the  point  still  more  clearly  if  it  be  possible :  I  assert 
as  well  as  you  that,  since  we  are  affected  from  with- 
out, we  must  allow  powers  to  be  without,  in  a  being 
distinct  from  ourselves.  So  far  we  are  agreed.  But 
then  we  differ  as  to  the  kind  of  this  powerful  being.  I 
will  have  it  to  be  spirit,  you  Matter,  or  I  know  not 
what  (I  may  add  too,  you  know  not  what)  third  na- 
ture. Thus,  I  prove  it  to  be  spirit.  From  the  effects 
I  see  produced  I  conclude  there  are  actions ;  and,  be- 
cause actions,  volitions ;  and,  because  there  are  voli- 
tions, there  must  be  a  will.  Again,  the  things  I  per- 
ceive must  have  an  existence,  they  or  their  archetypes, 
out  of  my  mind :  but,  being  ideas,  neither  they  nor 
their  archetypes  can  exist  otherwise  than  in  an  under- 
standing; there  is  therefore  an  understanding.  But 
will  and  understanding  constitute  in  the  strictest  sense 
a  mind  or  spirit.  The  powerful  cause,  therefore,  of 
my  ideas  is  in  strict  propriety  of  speech  a  spirit. 

Hyl.  And  now  I  warrant  you  think  you  have  made 
the  point  very  clear,  little  suspecting  that  what  you 
advance  leads  directly  to  a  contradiction.  Is  it  not 
an  absurdity  to  imagine  any  imperfection  in  God? 

Phil.  Without  a  doubt. 

Hyl.  To  suffer  pain  is  an  imperfection? 

Phil.   It  is. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  1 05 

HyL  Are  we  not  sometimes  affected  with  pain  and 
uneasiness  by  some  other  being? 

Phil.   We  are. 

HyL  And  have  you  not  said  that  being  is  a  spirit, 
and  is  not  that  spirit  God? 

Phil.   I  grant  it. 

HyL  But  you  have  asserted  that  whatever  ideas 
we  perceive  from  without  are  in  the  mind  which  affects 
us.  The  ideas,  therefore,  of  pain  and  uneasiness  are 
in  God ,  or,  in  other  words,  God  suffers  pain :  that  is 
to  say,  there  is  an  imperfection  in  the  Divine  nature, 
which,  you  acknowledge,  was  absurd.  So  you  are 
caught  in  a  plain  contradiction. 

Phil.  That  God  knows  or  understands  all  things, 
and  that  He  knows,  among  other  things,  what  pain 
is,  even  every  sort  of  painful  sensation,  and  what  it  is 
for  His  creatures  to  suffer  pain,  I  make  no  question. 
But,  that  God,  though  He  knows  and  sometimes 
causes  painful  sensations  in  us,  can  Himself  suffer 
pain,  I  positively  deny.  We,  who  are  limited  and 
dependent  spirits,  are  liable  to  impressions  of  sense, 
the  effects  of  an  external  agent,  which,  being  pro- 
duced against  our  wills,  are  sometimes  painful  and 
uneasy.  But  God,  whom  no  external  being  can  affect, 
who  perceives  nothing  by  sense  as  we  do,  whose  will 
is  absolute  and  independent,  causing  all  things,  and 
liable  to  be  thwarted  or  resisted  by  nothing ;  it  is  evi- 
dent, such  a  Being  as  this  can  suffer  nothing,  nor  be 
affected  with  any  painful  sensation,  or  indeed  any  sen- 
sation at  all.  We  are  chained  to  a  body,  that  is  to 
say,  our  perceptions  are  connected  with  corporeal 
motions.  By  the  law  of  our  nature,  we  are  affected 
upon  every  alteration  in  the  nervous  parts  of  our  sen- 
sible body  ;  which  sensible  body,  rightly  considered, 


106  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

is  nothing  but  a  complexion  of  such  qualities  or  ideas 
as  have  no  existence  distinct  from  being  perceived  by 
a  mind :  so  that  this  connexion  of  sensations  with 
corporeal  motions  means  no  more  than  a  correspond- 
ence in  the  order  of  nature  between  two  sets  of  ideas, 
or  things  immediately  perceivable.  But  God  is  a  pure 
spirit,  disengaged  from  all  such  sympathy  or  natural 
ties.  No  corporeal  motions  are  attended  with  the 
sensations  of  pain  or  pleasure  in  His  mind.  To  know 
everything  knowable  is  certainly  a  perfection ;  but  to 
endure,  or  surfer,  or  feel  anything  by  sense,  is  an  im- 
perfection. The  former,  I  say,  agrees  to  God,  but 
not  the  latter.  God  knows  or  hath  ideas ;  but  His 
ideas  are  not  conveyed  to  Him  by  sense,  as  ours  are. 
Your  not  distinguishing,  where  there  is  so  manifest  a 
difference,  makes  you  fancy  you  see  an  absurdity  where 
there  is  none. 

Hyl.  But,  all  this  while  you  have  not  considered 
that  the  quantity  of  Matter  hath  been  demonstrated 
to  be  proportioned  to  the  gravity  of  bodies.  And  what 
can  withstand  demonstration? 

Phil.   Let  me  see  how.  you  demonstrate  that  point. 

Hyl.  I  lay  it  down  for  a  principle  that  the  mo- 
ments or  quantities  of  motion  in  bodies  are  in  a  direct 
compounded  reason  of  the  velocities  and  quantities  of 
Matter  contained  in  them.  Hence,  where  the  veloci- 
ties are  equal,  it  follows  the  moments  are  directly  as 
the  quantity  of  Matter  in  each.  But  it  is  found  by 
experience  that  all  bodies  (bating  the  small  inequali- 
ties, arising  from  the  resistance  of  the  air)  descend 
with  an  equal  velocity ;  the  motion  therefore  of  de- 
scending bodies,  and  consequently  their  gravity,  which 
is  the  cause  or  principle  of  that  motion,  is  proper- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  IOJ 

tional  to  the  quantity  of  Matter;  which  was  to  be 
demonstrated. 

Phil.  You  lay  it  down  as  a  self-evident  principle 
that  the  quantity  of  motion  in  any  body  is  propor- 
tional to  the  velocity  and  Matter  taken  together ;  and 
this  is  made  use  of  to  prove  a  proposition  from  whence 
the  existence  of  Mattrr  is  inferred.  Pray  is  not  this 
arguing  in  a  circle? 

Hyl.  In  the  premise  I  only  mean  that  the  motion 
is  proportional  to  the  velocity,  jointly  with  the  exten- 
sion and  solidity. 

Phil.  But,  allowing  this  to  be  true,  yet  it  will  not 
thence  follow  that  gravity  is  proportional  to  Matter, 
in  your  philosophic  sense  of  the  word ;  except  you 
take  it  for  granted  that  unknown  substratum,  or  what- 
ever else  you  call  it,  is  proportional  to  those  sensible 
qualities;  which  to  suppose  is  plainly  begging  the 
question.  That  there  is  magnitude  and  solidity,  or 
resistance,  perceived  by  sense,  I  readily  grant ;  as 
likewise,  that  gravity  may  be  proportional  to  those 
qualities  I  will  not  dispute.  But  that  either  these 
qualities  as  perceived  by  us,  or  the  powers  producing 
them,  do  exist  in  a  material  substratum; — this  is  what 
I  deny,  and  you  indeed  affirm,  but,  notwithstanding 
your  demonstration,  have  not  yet  proved. 

Hyl.  I  shall  insist  no  longer  on  that  point.  Do 
you  think,  however,  you  shall  persuade  me  the  nat- 
ural philosophers  have  been  dreaming  all  this  while? 
Pray  what  becomes  of  all  their  hypotheses  and  expli- 
cations of  the  phenomena,  which  suppose  the  exist- 
ence of  Matter? 

Phil.   What  mean  you,  Hylas,  by  the  phenomena? 

Hyl.  I  mean  the  appearances  which  I  perceive  by 
my  senses. 


108  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

Phil.  And  the  appearances  perceived  by  sense,  are 
they  not  ideas? 

Hyl.   I  have  told  you  so  a  hundred  times. 

Phil.  Therefore,  to  explain  the  phenomena  is  to 
shew  how  we  come  to  be  affected  with  ideas,  in  that 
manner,  and  order  wherein  they  are  imprinted  on  our 
senses.  Is  it  not? 

Hyl.   It  is. 

Phil.  Now,  if  you  can  prove  that  any  philosopher 
hath  explained  the  production  of  any  one  idea  in  our 
minds  by  the  help  of  Matter,  I  shall  for  ever  acquiesce, 
and  look  on  all  that  hath  been  said  against  it  as  noth- 
ing ;  but,  if  you  cannot,  it  is  vain  to  urge  the  explica- 
tion of  phenomena.  That  a  Being  endowed  with 
knowledge  and  will  should  produce  or  exhibit  ideas 
is  easily  understood.  But,  that  a  Being  which  is  utterly 
destitute  of  these  faculties  should  be  able  to  produce 
ideas,  or  in  any  sort  to  affect  an  intelligence,  this  I 
can  never  understand.  This  I  say,  though  we  had 
some  positive  conception  of  Matter,  though  we  knew 
its  qualities,  and  could  comprehend  its  existence, 
would  yet  be  so  far  from  explaining  things,  that  it  is 
itself  the  most  inexplicable  thing  in  the  world.  And 
yet,  for  all  this,  it  will  not  follow  that  philosophers 
have  been  doing  nothing ;  for,  by  observing  and  rea- 
soning upon  the  connexion  of  ideas,  they  discover  the 
laws  and  methods  of  nature,  which  is  a  part  of  knowl- 
edge both  useful  and  entertaining. 

Hyl.  After  all,  can  it  be  supposed  God  would  de- 
ceive all  mankind?  Do  you  imagine  He  would  have 
induced  the  whole  world  to  believe  the  being  of  Mat- 
ter, if  there  was  no  such  thing? 

Phil.  That  every  epidemical  opinion  arising  from 
prejudice,  or  passion,  or  thoughtlessness  may  be  im- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  lOQ 

puted  to  God,  as  the  Author  of  it,  I  believe  you  will 
not  affirm.  Whatsoever  opinion  we  father  on  Him,  it 
must  be  either  because  He  has  discovered  it  to  us  by 
supernatural  revelation ;  or  because  it  is  so  evident  to 
our  natural  faculties,  which  were  framed  and  given 
us  by  God,  that  it  is  impossible  we  should  withhold 
our  assent  from  it.  But  where  is  the  revelation?  or 
where  is  the  evidence  that  extorts  the  belief  of  Mat- 
ter? Nay,  how  does  it  appear,  that  Matter,  taken  for 
something  distinct  from  what  we  perceive  by  our 
senses,  is  thought  to  exist  by  all  mankind ;  or,  indeed, 
by  any  except  a  few  philosophers,  who  do  not  know 
what  they  would  be  at?  Your  question  supposes  these 
points  are  clear ;  and,  when  you  have  cleared  them,  I 
shall  think  myself  obliged  to  give  you  another  answer. 
In  the  meantime  let  it  suffice  that  I  tell  you,  I  do  not 
suppose  God  has  deceived  mankind  at  all. 

Hyl.  But  the  novelty,  Philonous,  the  novelty ! 
There  lies  the  danger.  New  notions  should  always 
be  discountenanced ;  they  unsettle  men's  minds,  and 
nobody  knows  where  they  will  end. 

Phil.  Why  the  rejecting  a  notion  that  hath  no 
foundation,  either  in  sense,  or  in  reason,  or  in  Divine 
authority,  should  be  thought  to  unsettle  the  belief  of 
such  opinions  as  are  grounded  on  all  or  any  of  these, 
I  cannot  imagine.  That  innovations  in  government 
and  religion  are  dangerous,  and  ought  to  be  discoun- 
tenanced, I  freely  own.  But,  is  there  the  like  reason 
why  they  should  be  discouraged  in  philosophy?  The 
making  anything  known  which  was  unknown  before 
is  an  innovation  in  knowledge :  and,  if  all  such  inno- 
vations had  been  forbidden,  men  would  have  made  a 
notable  progress  in  the  arts  and  sciences.  But  it  is 
none  of  my  business  to  plead  for  novelties  and  para- 


110  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

doxes.  That  the  qualities  we  perceive  are  not  on  the 
objects :  that  we  must  not  believe  our  senses :  that 
we  know  nothing  of  the  real  nature  of  things,  and  can 
never  be  assured  even  of  their  existence:  that  real 
colours  and  sounds  are  nothing  but  certain  unknown 
figures  and  motions :  that  motions  are  in  themselves 
neither  swift  nor  slow :  that  there  are  in  bodies  abso- 
lute extensions,  without  any  particular  magnitude  or 
figure :  that  a  thing  stupid,  thoughtless,  and  inactive, 
operates  on  a  spirit :  that  the  least  particle  of  a  body 
contains  innumerable  extended  parts : — these  are  the 
novelties,  these  are  the  strange  notions  which  shock 
the  genuine  uncorrupted  judgment  of  all  mankind ; 
and  being  once  admitted,  embarrass  the  mind  with 
endless  doubts  and  difficulties.  And  it  is  against 
these  and  the  like  innovations  I  endeavour  to  vindi- 
cate Common  Sense.  It  is  true,  in  doing  this,  I  may 
perhaps  be  obliged  to  use  some  ambages,  and  ways  of 
speech  not  common.  But,  if  my  notions  are  once 
thoroughly  understood,  that  which  is  most  singular 
in  them  will,  in  effect,  be  found  to  amount  to  no  more 
than  this : — that  it  is  absolutely  impossible,  and  a 
plain  contradiction,  to  suppose  any  unthinking  being 
should  exist  without  being  perceived  by  a  mind.  And, 
if  this  notion  be  singular,  it  is  a  shame  it  should  be 
so  at  this  time  of  day,  and  in  a  Christian  country. 

Hyl.  As  for  the  difficulties  other  opinions  may  be 
liable  to,  those  are  out  of  the  question.  It  is  your 
business  to  defend  your  own  opinion.  Can  anything 
be  plainer  than  that  you  are  for  changing  all  things 
into  ideas?  You,  I  say,  who  are  not  ashamed  to  charge 
me  with  scepticism.  This  is  so  plain,  there  is  no  de- 
nying it. 

Phil.  You  mistake  me.     I  am   not  for  changing 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  Ill 

things  into  ideas,  but  rather  ideas  into  things  ;  since 
those  immediate  objects  of  perception,  which,  accord- 
ing to  you,  are  only  appearances  of  things,  I  take  to 
be  the  real  things  themselves. 

Hyl.  Things !  you  may  pretend  what  you  please ; 
but  it  is  certain  you  leave  us  nothing  but  the  empty 
forms  of  things,  the  outside  only  which  strikes  the 
senses. 

Phil.  What  you  call  the  empty  forms  and  outside 
of  things  seem  to  me  the  very  things  themselves.  Nor 
are  they  empty  or  incomplete,  otherwise  than  upon 
your  supposition  that  Matter  is  an  essential  part  of  all 
corporeal  things.  We  both,  therefore,  agree  in  this, 
that  we  perceive  only  sensible  forms:  but  herein  we 
differ,  you  will  have  them  to  be  empty  appearances, 
I  real  beings.  In  short,  you  do  not  trust  your  senses, 
I  do. 

Hyl.  You  say  you  believe  your  senses ;  and  seem 
to  applaud  yourself  that  in  this  you  agree  with  the 
vulgar.  According  to  you,  therefore,  the  true  nature 
of  a  thing  is  discovered  by  the  senses.  If  so,  whence 
comes  that  disagreement?  Why,  is  not  the  same 
figure,  and  other  sensible  qualities,  perceived  all  man- 
ner of  ways?  And  why  should  we  use  a  microscope 
the  better  to  discover  the  true  nature  of  a  body,  if  it 
were  discoverable  to  the  naked  eye? 

Phil.  Strictly  speaking,  Hylas,  we  do  not  see  the 
same  object  that  we  feel ;  neither  is  the  same  object 
perceived  by  the  microscope  which  was  by  the  naked 
eye.  But,  in  case  every  variation  was  thought  suffi- 
cient to  constitute  a  new  kind  or  individual,  the  end- 
less number  or  confusion  of  names  would  render  lan- 
guage impracticable.  Therefore,  to  avoid  this  as  well 
as  other  inconveniences  which  are  obvious  upon  a 


112  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

little  thought,  men  combine  together  several  ideas, 
apprehended  by  divers  senses,  or  by  the  same  sense 
at  different  times,  or  in  different  circumstances,  but 
observed,  however,  to  have  some  connexion  in  na- 
ture, either  with  respect  to  coexistence  or  succession ; 
all  which  they  refer  to  one  name,  and  consider  as  one 
thing.  Hence,  it  follows  that  when  I  examine  by  my 
other  senses  a  thing  I  have  seen,  it  is  not  in  order  to 
understand  better  the  same  object  which  I  had  per- 
ceived by  sight,  the  object  of  one  sense  not  being  per- 
ceived by  the  other  senses.  And,  when  I  look  through 
a  microscope,  it  is  not  that  I  may  perceive  more 
clearly  what  I  perceived  already  with  my  bare  eyes ; 
the  object  perceived  by  the  glass  being  quite  different 
from  the  former.  But,  in  both  cases,  my  aim  is  only 
to  know  what  ideas  are  connected  together ;  and  the 
more  a  man  knows  of  the  connexion  of  ideas,  the  more 
he  is  said  to  know  of  the  nature  of  things.  What, 
therefore,  if  our  ideas  are  variable ;  what  if  our  senses 
are  not  in  all  circumstances  affected  with  the  same 
appearances?  It  will  not  thence  follow  they  are  not 
to  be  trusted,  or  that  they  are  inconsistent  either  with 
themselves  or  anything  else ;  except  it  be  with  your 
preconceived  notion  of  (I  know  not  what)  one  single, 
unchanged,  unperceivable,  real  nature,  marked  by 
each  name :  which  prejudice  seems  to  have  taken  its 
rise  from  not  rightly  understanding  the  common  lan- 
guage of  men,  speaking  of  several  distinct  ideas  as 
united  into  one  thing  by  the  mind.  And,  indeed,  there 
is  cause  to  suspect  several  erroneous  conceits  of  the 
philosophers  are  owing  to  the  same  original :  while 
they  began  to  build  their  schemes  not  so  much  on  no- 
tions as  words,  which  were  framed  by  the  vulgar, 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  113 

merely  for  conveniency  and  dispatch  in  the  common 
actions  of  life,  without  any  regard  to  speculation. 

Hyl.   Methinks  I  apprehend  your  meaning. 

Phil.  It  is  your  opinion  the  ideas  we  perceive  by 
our  senses  are  not  real  things,  but  images  or  copies 
of  them.  Our  knowledge,  therefore,  is  no  farther  real 
than  as  our  ideas  are  the  true  representations  of  those 
originals.  But,  as  these  supposed  originals  are  in 
themselves  unknown,  it  is  impossible  to  know  how 
far  our  ideas  resemble  them ;  or  whether  they  resemble 
them  at  all.  We  cannot,  therefore,  be  sure  we  have 
any  real  knowledge.  Farther,  as  our  ideas  are  per- 
petually varied,  without  any  change  in  the  supposed 
real  things,  it  necessarily  follows  they  cannot  all  be 
true  copies  of  them  :  or,  if  some  are  and  others  are 
not,  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  the  former  from 
the  latter.  And  this  plunges  us  yet  deeper  in  uncer- 
tainty. Again,  when  we  consider  the  point,  we  can- 
not conceive  how  any  idea,  or  anything  like  an  idea, 
should  have  an  absolute  existence  out  of  a  mind  :  nor 
consequently,  according  to  you,  how  there  should  be 
any  real  thing  in  nature.  The  result  of  all  which  is 
that  we  are  thrown  into  the  most  hopeless  and  aban- 
doned Scepticism.  Now,  give  me  leave  to  ask  you, 
First,  Whether  your  referring  ideas  to  certain  abso- 
lutely existing  unperceived  substances,  as  their  orig- 
inals, be  not  the  source  of  all  this  Scepticism?  Sec- 
ondly, whether  you  are  informed,  either  by  sense  or 
reason,  of  the  existence  of  those  unknown  originals? 
And,  in  case  you  are  not,  whether  it  be  not  absurd  to 
suppose  them?  Thirdly,  Whether,  upon  inquiry,  you 
find  there  is  anything  distinctly  conceived  or  meant 
by  the  absolute  or  external  existence  of  unperceiving  sub- 
stances? Lastly,  Whether,  the  premises  considered, 


114  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

it  be  not  the  wisest  way  to  follow  nature,  trust  your 
senses,  and,  laying  aside  all  anxious  thought  about 
unknown  natures  or  substances,  admit  with  the  vul- 
gar those  for  real  things  which  are  perceived  by  the 
senses? 

Hyl.  For  the  present,  I  have  no  inclination  to  the 
answering  part.  I  would  much  rather  see  how  you 
can  get  over  what  follows.  Pray  are  not  the  objects 
perceived  by  the  senses  of  one,  likewise  perceivable 
to  others  present  ?  If  there  were  a  hundred  more  here, 
they  would  all  see  the  garden,  the  trees,  and  flowers, 
as  I  see  them.  But  they  are  not  in  the  same  manner 
affected  with  the  ideas  I  frame  in  my  imagination. 
Does  not  this  make  a  difference  between  the  former 
sort  of  objects  and  the  latter  ? 

Phil.  I  grant  it  does.  Nor  have  I  ever  denied  a 
difference  between  the  objects  of  sense  and  those  of 
imagination.  But  what  would  you  infer  from  thence? 
You  cannot  say  that  sensible  objects  exist  unper- 
ceived,  because  they  are  perceived  by  many. 

Hyl.  I  own  I  can  make  nothing  of  that  objection  : 
but  it  hath  led  me  into  another.  Is  it  not  your  opin- 
ion that  by  our  senses  we  perceive  only  the  ideas  ex- 
isting in  our  minds? 

Phil.  It  is. 

Hyl.  But  the  same  idea  which  is  in  my  mind  can- 
not be  in  yours,  or  in  any  other  mind.  Doth  it  not 
therefore  follow,  from  your  principles,  that  no  two  can 
see  the  same  thing?  And  is  not  this  highly  absurd ? 

Phil.  If  the  term  same  be  taken  in  the  vulgar  ac- 
ceptation, it  is  certain  (and  not  at  all  repugnant  to 
the  principles  I  maintain)  that  different  persons  may 
perceive  the  same  thing ;  or  the  same  thing  or  idea 
exist  in  different  minds.  Words  are  of  arbitrary  im- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  I  15 

position ;  and,  since  men  are  used  to  apply  the  word 
same  where  no  distinction  or  variety  is  perceived,  and 
I  do  not  pretend  to  alter  their  perceptions,  it  follows 
that,  as  men  have  said  before,  several  saw  the  same 
thing,  so  they  may,  upon  like  occasions,  still  continue 
to  use  the  same  phrase,  without  any  deviation  either 
from  propriety  of  language,  or  the  truth  of  things. 
But,  if  the  term  same  be  used  in  the  acceptation  of 
philosophers,  who  pretend  to  an  abstracted  notion  of 
identity,  then,  according  to  their  sundry  definitions  of 
this  notion  (for  it  is  not  yet  agreed  wherein  that  phil- 
osophic identity  consists),  it  may  or  may  not  be  pos- 
sible for  divers  persons  to  perceive  the  same  thing. 
But  whether  philosophers  shall  think  fit  to  call  a  thing 
the  same  or  no,  is,  I  conceive,  of  small  importance. 
Let  us  suppose  several  men  together,  all  endued  with 
the  same  faculties,  and  consequently  affected  in  like 
sort  by  their  senses,  and  who  had  yet  never  known 
the  use  of  language;  they  would  without  question, 
agree  in  their  perceptions.  Though  perhaps,  when 
they  came  to  the  use  of  speech,  some  regarding  the  uni- 
formness  of  what  was  perceived,  might  call  it  the  same 
thing  :  others,  especially  regarding  the  diversity  of  per- 
sons who  perceived,  might  choose  the  denomination 
of  different  things.  But  who  sees  not  that  all  the  dis- 
pute is  about  a  word?  to  wit,  whether  what  is  per- 
ceived by  different  persons  may  yet  have  the  term 
same  applied  to  it?  Or,  suppose  a  house,  whose  walls 
or  outward  shell  remaining  unaltered,  the  chambers 
are  all  pulled  down,  and  new  ones  built  in  their  place ; 
and  that  you  should  call  this  the  same,  and  I  should 
say  it  was  not  the  same  house : — would  we  not,  for  all 
this,  perfectly  agree  in  our  thoughts  of  the  house,  con- 
sidered in  itself?  And  would  not  all  the  difference 


Il6  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

consist  in  a  sound?  If  you  should  say,  We  differ  in  our 
notions  ;  for  that  you  superadded  to  your  idea  of  the 
house  the  simple  abstracted  idea  of  identity,  whereas 
I  did  not;  I  would  tell  you,  I  know  not  what  you 
mean  by  the  abstracted  idea  of  identity;  and  should  de- 
sire you  to  look  into  your  own  thoughts,  and  be  sure 

you  understood  yourself. Why  so  silent,  Hylas? 

Are  you  not  yet  satisfied  men  may  dispute  about  iden- 
tity and  diversity,  without  any  real  difference  in  their 
thoughts  and  opinions,  abstracted  from  names?  Take 
this  farther  reflexion  with  you — that  whether  Matter 
be  allowed  to  exist  or  no,  the  case  is  exactly  the  same 
as  to  the  point  in  hand.  For,  the  Materialists  them- 
selves acknowledge  what  we  immediately  perceive  by 
our  senses  to  be  our  own  ideas.  Your  difficulty,  there- 
fore, that  no  two  see  the  same  thing,  makes  equally 
against  the  Materialists  and  me. 

Hyl.  But  they  suppose  an  external  archetype,  to 
which  referring  their  several  ideas  they  may  truly  be 
said  to  perceive  the  same  thing. 

Phil.  And  (not  to  mention  your  having  discarded 
those  archetypes)  so  may  you  suppose  an  external 
archetype  on  my  principles ;  external,  I  mean,  to  your 
own  mind ;  though  indeed  it  must  be  supposed  to 
exist  in  that  mind  which  comprehends  all  things ;  but 
then,  this  serves  all  the  ends  of  identity,  as  well  as  if 
it  existed  out  of  a  mind.  And  I  am  sure  you  yourself 
will  not  say  it  is  less  intelligible. 

Hyl.  You  have  indeed  clearly  satisfied  me,  either 
that  there  is  no  difficulty  at  bottom  in  this  point ;  or, 
if  there  be,  that  it  makes  equally  against  both  opin- 
ions. 

Phil.  But  that  which  makes  equally  against  two 
contradictory  opinions  can  be  a  proof  against  neither. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  117 

Hyl.  I  acknowledge  it.  But,  after  all,  Philonous, 
when  I  consider  the  substance  of  what  you  advance 
against  Scepticism,  it  amounts  to  no  more  than  this : — 
We  are  sure  that  we  really  see,  hear,  feel ;  in  a  word, 
that  we  are  affected  with  sensible  impressions. 

Phil.  And  how  are  we  concerned  any  farther?  I 
see  this  cherry,  I  feel  it,  I  taste  it :  and  I  am  sure 
nothing  cannot  be  seen,  or  felt,  or  tasted  :  it  is  there- 
fore real.  Take  away  the  sensations  of  softness,  mois- 
ture, redness,  tartness,  and  you  take  away  the  cherry. 
Since  it  is  not  a  being  distinct  from  sensations ;  a 
cherry,  I  say,  is  nothing  but  a  congeries  of  sensible 
impressions,  or  ideas  perceived  by  various  senses: 
which  ideas  are  united  into  one  thing  (or  have  one 
name  given  them)  by  the  mind ;  because  they  are  ob- 
served to  attend  each  other.  Thus,  when  the  palate 
is  affected  with  such  a  particular  taste,  the  sight  is 
affected  with  a  red  colour,  the  touch  with  roundness, 
softness,  &c.  Hence,  when  I  see,  and  feel,  and  taste, 
in  sundry  certain  manners,  I  am  sure  the  cherry  ex- 
ists, or  is  real ;  its  reality  being  in  my  opinion  nothing 
abstracted  from  those  sensations.  But  if,  by  the  word 
cherry,  you  mean  an  unknown  nature,  distinct  from  all 
those  sensible  qualities,  and  by  its  existence  something 
distinct  from  its  being  perceived  ;  then,  indeed,  I  own, 
neither  you  or  I,  nor  any  one  else,  can  be  sure  it  ex- 
ists. 

Hyl.  But,  what  would  you  say,  Philonous,  if  I 
should  bring  the  very  same  reasons  against  the  exist- 
ence of  sensible  things  in  a  mind,  which  j'ou  have 
offered  against  their  existing  in  a  material  substratum? 

Phil.  When  I  see  your  reasons,  you  shall  hear 
what  I  have  to  say  to  them. 

Hyl.   Is  the  mind  extended  or  unextended? 


Il8  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

Phil.   Unextended,  without  doubt. 

HyL  Do  you  say  the  things  you  perceive  are  in 
your  mind? 

Phil.  They  are. 

HyL  Again,  have  I  not  heard  you  speak  of  sen- 
sible impressions? 

Phil.   I  believe  you  may. 

Hyl.  Explain  to  me  now,  O  Philonous  !  how  is  it 
possible  there  should  be  room  for  all  those  trees  and 
houses  to  exist  in  your  mind.  Can  extended  things 
be  contained  in  that  which  is  unextended?  Or,  are 
we  to  imagine  impressions  made  on  a  thing  void  of 
all  solidity?  You  cannot  say  objects  are  in  your  mind, 
as  books  in  your  study :  or  that  things  are  imprinted 
on  it,  as  the  figure  of  a  seal  upon  wax.  In  what  sense, 
therefore,  are  we  to  understand  those  expressions? 
Explain  me  this  if  you  can :  and  I  shall  then  be  able 
to  answer  all  those  queries  you  formerly  put  to  me 
about  my  substratum. 

Phil.  Look  you,  Hylas,  when  I  speak  of  objects  as 
existing  in  the  mind,  or  imprinted  on  the  senses,  I 
would  not  be  understood  in  the  gross  literal  sense — 
as  when  bodies  are  said  to  exist  in  a  place,  or  a  seal 
to  make  an  impression  upon  wax.  My  meaning  is 
only  that  the  mind  comprehends  or  perceives  them ; 
and  that  it  is  affected  from  without,  or  by  some  being 
distinct  from  itself.  This  is  my  explication  of  your 
difficulty ;  and  how  it  can  serve  to  make  your  tenet 
of  an  unperceiving  material  substratum  intelligible,  I 
would  fain  know. 

Hyl.  Nay,  if  that  be  all,  I  confess  I  do  not  see 
what  use  can  be  made  of  it.  But  are  you  not  guilty 
of  some  abuse  of  language  in  this  ? 

Phil.   None  at  all.   It  is  no  more  than  common  cus- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  IIQ 

torn,  which  you  know  is  the  rule  of  language,  hath 
authorised  :  nothing  being  more  usual,  than  for  phi- 
losophers to  speak  of  the  immediate  objects  of  the 
understanding  as  things  existing  in  the  mind.  Nor  is 
there  anything  in  this  but  what  is  conformable  to  the 
general  analogy  of  language  ;  most  part  of  the  mental 
operations  being  signified  by  words  borrowed  from 
sensible  things ;  as  is  plain  in  the  terms  comprehend, 
reflect,  discourse,  &c.,  which,  being  applied  to  the 
mind,  must  not  be  taken  in  their  gross  original  sense. 

Hyl.  You  have,  I  own,  satisfied  me  in  this  point. 
But  there  still  remains  one  great  difficulty,  which  I 
know  not  how  you  will  get  over.  And,  indeed,  it  is 
of  such  importance  that  if  you  could  solve  all  others, 
without  being  able  to  find  a  solution  for  this,  you 
must  never  expect  to  make  me  a  proselyte  to  your 
principles. 

Phil.   Let  me  know  this  mighty  difficulty. 

Hyl.  The  Scripture  account  of  the  creation  is  what 
appears  to  me  utterly  irreconcilable  with  your  notions. 
Moses  tells  us  of  a  creation:  a  creation  of  what?  of 
ideas?  No  certainly,  but  of  things,  of  real  things, 
solid  corporeal  substances.  Bring  your  principles  to 
agree  with  this,  and  I  shall  perhaps  agree  with  you. 

Phil.  Moses  mentions  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars, 
earth  and  sea,  plants  and  animals.  That  all  these  do 
really  exist,  and  were  in  the  beginning  created  by 
God,  I  make  no  question.  If  by  ideas  you  mean  fic- 
tions and  fancies  of  the  mind,  then  these  are  no  ideas. 
If  by  ideas  you  mean  immediate  objects  of  the  under- 
standing, or  sensible  things  which  cannot  exist  unper- 
ceived,  or  out  of  a  mind,  then  these  things  are  ideas. 
But  whether  you  do  or  do  not  call  them  ideas,  it  mat- 
ters little.  The  difference  is  only  about  a  name.  And, 


I2O  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

whether  that  name  be  retained  or  rejected,  the  sense, 
the  truth,  and  reality  of  things  continues  the  same. 
In  common  talk,  the  objects  of  our  senses  are  not 
termed  ideas  but  things.  Call  them  so  still — provided 
you  do  not  attribute  to  them  any  absolute  external 
existence — and  I  shall  never  quarrel  with  you  for  a 
word.  The  creation,  therefore,  I  allow  to  have  been 
a  creation  of  things,  of  real  things.  Neither  is  this  in 
the  least  inconsistent  with  my  principles,  as  is  evident 
from  what  I  have  now  said ;  and  would  have  been 
evident  to  you  without  this,  if  you  had  not  forgotten 
what  had  been  so  often  said  before.  But  as  for  solid 
corporeal  substances,  I  desire  you  to  shew  where 
Moses  makes  any  mention  of  them  ;  and,  if  they  should 
be  mentioned  by  him,  or  any  other  inspired  writer,  it 
would  still  be  incumbent  on  you  to  shew  those  words 
were  not  taken  in  the  vulgar  acceptation,  for  things 
falling  under  our  senses,  but  in  the  philosophic  ac- 
ceptation, for  Matter,  or  an  unknown  quiddity,  with 
an  absolute  existence.  When  you  have  proved  these 
points,  then  (and  not  till  then)  may  you  bring  the 
authority  of  Moses  into  our  dispute. 

Hyl.  It  is  in  vain  to  dispute  about  a  point  so  clear. 
I  am  content  to  refer  it  to  your  own  conscience.  Are 
you  not  satisfied  there  is  some  peculiar  repugnancy 
between  the  Mosaic  account  of  the  creation  and  your 
notions? 

Phil.  If  all  possible  sense  which  can  be  put  on  the 
first  chapter  of  Genesis  may  be  conceived  as  consist- 
ently with  my  principles  as  any  other,  then  it  has  no 
peculiar  repugnancy  with  them.  But  there  is  no  sense 
you  may  not  as  well  conceive,  believing  as  I  do.  Since, 
besides  spirits,  all  you  conceive  are  ideas ;  and  the 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  121 

existence  of  these  I  do  not  deny.  Neither  do  you 
pretend  they  exist  without  the  mind. 

Hyl.  Pray  let  me  see  any  sense  you  can  under- 
stand it  in. 

Phil.  Why,  I  imagine  that  if  I  had  been  present  at 
the  creation,  I  should  have  seen  things  produced  into 
being — that  is  become  perceptible — in  the  order  pre- 
scribed by  the  sacred  historian.  I  ever  before  be- 
lieved the  Mosaic  account  of  the  creation,  and  now 
find  no  alteration  in  my  manner  of  believing  it.  When 
things  are  said  to  begin  or  end  their  existence,  we  do 
not  mean  this  with  regard  to  God,  but  His  creatures. 
All  objects  are  eternally  known  by  God,  or,  which  is 
the  same  thing,  have  an  eternal  existence  in  His 
mind :  but  when  things,  before  imperceptible  to  crea- 
tures, are,  by  a  decree  of  God,  perceptible  to  them, 
then  are  they  said  to  begin  a  relative  existence,  with 
respect  to  created  minds.  Upon  reading  therefore 
the  Mosaic  account  of  the  creation,  I  understand  that 
the  several  parts  of  the  world  became  gradually  per- 
ceivable to  finite  spirits,  endowed  with  proper  facul- 
ties ;  so  that,  whoever  such  were  present,  they  were 
in  truth  perceived  by  them.  This  is  the  literal  ob- 
vious sense  suggested  to  me  by  the  words  of  the  Holy 
Scripture :  in  which  is  included  no  mention  or  no 
thought,  either  of  substratum,  instrument,  occasion, 
or  absolute  existence.  And,  upon  inquiry,  I  doubt 
not  it  will  be  found  that  most  plain  honest  men,  who 
believe  the  creation,  never  think  of  those  things  any 
more  than  I.  What  metaphysical  sense  you  may  un- 
derstand it  in,  you  only  can  tell. 

Hyl.  But,  Philonous,  you  do  not  seem  to  be  aware 
that  you  allow  created  things,  in  the  beginning,  only 
a  relative,  and  consequently  hypothetical  being :  that 


122  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

is  to  say,  upon  supposition  there  were  men  to  perceive 
them,  without  which  they  have  no  actuality  of  absolute 
existence  wherein  creation  might  terminate.  Is  it  not, 
therefore,  according  to  you,  plainly  impossible  the 
creation  of  any  inanimate  creatures  should  precede 
that  of  man?  And  is  not  this  directly  contrary  to  the 
Mosaic  account? 

Phil.  In  answer  to  that,  I  say,  first,  created  beings 
might  begin  to  exist  in  the  mind  of  other  created  in- 
telligences beside  men.  You  will  not  therefore  be 
able  to  prove  any  contradiction  between  Moses  and 
my  notions,  unless  you  first  shew  there  was  no  other 
order  of  finite  created  spirits  in  being  before  man.  I 
say  farther,  in  case  we  conceive  the  creation,  as  we 
should  at  this  time  a  parcel  of  plants  or  vegetables  of 
all  sorts  produced;  by  an  invisible  power,  in  a  desert 
where  nobody  was  present — that  this  way  of  explain- 
ing or  conceiving  it  is  consistent  with  my  principles, 
since  they  deprive  you  of  nothing,  either  sensible  or 
imaginable;  that  it  exactly  suits  with  the  common, 
natural,  and  undebauched  notions  of  mankind ;  that 
it  manifests  the  dependence  of  all  things  on  God  ;  and 
consequently  hath  all  the  good  effect  or  influence, 
which  it  is  possible  that  important  article  of  our  faith 
should  have  in  making  men  humble,  thankful,  and  re- 
signed to  their  Creator.  I  say,  moreover,  that,  in 
this  naked  conception  of  things,  divested  of  words, 
there  will  not  be  found  any  notion  of  what  you  call 
the  actuality  of  absolute  existence.  You  may  indeed 
raise  a  dust  with  those  terms,  and  so  lengthen  our 
dispute  to  no  purpose.  But  I  entreat  you  calmly  to 
look  into  your  own  thoughts,  and  then  tell  me  if  they 
are  not  a  useless  and  unintelligible  jargon. 

Hyl.   I  own  I  have  no  very  clear  notion  annexed  to 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  12$ 

them.  But  what  say  you  to  this?  Do  you  not  make 
the  existence  of  sensible  things  consist  in  their  being 
in  a  mind?  And  were  not  all  things  eternally  in  the 
mind  of  God?  Did  they  not  therefore  exist  from  all 
eternity,  according  to  you?  And  how  could  that  which 
was  eternal  be  created  in  time?  Can  anything  be 
clearer  or  better  connected  than  this? 

Phil.  And  are  not  you  too  of  opinion,  that  God 
knew  all  things  from  eternity? 

Hyl.    I  am. 

Phil.  Consequently  they  always  had  a  being  in  the 
Divine  intellect. 

Hyl.   This  I  acknowledge. 

Phil.  By  your  own  confession,  therefore,  nothing 
is  new,  or  begins  to  be,  in  respect  of  the  mind  of  God. 
So  we  are  agreed  in  that  point. 

Hyl.   What  shall  we  make  then  of  the  creation? 

Phil.  May  we  not  understand  it  to  have  been  en- 
tirely in  respect  of  finite  spirits;  so  that  things,  with 
regard  to  us,  may  properly  be  said  to  begin  their  ex- 
istence, or  be  created,  when  God  decreed  they  should 
become  perceptible  to  intelligent  creatures,  in  that 
order  and  manner  which  He  then  established,  and  we 
now  call  the  laws  of  nature?  You  may  call  this  a  re- 
lative, or  hypothetical  existence  if  you  please.  But  so 
long  as  it  supplies  us  with  the  most  natural,  obvious, 
and  literal  sense  of  the  Mosaic  history  of  the  creation  ; 
so  long  as  it  answers  all  the  religious  ends  of  that 
great  article;  in  a  word,  so  long  as  you  can  assign  no 
other  sense  or  meaning  in  its  stead ;  why  should  we 
reject  this?  Is  it  to  comply  with  a  ridiculous  sceptical 
humour  of  making  everything  nonsense  and  unintelli- 
gible? I  am  sure  you  cannot  say  it  is  for  the  glory 
of  God.  For,  allowing  it  to  be  a  thing  possible  and 


124  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

conceivable  that  the  corporeal  world  should  have  an 
absolute  existence  extrinsical  to  the  mind  of  God,  as 
well  as  to  the  minds  of  all  created  spirits ;  yet  how 
could  this  set  forth  e'ther  the  immensity  or  omnis- 
cience of  the  Deity,  or  the  necessary  and  immediate 
dependence  of  all  things  on  Him?  Nay,  would  it  not 
rather  seem  to  derogate  from  those  attributes  ? 

Hyl.  Well,  but  as  to  this  decree  of  God's,  for  mak- 
ing things  perceptible,  what  say  you,  Philonous,  is  it 
not  plain,  God  did  either  execute  that  decree  from  all 
eternity,  or  at  some  certain  time  began  to  will  what 
He  had  not  actually  willed  before,  but  only  designed 
to  will?  If  the  former,  then  there  could  be  no  crea- 
tion or  beginning  of  existence  in  finite  things.  If  the 
latter,  then  we  must  acknowledge  something  new  to 
befall  the  Deity ;  which  implies  a  sort  of  change :  and 
all  change  argues  imperfection. 

Phil.  Pray  consider  what  you  are  doing.  Is  it  not 
evident  this  objection  concludes  equally  against  a 
creation  in  any  sense ;  nay,  against  every  other  act  of 
the  Deity,  discoverable  by  the  light  of  nature?  None 
of  which  can  we  conceive,  otherwise  than  as  performed 
in  time,  and  having  a  beginning.  God  is  a  Being  of 
transcendent  and  unlimited  perfections  :  His  Nature, 
therefore,  is  incomprehensible  to  finite  spirits.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  to  be  expected,  that  any  man,  whether 
Materialist  or  Immaterialisty  should  have  exactly  just 
notions  of  the  Deity,  His  attributes,  and  ways  of  ope- 
ration. If  then  you  would  infer  anything  against  me, 
your  difficulty  must  not  be  drawn  from  the  inadequate- 
ness  of  our  conceptions  of  the  Divine  nature,  which 
is  unavoidable  on  any  scheme,  but  from  the  denial  of 
Matter,  of  which  there  is  not  one  word,  directly  or  in- 
directly, in  what  you  have  now  objected. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  125 

Hyl.  I  must  acknowledge  the  difficulties  you  are 
concerned  to  clear  are  such  only  as  arise  from  the  non- 
existence  of  Matter,  and  are  peculiar  to  that  notion. 
So  far  you  are  in  the  right.  But  I  cannot  by  any 
means  bring  myself  to  think  there  is  no  such  peculiar 
repugnancy  between  the  creation  and  your  opinion : 
though  indeed  where  to  fix  it,  I  do  not  distinctly  know. 

Phil.  What  would  you  have?  Do  I  not  acknowl- 
edge a  twofold  state  of  things,  the  one  ectypal  or  nat- 
ural, the  other  archetypal  and  eternal?  The  former 
was  created  in  time ;  the  latter  existed  from  everlast- 
ing in  the  mind  of  God.  Is  not  this  agreeable  to  the 
common  notions  of  divines?  Or  is  any  more  than 
this  necessary  in  order  to  conceive  the  creation?  But 
you  suspect  some  peculiar  repugnancy,  though  you 
know  not  where  it  lies.  To  take  away  all  possibility 
of  scruple  in  the  case,  do  but  consider  this  one  point. 
Either  you  are  not  able  to  conceive  the  creation  on 
any  hypothesis  whatsoever ;  and,  if  so,  there  is  no 
ground  for  dislike  or  complaint  against  any  particular 
opinion  on  that  score  :  or  you  are  able  to  conceive  it; 
and,  if  so,  why  not  on  my  principles,  since  thereby 
nothing  conceivable  is  taken  away?  You  have  all 
along  been  allowed  the  full  scope  of  sense,  imagina- 
tion, and  reason.  Whatever,  therefore,  you  could  be- 
fore apprehend,  either  immediately  or  mediately  by 
your  senses,  or  by  ratiocination  from  your  senses; 
whatever  you  could  perceive,  imagine,  or  understand, 
remains  still  with  you.  If,  therefore,  the  notion  you 
have  of  the  creation  by  other  principles  be  intelligible, 
you  have  it  still  upon  mine ;  if  it  be  not  intelligible,  I 
conceive  it  to  be  no  notion  at  all ;  and  so  there  is  no 
loss  of  it.  And  indeed  it  seems  to  me  very  plain  that 
the  supposition  of  Matter,  that  is  a  thing  perfectly 


126  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

unknown  and  inconceivable,  cannot  serve  to  make  us 
conceive  anything.  And,  I  hope  it  need  not  be  proved 
to  you  that  if  the  existence  of  Matter  doth  not  make 
the  creation  conceivable,  the  creation's  being  without 
it  inconceivable  can  be  no  objection  against  its  non- 
existence. 

Hyl.  I  confess,  Philonous,  you  have  almost  satisfied 
me  in  this  point  of  the  creation. 

Phil.  I  would  fain  know  why  you  are  not  quite 
satisfied.  You  tell  me  indeed  of  a  repugnancy  be- 
tween the  Mosaic  history  and  Immaterialism  :  but  you 
know  not  where  it  lies.  Is  this  reasonable,  Hylas? 
Can  you  expect  I  should  solve  a  difficulty  without 
knowing  what  it  is?  But,  to  pass  by  all  that,  would 
not  a  man  think  you  were  assured  there  is  no  repug- 
nancy between  the  received  notions  of  Materialists 
and  the  inspired  writings? 

HyL  And  so  I  am. 

Phil.  Ought  the  historical  part  of  Scripture  to  be 
understood  in  a  plain  obvious  sense,  or  in  a  sense 
which  is  metaphysical  and  out  of  the  way  ? 

Hyl.   In  the  plain  sense,  doubtless. 

Phil.  When  Moses  speaks  of  herbs,  earth,  water, 
&c.,  as  having  been  created  by  God ;  think  you  not 
the  sensible  things  commonly  signified  by  those  words 
are  suggested  to  every  unphilosophical  reader? 

Hyl.   I  cannot  help  thinking  so. 

Phil.  And  are  not  all  ideas,  or  things  perceived  by 
sense,  to  be  denied  a  real  existence  by  the  doctrine  of 
the  Materialist? 

Hyl.  This  I  have  already  acknowledged. 

Phil.  The  creation,  therefore,  according  to  them, 
was  not  the  creation  of  things  sensible,  which  have 
only  a  relative  being,  but  of  certain  unknown  natures, 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  127 

which  have  an  absolute  being,  wherein  creation  might 
terminate? 

Hyl.   True. 

Phil.  Is  it  not  therefore  evident  the  assertors  of 
Matter  destroy  the  plain  obvious  sense  of  Moses,  with 
which  their  notions  are  utterly  inconsistent ;  and  in- 
stead of  it  obtrude  on  us  I  know  not  what,  something 
equally  unintelligible  to  themselves  and  me? 

Hyl.    I  cannot  contradict  you. 

Phil.  Moses  tells  us  of  a  creation.  A  creation  of 
what?  of  unknown  quiddities,  of  occasions,  or  sub- 
stratum? No,  certainly;  but  of  things  obvious  to  the 
senses.  You  must  first  reconcile  this  with  your  no- 
tions, if  you  expect  I  should  be  reconciled  to  them. 

Hyl.  I  see  you  can  assault  me  with  my  own  weap- 
ons. 

Phil.  Then  as  to  absolute  existence;  was  there  ever 
known  a  more  jejune  notion  than  that?  Something  it 
is  so  abstracted  and  unintelligible  that  you  have 
frankly  owned  you  could  not  conceive  it,  much  less 
explain  anything  by  it.  But,  allowing  Matter  to  ex- 
ist, and  the  notion  of  absolute  existence  to  be  as  clear 
as  light,  yet,  was  this  ever  known  to  make  the  crea- 
tion more  credible?  Nay,  hath  it  not  furnished  the 
atheists  and  infidels  of  all  ages  with  the  most  plausible 
arguments  against  a  creation?  That  a  corporeal  sub- 
stance, which  hath  an  absolute  existence  without  the 
minds  of  spirits,  should  be  produced  out  of  nothing, 
by  the  mere  will  of  a  Spirit,  hath  been  looked  upon 
as  a  thing  so  contrary  to  all  reason,  so  impossible  and 
absurd,  that  not  only  the  most  celebrated  among  the 
ancients,  but  even  divers  modern  and  Christian  phi- 
losophers have  thought  Matter  co-eternal  with  the 
Deity.  Lay  these  things  together,  and  then  judge 


128  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

you  whether  Materialism  disposes  men  to  believe  the 
creation  of  things. 

Hyl.  I  own,  Philonous,  I  think  it  does  not.  This 
of  the  creation  is  the  last  objection  I  can  think  of; 
and  I  must  needs  own  it  hath  been  sufficiently  an- 
swered as  well  as  the  rest.  Nothing  now  remains  to 
be  overcome  but  a  sort  of  unaccountable  backward- 
ness that  I  find  in  myself  towards  your  notions. 

Phil.  When  a  man  is  swayed,  he  knows  not  why, 
to  one  side  of  the  question,  can  this,  think  you,  be 
anything  else  but  the  effect  of  prejudice,  which  never 
fails  to  attend  old  and  rooted  notions?  And  indeed 
in  this  respect  I  cannot  deny  the  belief  of  Matter  to 
have  very  much  the  advantage  over  the  contrary  opin- 
ion, with  men  of  a  learned  education. 

Hyl.   I  confess  it  seems  to  be  as  you  say. 

Phil.  As  a  balance,  therefore,  to  this  weight  of 
prejudice,  let  us  throw  into  the  scale  the  great  advan- 
tages that  arise  from  the  belief  of  Immaterialism,  both 
in  regard  to  religion  and  human  learning.  The  being 
of  a  God,  and  incorruptibility  of  the  soul,  those  great 
articles  of  religion,  are  they  not  proved  with  the  clear- 
est and  most  immediate  evidence?  When  I  say  the 
being  of  a  God,  I  do  not  mean  an  obscure  general 
cause  of  things,  whereof  we  have  no  conception,  but 
God,  in  the  strict  and  proper  sense  of  the  word;  a 
Being  whose  spirituality,  omnipresence,  providence, 
omniscience,  infinite  power  and  goodness,  are  as  con- 
spicuous as  the  existence  of  sensible  things,  of  which 
(notwithstanding  the  fallacious  pretences  and  affected 
scruples  of  Sceptics)  there  is  no  more  reason  to  doubt 
than  of  our  own  being.  Then,  with  relation  to  human 
sciences :  in  Natural  Philosophy,  what  intricacies, 
what  obscurities,  what  contradictions  hath  the  belief 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  I  2Q 

of  Matter  led  men  into  !  To  say  nothing  of  the  num- 
berless disputes  about  its  extent,  continuity,  homo- 
geneity, gravity,  divisibility,  &c. — do  they  not  pretend 
to  explain  all  things  by  bodies  operating  on  bodies, 
according  to  the  laws  of  motion?  and  yet,  are  they 
able  to  comprehend  how  one  body  should  move  an- 
other? Nay,  admitting  there  was  no  difficulty  in  rec- 
onciling the  notion  of  an  inert  being  with  a  cause,  or 
in  conceiving  how  an  accident  might  pass  from  one 
body  to  another ;  yet,  by  all  their  strained  thoughts 
and  extravagant  suppositions,  have  they  been  able  to 
reach  the  mechanical  production  of  any  one  animal  or 
vegetable  body?  Can  they  account,  by  the  laws  of 
motion,  for  sounds,  tastes,  smells,  or  colours,  or  for 
the  regular  course  of  things?  Have  they  accounted, 
by  physical  principles,  for  the  aptitude  and  contri- 
vance even  of  the  most  inconsiderable  parts  of  the 
universe?  But  laying  aside  Matter  and  corporeal 
causes,  and  admitting  only  the  efficiency  of  an  All- 
perfect  Mind,  are  not  all  the  effects  of  nature  easy 
and  intelligible?  If  the  phenomena  are  nothing  else 
but  ideas;  God  is  a  spirit,  but  Matter  an  unintelligent, 
unperceiving  being.  If  they  demonstrate  an  unlim- 
ited power  in  their  cause ;  God  is  active  and  omnipo- 
tent, but  Matter  an  inert  mass.  If  the  order,  regu- 
larity, and  usefulness  of  them  can  never  be  sufficiently 
admired;  God  is  infinitely  wise  and  provident,  but 
Matter  destitute  of  all  contrivance  and  design.  These 
surely  are  great  advantages  in  physics.  Not  to  mention 
that  the  apprehension  of  a  distant  Deity  naturally  dis- 
poses men  to  a  negligence  of  their  moral  actions, 
which  they  would  be  more  cautious  of,  in  case  they 
thought  him  immediately  present,  and  acting  on  their 
minds,  without  the  interposition  of  Matter,  or  un- 


J3O  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

thinking  second  causes.  Then  in  metaphysics:  what 
difficulties  concerning  entity  in  abstract,  substantial 
forms,  hylarchic  principles,  plastic  natures,  substance 
and  accident,  principle  of  individuation,  possibility  of 
Matter's  thinking,  origin  of  ideas,  the  manner  how 
two  independent  substances  so  widely  different  as 
Spirit  and  Matter,  should  mutually  operate  on  each 
other?  what  difficulties,  I  say,  and  endless  disquisi- 
tions, concerning  these  and  innumerable  other  the 
like  points,  do  we  escape,  by  supposing  only  Spirits 
and  ideas?  Even  the  mathematics  themselves,  if  we 
take  away  the  absolute  existence  of  extended  things, 
become  much  more  clear  and  easy ;  the  most  shock- 
ing paradoxes  and  intricate  speculations  in  those  sci- 
ences depending  on  the  infinite  divisibility  of  finite 
extension,  which  depends  on  that  supposition. — But 
what  need  is  there  to  insist  on  the  particular  sciences? 
Is  not  that  opposition  to  all  science  whatsoever,  that 
frenzy  of  the  ancient  and  modern  Sceptics,  built  on 
the  same  foundation?  Or  can  you  produce  so  much 
as  one  argument  against  the  reality  of  corporeal  things 
or  in  behalf  of  that  avowed  utter  ignorance  of  their 
natures,  which  doth  not  suppose  their  reality  to  con- 
sist in  an  external  absolute  existence?  Upon  this  sup- 
position, indeed,  the  objections  from  the  change  of 
colours  in  a  pigeon's  neck,  or  the  appearance  of  the 
broken  oar  in  the  water,  must  be  allowed  to  have 
weight.  But  these  and  the  like  objections  vanish,  if 
we  do  not  maintain  the  being  of  absolute  external 
originals,  but  place  the  reality  of  things  in  ideas,  fleet- 
ing indeed,  and  changeable ;  however,  not  changed 
at  random,  but  according  to  the  fixed  order  of  nature. 
For,  herein  consists  that  constancy  and  truth  of  things 
which  secures  all  the  concerns  of  life,  and  distin- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  131 

guishes  that  which  is  real  from  the  irregular  visions 
of  the  fancy. 

Hyl.  I  agree  to  all  you  have  now  said,  and  must 
own  that  nothing  can  incline  me  to  embrace  your 
opinion  more  than  the  advantages  I  see  it  is  attended 
with.  I  am  by  nature  lazy;  and  this  would  be  a  mighty 
abridgment  in  knowledge.  What  doubts,  what  hy- 
potheses, what  labyrinths  of  amusement,  what  fields 
of  disputation,  what  an  ocean  of  false  learning  may  be 
avoided  by  that  single  notion  of  Immaterialism! 

Phil.  After  all,  is  there  anything  farther  remaining 
to  be  done?  You  may  remember  you  promised  to 
embrace  that  opinion  which  upon  examination  should 
appear  most  agreeable  to  Common  Sense  and  remote 
from  Scepticism.  This,  by  your  own  confession,  is 
that  which  denies  Matter,  or  the  absolute  existence  of 
corporeal  things.  Nor  is  this  all ;  the  same  notion 
has  been  proved  several  ways,  viewed  in  different 
lights,  pursued  in  its  consequences,  and  all  objections 
against  it  cleared.  Can  there  be  a  greater  evidence 
of  its  truth?  or  is  it  possible  it  should  have  all  the 
marks  of  a  true  opinion  and  yet  be  false? 

Hyl.  I  own  myself  entirely  satisfied  for  the  present 
in  all  respects.  But,  what  security  can  I  have  that  I 
shall  still  continue  the  same  full  assent  to  your  opin- 
ion, and  that  no  unthought-of  objection  or  difficulty 
will  occur  hereafter? 

Phil.  Pray,  Hylas,  do  you  in  other  cases,  when  a 
point  is  once  evidently  proved,  withhold  your  consent 
on  account  of  objections  or  difficulties  it  may  be  liable 
to?  Are  the  difficulties  that  attend  the  doctrine  of  in- 
commensurable quantities,  of  the  angle  of  contact,  of 
the  asymptotes  to  curves,  or  the  like,  sufficient  to 
make  you  hold  out  against  mathematical  demonstra- 


132  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

tion?  Or  will  you  disbelieve  the  Providence  of  God, 
because  there  may  be  some  particular  things  which 
you  know  not  how  to  reconcile  with  it?  If  there  are 
difficulties  attending  fmmaterialism,  there  are  at  the 
same  time  direct  and  evident  proofs  of  it.  But  for  the 
existence  of  Matter  there  is  not  one  proof,  and  far  more 
numerous  and  insurmountable  objections  lie  against 
it.  But  where  are  those  mighty  difficulties  you  insist 
on?  Alas!  you  know  not  where  or  what  they  are; 
something  which  may  possibly  occur  hereafter.  If 
this  be  a  sufficient  pretence  for  withholding  your  full 
assent,  you  should  never  yield  it  to  any  proposition, 
how  free  soever  from  exceptions,  how  clearly  and 
solidly  soever  demonstrated. 

Hyl.  You  have  satisfied  me,  Philonous. 

Phil,  But,  to  arm  you  against  all  future  objections, 
do  but  consider,  that  which  bears  equally  hard  on  two 
contradictory  opinions  can  be  proof  against  neither. 
Whenever,  therefore,  any  difficulty  occurs,  try  if  you 
can  find  a  solution  for  it  on  the  hypothesis  of  the  Ma- 
terialists. Be  not  deceived  by  words ;  but  sound  your 
own  thoughts.  And  in  case  you  cannot  conceive  it 
easier  by  the  help  of  Materialism,  it  is  plain  it  can  be 
no  objection  against  Immaterialism.  Had  you  pro- 
ceeded all  along  by  this  rule,  you  would  probably  have 
spared  yourself  abundance  of  trouble  in  objecting ; 
since  of  all  your  difficulties  I  challenge  you  to  shew 
one  that  is  explained  by  Matter:  nay,  which  is  not 
more  unintelligible  with  than  without  that  supposi- 
tion, and  consequently  makes  rather  against  than  for 
it.  You  should  consider,  in  each  particular,  whether 
the  difficulty  arises  from  the  non-existence  of  Matter. 
If  it  doth  not,  you  might  as  well  argue  from  the  in- 
finite divisibility  of  extension  against  the  Divine  pre- 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  133 

science,  as  from  such  a  difficulty  against  Immaterial- 
ism.  And  yet,  upon  recollection,  I  believe  you  will 
find  this  to  have  been  often  if  not  always  the  case. 
You  should  likewise  take  heed  not  to  argue  on  a  petitio 
principii.  One  is  apt  to  say,  the  unknown  substances 
ought  to  be  esteemed  real  things,  rather  than  the 
ideas  in  our  minds :  and  who  can  tell  but  the  unthink- 
ing external  substance  may  concur  as  a  cause  or  in- 
strument in  the  productions  of  our  ideas?  But,  is  not 
this  proceeding  on  a  supposition  that  there  are  such  ex- 
ternal substances?  And  to  suppose  this,  is  it  not  beg- 
ging the  question?  But,  above  all  things,  you  should 
beware  of  imposing  on  yourself  by  that  vulgar  sophism 
which  is  called  ignoratio  elenchi.  You  talked  often  as 
if  you  thought  I  maintained  the  non-existence  of  Sen- 
sible Things :  whereas  in  truth  no  one  can  be  more 
thoroughly  assured  of  their  existence  than  I  am :  and 
it  is  you  who  doubt ;  I  should  have  said,  positively 
deny  it.  Everything  that  is  seen,  felt,  heard,  or  any 
way  perceived  by  the  senses,  is,  on  the  principles  I 
embrace,  a  real  being,  but  not  on  yours.  Remember, 
the  Matter  you  contend  for  is  an  unknown  somewhat 
(if  indeed  it  may  be  termed  somewhaf),  which  is  quite 
stripped  of  all  sensible  qualities,  and  can  neither  be 
perceived  by  sense,  nor  apprehended  by  the  mind. 
Remember,  I  say,  that  it  is  not  any  object  which  is 
hard  or  soft,  hot  or  cold,  blue  or  white,  round  or 
square,  &c. ; — for  all  these  things  I  affirm  do  exist. 
Though  indeed  I  deny  they  have  an  existence  distinct 
from  being  perceived ;  or  that  they  exist  out  of  all 
minds  whatsoever.  Think  on  these  points ;  let  them 
be  attentively  considered  and  still  kept  in  view.  Other- 
wise you  will  not  comprehend  the  state  of  the  ques- 
tion; without  which  your  objections  will  always  be 


134  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

wide  of  the  mark,  and  instead  of  mine,  may  possibly 
be  directed  (as  more  than  once  they  have  been)  against 
your  own  notions. 

Hyl.  I  must  needs  own,  Philonous,  nothing  seems 
to  have  kept  me  from  agreeing  with  you  more  than 
this  same  mistaking  the  question.  In  denying  Matter, 
at  first  glimpse  I  am  tempted  to  imagine  you  deny 
the  things  we  see  and  feel :  but,  upon  reflexion,  find 
there  is  no  ground  for  it.  What  think  you,  therefore, 
of  retaining  the  name  Matter,  and  applying  it  to  sen- 
sible things?  This  may  be  done  without  any  change 
in  your  sentiments :  and,  believe  me,  it  would  be  a 
means  of  reconciling  them  to  some  persons  who  may 
be  more  shocked  at  an  innovation  in  words  than  in 
opinion. 

Phil.  With  all  my  heart :  retain  the  word  Matter, 
and  apply  it  to  the  objects  of  sense,  if  you  please  ; 
provided  you  do  not  attribute  to  them  any  subsistence 
distinct  from  their  being  perceived.  I  shall  never 
quarrel  with  you  for  an  expression.  Matter,  or  ma- 
terial substance,  are  terms  introduced  by  philosophers ; 
and,  as  used  by  them,  imply  a  sort  of  independency, 
or  a  subsistence  distinct  from  being  perceived  by  a 
mind:  but  are  never  used  by  common  people;  or,  if 
ever,  it  is  to  signify  the  immediate  objects  of  sense. 
One  would  think,  therefore,  so  long  as  the  names  of 
all  particular  things,  with  the  terms  sensible,  substance, 
body,  stuff,  and  the  like,  are  retained,  the  word  Matter 
should  be  never  missed  in  common  talk.  And  in  phil- 
osophical discourses  it  seems  the  best  way  to  leave  it 
quite  out :  since  there  is  not,  perhaps,  any  one  thing 
that  hath  more  favoured  and  strengthened  the  de- 
praved bent  of  the  mind  towards  Atheism  than  the 
use  of  that  general  confused  term. 


BETWEEN  HYLAS  AND  PHILONOUS.  1 35 

HyL  Well  but,  Philonous,  since  I  am  content  to 
give  up  the  notion  of  an  unthinking  substance  exterior 
to  the  mind,  I  think  you  ought  not  to  deny  me  the 
privilege  of  using  the  word  Matter  as  I  please,  and 
annexing  it  to  a  collection  of  sensible  qualities  sub- 
sisting only  in  the  mind.  I  freely  own  there  is  no 
other  substance,  in  a  strict  sense,  than  Spirit.  But  I 
have  been  so  long  accustomed  to  the  term  Matter  that 
I  know  not  how  to  part  with  it.  To  say,  there  is  no 
Matter  in  the  World,  is  still  shocking  to  me.  Whereas 
to  say  There  is  no  Matter,  if  by  that  term  be  meant 
an  unthinking  substance  existing  without  the  mind ; 
but  if  by  Matter  is  meant  some  sensible  thing,  whose 
existence  consists  in  being  perceived,  then  there  is 
Matter: — this  distinction  gives  it  quite  another  turn  ; 
and  men  will  come  into  your  notions  with  small  diffi- 
culty, when  they  are  proposed  in  that  manner.  For, 
after  all,  the  controversy  about  Matter  in  the  strict 
acceptation  of  it,  lies  together  between  you  and  the 
philosophers :  whose  principles,  I  acknowledge,  are 
not  near  so  natural,  or  so  agreeable  to  the  common 
sense  of  mankind,  and  Holy  Scripture,  as  yours. 
There  is  nothing  we  either  desire  or  shun  but  as  it 
makes,  or  is  apprehended  to  make,  some  part  of  our 
happiness  or  misery.  But  what  hath  happiness  or 
misery,  joy  or  grief,  pleasure  or  pain,  to  do  with  Ab- 
solute Existence  ;  or  with  unknown  entities,  abstracted 
from  all  relation  to  us?  It  is  evident,  things  regard 
us  only  as  they  are  pleasing  or  displeasing :  and  they 
can  please  or  displease  only  so  far  forth  as  they  are 
perceived.  Farther,  therefore,  we  are  not  concerned ; 
and  thus  far  you  leave  things  as  you  found  them.  Yet 
still  there  is  something  new  in  this  doctrine.  It  is 
plain,  I  do  not  now  think  with  the  philosophers,  nor 


136  THE  THIRD  DIALOGUE 

yet  altogether  with  the  vulgar.  I  would  know  how 
the  case  stands  in  that  respect ;  precisely,  what  you 
have  added  to,  or  altered  in  my  former  notions. 

Phil.  I  do  not  pretend  to  be  a  setter-up  of  new 
notions.  My  endeavours  tend  only  to  unite  and  place 
in  a  clearer  light  that  truth  which  was  before  shared 
between  the  vulgar  and  the  philosophers  : — the  former 
being  of  opinion,  that  those  things  they  immediately  per- 
ceive are  the  real  things;  and  the  latter,  that  the  things 
immediately  perceived  are  ideas  which  exist  only  in  the 
mind.  Which  two  notions  put  together,  do,  in  effect, 
constitute  the  substance  of  what  I  advance. 

Hyl.  I  have  been  a  long  time  distrusting  my 
senses;  methought  I  saw  things  by  a  dim  light  and 
through  false  glasses.  Now  the  glasses  are  removed 
and  a  new  light  breaks  in  upon  my  understanding.  I 
am  clearly  convinced  that  I  see  things  in  their  native 
forms,  and  am  no  longer  in  pain  about  their  unknown 
natures  or  absolute  existence.  This  is  the  state  I  find 
myself  in  at  present ;  though,  indeed,  the  course  that 
brought  me  to  it  I  do  not  yet  thoroughly  comprehend. 
You  set  out  upon  the  same  principles  that  Academics, 
Cartesians,  and  the  like  sects  usually  do,  and  for  a 
long  time  it  looked  as  if  you  were  advancing  their 
Philosophical  Scepticism ;  but,  in  the  end,  your  con- 
clusions are  directly  opposite  to  theirs. 

Phil.  You  see,  Hylas,  the  water  of  yonder  foun- 
tain, how  it  is  forced  upwards,  in  a  round  column,  to 
a  certain  height ;  at  which  it  breaks,  and  falls  back 
into  the  basin  from  whence  it  rose  :  its  ascent  as  well 
as  descent  proceeding  from  the  same  uniform  law  or 
principle  of  gravitation.  Just  so,  the  same  principles 
which,  at  first  view,  lead  to  Scepticism,  pursued  to  a 
certain  point,  bring  men  back  to  Common  Sense. 


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a  Systematic  Arrangement  of  Knowledge.  Paul  Carus.  soc, 
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43-     THE  GOSPEL  ACCORDING  TO  DARWIN.    Woods  Hutchinson. 
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KNOWLEDGE.     George  Berkeley.     250,  mailed  310.    (is.  6d.) 

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5oc,  mailed  s8c.  (23.  6d.) 

53.  KANT'S   PROLEGOMENA  to  any   Future  Metaphysics.     Edited 

by  Dr.  Paul  Carus.     soc,  mailed  sgc.     (23.  6d.) 

54  ST.  ANSELM:  PROSLOGIUM;  MONOLOGIUM;  AN  APPEN- 
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57.  THE  METAPHYSICAL   SYSTEM   OF  HOBBES,    as  contained 

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59.  THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   DESCARTES'   PHILOSOPHY.    Bene- 

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The  Monist  Advocates  the . 
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Which  is  an  application  of  the  scientific  method  to 
philosophy.  The  old  philosophical  systems  were 
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built  in  the  realm  of  pure  thought.  The  Philosophy 
of  Science  is  a  systematization  of  positive  facts;  it 
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assumptions,  and  on  the  other  hand,  to  the  scepticism 
of  negation  which  finds  expression  in  the  agnostic 
tendencies  of  to-day. 

Monism  Means  a  Unitary 
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There  may  be  different  aspects  and  even  contrasts, 
diverse  views  and  opposite  standpoints,  but  there  can 
never  be  contradiction  in  truth.  Monism  is  not  a 
one-substance  theory,  be  it  materialistic  or  spiritual- 
istic or  agnostic;  it  means  simply  and  solely  CON- 
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any  dualism  of  irreconcilable  statements  indicates 
that  there  is  a  problem  to  be  solved;  there  must  be 
fault  somewhere  either  in  our  reasoning  or  in  our 
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